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Th   e Doha Round is the longest-running trade liberalization negotiation in the postwar era. Despite its 
longevity, the end is not yet in sight as parties disagree on the depth of liberalization necessary in agriculture 
and nonagricultural market access (NAMA). Th   is rift is prolonging the Round’s completion and hindering 
the discussion of other important issues on the negotiating agenda, particularly services. To shed light on 
the debate concerning the beneﬁ  ts from Doha, this paper ﬁ  rst estimates, using three metrics, the potential 
gains from liberalization in agriculture and NAMA resulting from the speciﬁ  c “modalities” set forth in papers 
drafted by the chairs of the Doha negotiating groups. Next, the study estimates the beneﬁ  ts that could result 
from sector initiatives in chemicals, electronic/electrical goods, and environmental goods that go beyond 
the tariﬀ   cuts outlined in the negotiating modalities. Finally, prospective gains from liberalization of services 
barriers and improvements in trade facilitation are also analyzed. Overall, we estimate that the boost to global 
exports from concluding the Doha Round could range between $180 billion and $520 billion annually. 
Likewise, the potential GDP gains are signiﬁ  cant, between $300 billion and $700 billion annually, and well 
balanced between developed and developing countries.
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INTRODUCTION
Th   e Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which began in November 2001, will soon mark 
its eighth birthday, making it the longest-running negotiation in the postwar era. And the end is not 
yet in sight. Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) continue to diﬀ  er on the depth of 
liberalization required in the areas of agriculture and nonagricultural market access (NAMA), thus 
hindering the discussion of other important issues on the negotiating agenda, particularly services. To 
date, the negotiating groups have elaborated general formulas for cutting tariﬀ  s and reducing agricultural 
subsidies but diﬀ  er sharply on how countries could limit or exempt certain products from these “formula 
cuts.” Negotiations on services have barely progressed from the initial oﬀ  ers put on the table years ago, 
but talks on other issues are well advanced, including the agreement on trade facilitation measures and 
rules on the transparency of regional trading arrangements (already implemented on a provisional basis).
Doha participants have diﬀ  erent assessments on what has been accomplished to date. Some see the 
glass mostly full, with the formulas providing the backbone of liberalization commitments. Others worry 
that “ﬂ  exibilities” to exclude products from formula cuts will turn the backbone into a rubber hose and 
substantially water down the commercial value of a deal. To some, the prospective deal is signiﬁ  cant; to 
others, the deal seems a close approximation of the status quo and not worth doing.
Th   e Doha Round needs to be completed for two key reasons. Th  e  ﬁ  rst is to implement the tariﬀ   and 
subsidy reforms embedded in the draft texts developed to date and pocket the gains already substantially 
agreed to. Th   e second is to ensure the viability of the rules-based multilateral trading system. If 
multilateral solutions are put on hold, national governments—pressed by their domestic constituencies—
will look elsewhere to resolve trade and investment problems, either through unilateral measures or 
through bilateral and regional trade pacts. Failure in the Doha Round would cause irreparable harm to 
the WTO’s credibility as a negotiating forum, which would, over time, undermine its valuable dispute 
settlement mechanism. 
A failure scenario is especially worrisome given the frailty of the global recovery from the 
ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis and the possibility that a double dip recession will deliver prolonged high 
unemployment, resulting in pressures for more protection. Aware of this possibility, leaders of the Group 
of 8 (G-8) and the Group of 5 (G-5) at the G-8 Summit in July 2009 committed to concluding the 
Doha Round in 2010, citing a successful Round as one means of reviving the global economy.1 A few 
weeks later, member countries of the Asia Paciﬁ  c Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum also pledged to 
complete the Round by that deadline.2
Th   e key to completing the Doha Round is to achieve meaningful cuts in trade barriers in 
1. G-8 Summit, 2009, “Promoting the Global Agenda,” available at www.g8italia2009.it (accessed on July 24, 2009). 
2. “APEC Ministers Push to Wrap Up Doha 2010 Talks,” Agence France Presse, July 21, 2009. 3
agriculture, NAMA, and services and to restrain recourse by major trading nations—developed or 
developing—to the ample “ﬂ  exibilities” allowed by the modalities. In other words, what counts is what 
the major trading countries agree to in their schedules on speciﬁ  c products and sectors in goods and 
services. Who are these countries? Overall, we consider participants in the G-20 summit process to have 
self-selected themselves for this leadership role in the Doha Round.
To shed light on the debate concerning the beneﬁ  ts from Doha, we ﬁ  rst estimate the potential gains 
from the liberalization in agriculture and NAMA resulting from the speciﬁ  c terms of modalities in papers 
drafted by the chairs of the Doha negotiating groups. We calculate the gains from formula cuts in trade 
barriers using three metrics:
   Reciprocity measure: Th   is metric calculates the change in revenue from tariﬀ   cuts in 
agriculture and NAMA and the revenue equivalent of concessions on nontariﬀ   barriers 
(NTBs), namely agricultural tariﬀ   quotas, domestic support, and export subsidies. Using this 
metric, concessions received are expressed in terms of tariﬀ  s and tariﬀ   equivalent costs not paid 
by exporting countries. Concessions given are expressed in terms of tariﬀ  s and tariﬀ  -equivalent 
barriers forgone by importing countries.
   Trade gains: Th   is metric indicates the increased trade that results from the tariﬀ   cuts and 
tariﬀ   equivalent of concessions on NTBs calculated in the reciprocity measure. Trade gains are 
separately stated for exports and imports. 
   GDP gains: Th   is metric builds on the calculated trade gains by applying a GDP coeﬃ   cient to 
increased exports and imports. It is important to remember that large exports and imports both 
contribute to higher GDP through lower consumer prices, more variety, greater productivity, 
and improved allocation of resources (Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer 2005).
We clearly indicate the three metrics in the section headings and italicize them throughout the text.
Next, we estimate the beneﬁ  ts that could result from sector initiatives in chemicals, information 
technology (IT) goods, and environmental goods that go beyond the liberalization that would result 
from the formula tariﬀ   cuts. We also calculate prospective gains from a 10 percent reduction by major 
trading nations in barriers to their imports of services. Th   e 10 percent benchmark, which is arbitrary but 
optimistic, would yield large gains for both developed and developing countries. Finally, we estimate the 
beneﬁ  ts from enhanced trade facilitation measures, drawing on prior analyses by John Wilson, Catherine 
Mann, and Tsunehiro Otsuki (2005). In each of these sections, we calculate both trade gains and GDP 
gains.
Th   roughout the study, we consider that both exports and imports deliver trade gains. Politicians 
and unions often take a mercantilist approach to trade: Exports are good and imports are bad. However, 
imports can result in large gains for the buying nation as well. Imports beneﬁ  t consumers in three 4
ways: Th   ey deliver lower prices, better quality, and greater variety. Consumers are not just individuals; 
industries are consumers as well, and they beneﬁ  t from imports in the same ways. For example, greater 
variety allows industrial ﬁ  rms to “right size” their purchased inputs. Moreover, domestic ﬁ  rms learn from 
import competition: Often they boost their own productivity and improve the quality of their product 
lines. Leading exporting ﬁ  rms are often big importers.
Table 1 summarizes the trade gains we have calculated for the 22 countries in our sample. Th  ese 
countries account for about three-quarters of world merchandise trade and 88 percent of global GDP. 
Total gains from what is “on the table” in agriculture and NAMA would be an increase in exports of $54 
billion among the sample countries. Trade between these 22 countries (exports of the 22 countries to the 
sample) would increase by another $40 billion from a 10 percent liberalization of services barriers and by 
a further $50 billion from the three sector initiatives. In turn, the trade growth in table 1 (exports and 
imports) would yield GDP gains for the 22 countries of $100 billion due to the modalities currently on 
the table in agriculture and NAMA (table 2). Bold new initiatives on liberalizing services and freeing trade 
in selective sectors would further increase GDP by an additional $100 billion each. Improvements in 
trade facilitation could yield additional GDP gains of $385 billion, if governments engage in wide-ranging 
policy and administrative reforms.
In sum, the Doha deal “on the table” would boost global GDP by $114 billion; if modestly “topped 
up” with additional liberalization in services and manufactures, the value of the Doha package triples to 
$341 billion.3 
Th   e United States would reap small trade gains in agriculture and NAMA (export and import gains 
of $6 billion and $14.3 billion, respectively). Th   is result is not surprising since the United States already 
has free trade agreements or low barriers with many of the other 21 countries and explains why the deal 
on modalities has not attracted active support by US pro-trade constituencies. To acquire that support, 
the deal should be supplemented, particularly in services, which could add $10.8 billion and $3.5 billion, 
respectively, in export and import gains. In addition, “topping up” NAMA in several sectors could yield 
further gains ($6.1 billion and $5.5 billion, respectively, in exports and imports). Combined, we estimate 
US export gains of $22.9 billion and US import gains of $23.3 billion from a Doha deal with modest 
“top-ups.” Th  e  resulting  GDP gains would be $38.7 billion.
Th   e European Union stands to gain more from agriculture and NAMA reforms because its current 
barriers are higher. Th   e formula cuts produce EU export and import gains of $9.2 billion and 
$26.3 billion, respectively, generating GDP gains of $35 billion—the largest gains incurred by any 
3. Th   ese numbers were calculated scaling up the GDP gains of the 22 countries. Since GDP gains for the 22 countries in 
agriculture and NAMA are $100 billion, and these 22 countries account for 88 percent of global GDP, we estimate that 
global GDP gains will be ($100 billion/88)*100 = $114 billion.5
of the six major trading nations. EU trade gains from services reform ($10.8 billion and $5.2 billion, 
respectively, in exports and imports) and from NAMA top-ups ($10.4 billion and $4.7 billion) are 
roughly comparable to the US results and would yield an additional $15 billion in GDP gains each. It is 
interesting to note that the European Union would be one of the main beneﬁ  ciaries of a sector agreement 
in environmental goods. 
Japanese trade gains are most notable in NAMA, where exports will increase by $6.7 billion and 
imports by $2.5 billion, and in services, with exports increasing by $2.7 billion and imports by 
$3.5 billion. In the three “top-up” sectors, Japan has barely any import gains, but gains can be signiﬁ  cant 
on the export side, notably a $6.5 billion increase in electronics and electrical goods. Th  e  total  GDP gains 
for Japan are smaller than those of the European Union and the United States in absolute numbers, but 
in relative terms, Japan is in line with the two other major nations (0.18 percent of GDP for formula 
tariﬀ   cuts, 0.09 percent for services, and 0.14 percent for NAMA “top-ups”).
As a result of liberalization undertaken in its WTO accession process, China has low tariﬀ   barriers 
in NAMA relative to other developing countries. Because its applied rates are already low, China could 
aﬀ  ord to cut them further without signiﬁ  cantly changing its competitive position. China’s agriculture and 
NAMA trade gains are concentrated on the export side, with gains of $14.3 billion, about twice as large 
as its import gains. Conversely, its gains from services reform are predominantly on the import side 
($14.3 billion in imports versus $3.7 billion in exports). NAMA top-ups would yield greater balance 
between China’s export and import gains, if additional reforms are made in the electronic and electrical 
goods sectors. Combined, liberalization of goods and services would boost Chinese GDP by more than 
$60 billion.
India’s trade gains from both the formula cuts and Doha top-ups are much more muted, with the 
notable exception of import gains on services ($10.5 billion). Liberalization of services would generate 
an increase of more than $22 billion (or 2 percent) to Indian GDP and account for about two-thirds of 
India’s GDP gains from an expanded Doha accord. 
Brazil’s trade gains are most prominent in exports of agriculture ($2 billion) and imports of services 
($2.8 billion) and electronics and electrical goods ($3.9 billion). Formula cuts would boost Brazilian 
GDP by about $9 billion; services reforms would yield beneﬁ  ts of a similar magnitude. Including NAMA 
top-ups, Brazil could see a GDP increase of more than $33 billion (about 2.5 percent of GDP).
WTO members expect that the ﬁ  nal deal should provide relatively larger beneﬁ  ts for developing 
countries if Doha is to meet its goal of being a “development round.” Overall, we ﬁ  nd this to be the case.
In absolute numbers, trade gains in agriculture are larger for developed countries ($7.6 billion 
and $19.2 billion in exports and imports, respectively) than for developing countries ($6.4 billion and 
$1.4 billion). In NAMA, gains for the two country groups are of similar magnitude, but developing 6
countries gain more on the export side ($22.8 billion for exports versus $16.1 billion for imports), 
whereas developed countries gain more in imports ($29.5 billion in imports versus $17.6 billion in 
exports). Still, GDP gains from agriculture and NAMA formula cuts for developing countries amount 
to 0.30 percent of GDP ($31 billion), almost double the percentage increase for developed countries 
(0.18 percent, $68 billion). 
In services, in a 10 percent liberalization scenario, the trade gains for developing countries are higher 
than for developed countries both in exports ($27.9 billion and $15 billion for developing and developed, 
respectively) and in imports ($40.9 billion and $14.8 billion, respectively). GDP gains for developing 
countries reach $66 billion (0.66 percent of GDP) compared with $34 billion for developed countries 
(0.09 percent of GDP). 
In the three NAMA top-ups, the additional increase in trade from sector tariﬀ   cuts above the 
NAMA formula cuts is roughly equal for developing and developed countries on the export side, 
but developing countries gain more in imports. GDP gains, when all three sectors are liberalized, total 
$71 billion for developing countries (0.69 percent) and $32 billion for developed countries 
(0.08 percent). 
As for trade facilitation (where the numbers are less rigorous), trade gains for developed countries 
exceed those for developing countries, both in exports and imports. However, this result is biased by 
the methodology,4 and in percentage terms GDP gains for developing countries are greater. Developing 
countries might expect GDP gains of 1.48 percent ($153 billion), while the GDP increase for developed 
countries might reach 0.61 percent ($232 billion). 
We suspect that table 1 and the numbers discussed throughout this introduction will prove 
disconcerting to many readers: For the 22 countries, import gains across the board are larger than export 
gains! Th   is, however, is no cause for alarm; the disparity between import and export gains is created by 
our data methods—not by poor bargaining on the part of our sample countries. We only cover tariﬀ   data 
on imports by the 22 sample countries. Th   is means, for example, that we cover imports by the United 
States (a sample country) from, say, Vietnam (not a sample country), but we do not include exports by 
the United States to Vietnam. Th   erefore, import gains are routinely larger than export gains. Th  roughout 
the rest of this paper we rely on these unbalanced calculations because they are the most accurate that 
our data methods can generate. In table 3, however, we display a modiﬁ  ed version of table 1 with rough 
calculations of exports to the world by the 22 countries. When this rough adjustment is made, import 
and export gains for the 22 countries are far more equal.
4. We use a conservative method that applied the OECD coeﬃ   cient of increased trade due to trade facilitation 
improvements to all countries in the sample, including developing countries. Th  e  OECD  coeﬃ   cient, however, is lower 
than the estimated coeﬃ   cient for developing countries.7
Overall, we ﬁ  nd the prospective results from what has already been done in the Doha Round to 
be signiﬁ  cant but not suﬃ   cient to marshal the requisite political support to close the deal and ensure 
its ratiﬁ  cation by member countries. We conclude that the “potential” exists for a good outcome in 
the Doha Round based on conservative assumptions as to how the major trading nations will use 
“ﬂ  exibilities” in crafting their schedules of national commitments. In the text that follows, we summarize 
the potential aggregate gains and the resulting scorecard for ﬁ  ve key players: the United States, the 
European Union, Brazil, India, and China.
Th   is working paper does not include an assessment of prospective results from the negotiating group 
on rules. Some of this work has already been implemented on a provisional basis (regarding regional 
trading arrangements). Disciplines on ﬁ  sh subsidies remain a work in progress and should add to the 
value of the overall package. With respect to antidumping procedures, we believe that the negotiations 
will leave intact nearly all current practices and rulings by the Appellate Body. 
AGRICULTURE AND NONAGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS (NAMA)
Data and Methodology
Our dataset, provided by the WTO, covers 22 countries, 7 developed and 15 developing.5 In 2008 these 
countries accounted for 73 percent of world exports and 76 percent of world imports. Fourteen of the 
countries are G-20 summit participants.6 Th   ese 14 account for 91 percent of G-20 exports to the world 
and 96 percent of G-20 imports from the world (table 4). 
Th   e dataset contains, for each of these countries, the bound, most favored nation (MFN) applied, 
and, where applicable, preferential duty rates in 2006 for all tariﬀ   lines of traded goods at the 2-digit level 
of the HS code.7 Our methodology is detailed in appendix B. Th   e tables give weighted averages of bound 
and applied tariﬀ   rates. However, trade-weighted averages miss an important reform contemplated in the 
Doha Round—namely downward harmonization of rates. Sharp reductions in tariﬀ   peaks are masked by 
aggregate numbers on bound or applied tariﬀ   rate cuts, but the reduction of peaks is especially important 
in agriculture. Th   at is why negotiators worry about “special” and “sensitive” products, categories that 
encompass goods with peak tariﬀ  s that importing countries are very reluctant to cut. 
5. Th   e 7 developed countries are: Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the United 
States. Th   e 15 developing nations are: Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Africa, Taiwan, Th  ailand,  and  Turkey.
6. Th   e countries in our sample that are also part of the G-20 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the 
European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, and the United States. 
Th   e G-20 summit members should not be confused with the G-20 developing-country caucus that was created just prior 
to the Cancun WTO ministerial in 2003 and coordinates the agricultural trade positions of its members in Doha Round 
talks. 
7. HS stands for the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. Th   e level of detail goes to 8 digits and for 
some countries to 10 digits.8
Results for Agriculture
Th   e agricultural negotiations seek to eliminate export subsidies, sharply reduce tariﬀ  s and domestic farm 
subsidies, and expand tariﬀ   quotas. In this paper, we do not go into the details of the commitments for 
each product line but rather summarize the overall gains in agriculture for selected countries. 
Table 5 shows the trade-weighted average bound and applied tariﬀ   rates, both pre- and post-Doha, 
for the sample group of all 22 countries and for 6 major trading nations that we will discuss in more 
detail: Brazil, China, India, the European Union, Japan, and the United States. For the group of all 
22 countries, bound rates will be decreased from 25 to 18.2 percent. Th   e US average pre-Doha bound 
rate is quite low, 3 percent, and will be reduced to 1.6 percent. Th   e European Union has a higher average 
pre-Doha bound rate, 7.8 percent, but commits to a cut of almost half, bringing the post-Doha bound 
rate down to 4.2 percent. Among the leading developed countries, Japan has the highest average pre-
Doha bound rate, 10.7 percent, which will be cut to 4.5 percent, a level similar to the EU post-Doha 
bound rate. 
Th   e largest cuts in percentage point terms come from the three developing countries. India has a 
particularly high average pre-Doha bound rate (167 percent), which will be reduced by 36.6 percentage 
points to 130.4 percent. Th   is is by far the largest cut in average bound rates, but the post-Doha average 
is still remarkably high. Brazil commits to cut its average bound rate by 9.6 percentage points, from an 
initial level of 40.6 percent to a new level of 31 percent. Th   ese large cuts in bound rates for developing 
countries reﬂ  ect high pre-Doha bound rates in agriculture and show the workings of the Swiss formula 
for cutting tariﬀ  s.8
Tables A1 and A2 in appendix A show details of the pre- and post-Doha bound rates and the cuts 
in percentage points, respectively, for bilateral trade between selected country groups and individual 
countries. Particularly steep reductions can be observed in the rates applied to imports of agricultural 
goods by most developing countries from least developed countries (LDCs) and from China. 
Cuts in bound rates may not create new opportunities for trade because the new bound rates are still 
higher than the old applied rates. However, bound rates are important because they lock in liberalization 
and provide insurance against large doses of new protection in the future via increases in applied rates. 
Although this gain is not quantiﬁ  able, it is an important beneﬁ  t of the Doha Round.
As a result of substantial unilateral liberalization over the past two decades, many developing 
countries impose tariﬀ  s at levels well below their WTO bound rates. Th   ose countries have the right to 
raise such tariﬀ  s at any time without violating their obligations to other WTO members, and they value 
that ﬂ  exibility. In eﬀ  ect, countries that apply tariﬀ  s below their bound rates can have recourse to a “free 
8. As detailed in appendix A, the Swiss formula applies larger percentage point cuts to high initial tariﬀ  s and smaller cuts 
to low initial tariﬀ  s.9
safeguard,” i.e., a WTO-legal tariﬀ   increase equal to (or less than) the diﬀ  erence between the bound and 
applied rates. When the bound rate comes closer to (or even equal to) the applied rate, that reduces the 
scope of the “free safeguard” and gives greater policy security to the country’s trading partners. 
Column 3 of table 5 shows the pre-Doha applied rates (again, trade-weighted averages). As noted 
above, applied rates are often well below WTO bound rates because of unilateral liberalization. Th  e 
diﬀ  erence between bound and applied rates, in percentage points, measures the “water” in the tariﬀ   
schedule. Brazil and India have particularly high water levels. In fact, water levels are usually quite high 
in agriculture for developing countries (see table A3 of appendix A for detail). China is an exception as 
it recently acceded to the WTO and generally bound its tariﬀ  s at or close to the levels negotiated in its 
bilateral protocols.9
Table A4 in appendix A presents the trade-weighted average applied tariﬀ   rates for the 22 countries 
in the sample for 2001, 2006, and post-Doha. Between the beginning of the Doha negotiations in 
November 2001 and the end of 2006, some countries engaged in unilateral liberalization and reduced 
their applied MFN rates, sometimes substantially. China, for example, lowered its trade-weighted average 
applied MFN rates on agriculture from 49 to 16 percent. Korea and Mexico also signiﬁ  cantly decreased 
their trade-weighted average applied MFN rates on agriculture, from 79 to 14 percent and from
34 to 24 percent, respectively. In other words, key emerging countries have been liberalizing farm trade 
throughout the Doha Round talks. In fact, for some of those countries, the additional reduction from 
Doha commitments would be marginal compared with the unilateral liberalization they have already 
implemented over the past few years. A few countries, by contrast, raised their average trade-weighted 
applied MFN tariﬀ   rates in agriculture between 2001 and 2006 (e.g., Malaysia, Pakistan, and India).  
We see no reason why countries that have unilaterally reduced tariﬀ  s should not receive credit in 
WTO negotiations if they accept a legal obligation to maintain or “lock-in” the reforms. In other words, 
a country should be able to claim a negotiating credit for any increase in imports that is reasonably 
attributable to its unilateral liberalization. Indeed, we proposed such a process at the start of the Uruguay 
Round! For example, a country that liberalized imports of a product category, and experienced a rise in 
imports in that category of $500 million that can be reasonably attributed to the lower tariﬀ  , should be 
able to claim concessions of an equivalent amount in WTO negotiations (Hufbauer and Schott 1985).
Column 4 of table 5 shows prospective post-Doha applied rates. Applied rates are cut only when the 
pre-Doha applied rate of a speciﬁ  c tariﬀ   line exceeds the post-Doha bound rate for that tariﬀ   line. For the 
9. According to the July 2008 package on agriculture, recently acceded members (RAMs) will be granted additional time 
to implement their Doha commitments if those overlap with commitments to be undertaken according to the accession 
process. Very recently acceded countries, namely Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Tonga, Vietnam, and Ukraine, and small 
low-income RAMs, namely Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Mongolia, will be exempt from 
tariﬀ   reductions beyond their accession commitments. 10
group of 22 countries, the average trade-weighted applied rate will be reduced from 7.6 to 5.3 percent. 
Japanese and EU applied rates in agriculture are high for developed countries, and their commitments for 
reducing applied rates in agriculture are signiﬁ  cant (this is the case for imports from both developed and 
developing countries—see table A5 in appendix A). India will undergo much higher cuts in applied tariﬀ  s 
on agricultural imports than China or Brazil, because current Indian applied tariﬀ  s are much higher.
As for the United States, while US negotiators argue that the Doha Round must achieve “real 
market access,” meaning signiﬁ  cant cuts in foreign applied tariﬀ  s and subsidies, in fact the United States 
has committed to very little reduction in its own applied rates on agricultural imports. At present, the 
United States would reduce its weighted average applied rate by just 0.6 percentage points in agricultural 
goods, which is comparable with the commitments of major developing countries such as Brazil and 
China. On the other hand, India would reduce its applied rates on agricultural imports by 4.5 percentage 
points. However, US peak tariﬀ  s would be cut substantially due to the harmonizing eﬀ  ect of the formula 
cuts. Moreover, the United States and the European Union also contribute large cuts in agricultural 
subsidies (discussed below). 
Th   e United States subsidizes its farmers who grow “ﬁ  eld crops” (soybeans, wheat, corn, and cotton) 
and certain other products. Th   e subsidies fall in two categories. Th  e  ﬁ  rst covers payments to farmers, 
which can be either direct payments decoupled from production and price or payments that compensate 
for adverse price movements. Th   e second category covers price support programs (mostly for dairy and 
sugar). When the relevant price falls below a certain level, the US Department of Agriculture buys excess 
production to bolster the price. 
Th   e US proposal in July 2008 oﬀ  ered to bring the ceiling for its overall trade-distorting domestic 
support (OTDS) from $48 billion to $15 billion.10 Developing countries argued that the oﬀ  er was 
insuﬃ   cient since actual disbursements of subsidies are already well below $15 billion owing to the general 
rise in commodity prices over recent years. However, the US proposal would constrain an increase in 
subsidies when prices fall. Th   e proposal as it stands, or anything more stringent, will require signiﬁ  cant 
changes in some US farm programs currently in force.11 But since the greatest concessions are usually 
back-end loaded—i.e., implemented after a lengthy transition period—the current US farm bill would 
not have to be changed. Instead, in writing the next farm bill in 2012–2013, Congress would need to 
restructure US programs so that they remain consistent with the new WTO obligations. 
Table A6 summarizes the prospective cuts in applied rates in percentage point terms. Neither 
developed- nor developing-country importers will appreciably decrease tariﬀ  s on LDC agricultural 
exports. Rates on LDC exports are already low across the board, except in a few developing-country 
10. In October 2005, the United States had proposed decreasing the OTDS ceiling from $48 billion to $22 billion.
11. Kimberly Ann Elliott, “Last Gasp for Doha,” CGD Global Development: Views from the Center, Center for Global 
Development, July 25, 2008. 11
importers such as Brazil and India. China’s current applied rates are similar to those of Japan (9.6 and 
10.4 percent, respectively), but China committed to Doha reductions that are much smaller, less than 
1 percentage point compared with Japan’s 6 percentage points. 
Table 6 shows the bound and applied rates in agriculture, pre- and post-Doha, imposed by Brazil, 
China, and India on the imports of the 15 developing countries in the sample. Again, Indian bound 
and applied rates stand out as extremely high, and Indian bound rates undergo large cuts. Brazil has 
particularly low applied rates on agricultural imports from the 15 developing countries. Th   is is in part 
explained by the presence of Argentina in the group of 15 developing countries. Argentina accounts for a 
large proportion of Brazilian agricultural imports from the group, and much of trade between Argentina 
and Brazil is already duty-free under the Mercosur (Southern Common Market).12 
Th  e  ﬁ  nal design of Doha “modalities” could aﬀ  ect which products are covered by prospective 
tariﬀ   cuts. One important example is the proposed Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), which allows 
developing countries ﬂ  exibility to protect their rural communities by raising temporary tariﬀ  s on 
agricultural imports. According to one proposal, the SSM should cover all agricultural products imported 
by developing countries, with a single set of triggers, but diﬀ  erentiate between four country groups 
(developing, recently acceded, small and vulnerable, and least developed), and with a gradual phase-out.13 
Reciprocity Measure
Leaving aside these important design details, in the following tables, we try to determine the gains from 
the concessions already outlined, using a method called reciprocity measure. We ﬁ  rst calculate the change 
in revenue from tariﬀ   cuts in agriculture and the revenue equivalent of concessions on tariﬀ   quotas, 
domestic support, and export subsidies. We then multiply tariﬀ   equivalents for all concessions by 2006 
trade ﬂ  ows to “size up” the impact on the reciprocity measure. Th   e general idea is that every billion dollars 
of reciprocity measure concessions have approximately the same impact on trade ﬂ  ows (see appendix B for 
more details). Table 7 summarizes the total reciprocity measure gains given and received by each country, 
in billions of dollars, distinguishing for agriculture between tariﬀ   cuts and concessions on nontariﬀ   
barriers (NTBs), namely export subsidies, domestic support, and tariﬀ   rate quotas. Concessions given are 
tariﬀ   and tariﬀ  -equivalent revenues forgone on imports. Concessions received are reduced tariﬀ  s or tariﬀ   
equivalents on exports. 
Th   ese calculations suggest that 44 percent of developed-country reciprocity measure concessions (in 
both agriculture and NAMA) arise in the agricultural sector (both tariﬀ   cuts and other concessions). On 
12. However, there are notable exceptions to duty-free trade in Mercosur, and several of them are in agriculture. 
13. Gary Hufbauer and Matthew Adler, “Th   e Special Safeguard Mechanism: Possible Solutions to the Impasse,” note 
prepared for the World Bank and presented in Geneva, October 28, 2008.12
the other hand, only 9 percent of developing-country concessions are made in agriculture. Looking at the 
country breakdown for the major developed economies, roughly half of EU and Japanese concessions, 
but only 10 percent of US concessions, come from agriculture. Interestingly, however, the majority of 
US reciprocity measure gains received come from agriculture. For developing countries, Brazil and China 
concede little in agriculture, in terms of both the reciprocity measure value in dollars and the percent of 
total concessions. Indian concessions in agriculture represent 30 percent of total Indian concessions, but 
the reciprocity measure value is small, only $200 million. 
Table 7 shows that, in agriculture, apart from the European Union, all of the other major trading 
nations receive more gains from the liberalization of NTBs than from lower tariﬀ   rates, in reciprocity 
measure terms. Th   e United States is the largest beneﬁ  ciary of NTB liberalization in reciprocity measure 
terms ($2.4 billion), followed by Brazil ($1.6 billion). Th   e European Union receives less than $1 billion 
in NTB cuts but gains $1.2 billion in tariﬀ   cuts, the largest gains of all six major trading nations. 
In reciprocity measure terms, for concessions given from tariﬀ   cuts in agriculture, EU and Japanese 
concessions are signiﬁ  cantly higher than others (more than $2 billion compared with less than 
$0.5 billion for the others). EU concessions in NTBs also dwarf those of the other ﬁ  ve countries (over 
$12 billion for the European Union, compared with $1 billion or less for each of the others). Tables 
A7 through A9 in appendix A show that EU concessions are large in all three categories of NTBs: tariﬀ   
rate quotas, export subsidies, and domestic support. However, the magnitude of the ﬁ  gures is biased by 
the methodology. To calculate the tariﬀ   rate equivalents of these concessions, the method uses outlays 
notiﬁ  ed to the WTO over the last three years for which data are available, which, in the case of the 
European Union, were high. EU concessions are thus calculated on the basis of high outlay levels, which 
creates an upward bias in calculated concessions given. Th   e European Union also has high trade ﬂ  ows in 
the products it subsidizes, another factor that contributes to a calculation of high concessions. Finally, 
after calculating the concessions in domestic support based on the modalities, the method checks to 
ensure that the total does not exceed the agreed OTDS limit. In the case of the European Union, the new 
total subsidies often exceeded the OTDS and needed to be cut further. 
US agricultural concessions are larger in NTBs than in tariﬀ  s, in reciprocity measure terms. 
Nonetheless, US NTB concessions are still low ($1 billion). Th   is can be partly explained by the 
methodology. Due to high commodity prices in the past few years, US outlays to farmers have been 
limited. Concessions are calculated from a low base since they are calculated using the last three years of 
notiﬁ  ed outlays.
Th   e draft modalities propose the abolition of all export subsidies in agriculture. Aside from the 
European Union, the eﬀ  ects of eliminating export subsidies are limited (table A8 in appendix A). 
However, as previously discussed, despite the low impact of this measure, the lock-in eﬀ  ect is not 
negligible, and its advantages are especially evident in times of crisis.13
Table A10 in appendix A gives a breakdown of the gains by partner. Th  e  reciprocity measure gain 
for US exports to the 22 countries in the sample is over $3 billion. For the most part, that gain comes 
from concessions by the European Union (almost $2 billion). In addition, the United States will gain 
$1.4 billion on the import side. Reciprocity measure gains for Brazilian exports are over $2 billion. Once 
again, the majority of the gains come from concessions by the European Union. 
In terms of the shares of agricultural concessions, our calculations show that 93 percent will come 
from developed countries, while only 7 percent will originate from developing countries (table 8). 
Th   erefore, developed countries will do the heavy lifting. Th   e distribution of the reciprocity measure gains 
is the opposite. Forty-eight percent of the gains in agriculture accrue to the developing countries in the 
sample and 37 percent to the developed countries in the sample.14 Brazil, despite conceding roughly 
nothing in agriculture, receives 9 percent of the gains, meaning its exports will beneﬁ  t from lower tariﬀ  s 
and NTBs in partner countries. Brazil beneﬁ  ts from the liberalization of others while keeping its own 
barriers up. 
Th   e breakdown by country shows that, among developed economies, the European Union makes 
the most total concessions, followed by the United States, and then Japan. EU concessions are particularly 
important in agriculture, which reﬂ  ects the fact that the European Union has long maintained high tariﬀ  s 
in agriculture, its most sensitive sector. Despite a large share of concessions in agriculture (64 percent), 
the European Union does not capture a large portion of reciprocity measure gains (only 8 percent). 
Th   e United States, which makes 6 percent of total agricultural concessions, will receive 14 percent 
of total agricultural gains, in reciprocity measure terms. Th  ese  ﬁ  gures include export subsidies, domestic 
support, and tariﬀ   quota expansions. As discussed above, US agricultural tariﬀ  s are low, but US domestic 
subsidies are high. Developing countries are particularly intent on obtaining US commitments to reduce 
those subsidies, but they have yet to achieve their goal. Farm support is a highly sensitive issue for the 
United States, and only large concessions in NAMA or services will generate the necessary political 
support in Congress to enact signiﬁ  cant cuts in farm support. 
Trade Gains
Table 9 calculates the increase in trade owing to tariﬀ   cuts in agriculture, using the elasticity of trade 
to tariﬀ   cuts calculated in table A11 in appendix A. In other words, table 9 reﬂ  ects the trade gains in 
agriculture that will result from reducing applied tariﬀ   rates by the amounts shown in table A6 in 
appendix A. Table 9 also calculates the increase in trade generated by cuts in tariﬀ   quotas, domestic 
support, or export subsidies, based on the tariﬀ   equivalents produced in the reciprocity measure. 
14. Th   e remaining 15 percent of gains accrue to the rest of the world, since those countries also beneﬁ  t from liberalization 
by the 22 countries in the sample.14
Table A12 in appendix A gives bilateral detail of trade gains from tariﬀ   cuts and concessions in 
NTBs. Th   e total increase in agricultural exports of the 22 countries in the sample to the other
21 countries is estimated at $14 billion, 5.2 percent of 2006 agricultural exports. Th   e majority of trade 
gains within the sample (exports of the 22 countries to the rest of the sample), an increase of 3.3 percent, 
is due to NTB concessions, and the remaining 2 percent is due to tariﬀ   cuts. Gains in agricultural exports 
to the group of 22 countries (not the world) due to tariﬀ   cuts amount to roughly 2.5 percent of exports 
each for the European Union, Japan, Brazil, and China.15 Th   e comparable ﬁ  gures for the United States 
and India are 1.3 and 1.1 percent, respectively. 
Export gains from NTB concessions are more signiﬁ  cant, except in the case of EU exports, which 
gain only 1.2 percent. Overall, EU agricultural exports to the other 21 countries will be boosted by 
around 4 percent, notably to Japan and India. Japanese exports will experience the sharpest rise from 
NTB concessions, 25 percent, but this represents an absolute increase in total agricultural exports for 
Japan of less than $1 billion. Th   e growth numbers for Japanese agricultural exports are very large but the 
absolute number is small because Japanese agricultural exports are low. 
US exports of agricultural products due to NTB concessions will increase by roughly 4 percent to 
the group of 22 countries. Brazil will also beneﬁ  t signiﬁ  cantly from NTB concessions, with exports rising 
by 6 percent. In total, US agricultural exports will grow by around 5 percent. US exports to the European 
Union will witness the largest growth, 28 percent total, including almost 26 percent due to EU NTB 
concessions. US exports to India will notably increase by 6 percent. 
Th   e total increase in agricultural imports of the 22 countries of the sample from the world is $20 
billion, 6.2 percent of 2006 agricultural imports. EU concessions in NTBs will lead to an increase in EU 
agricultural imports of 16 percent. Cuts in EU agricultural tariﬀ  s will increase EU imports by an additional 
2.7 percent. Th   is large increase in EU imports from the world (nearly 19 percent) can be explained by high 
pre-Doha EU levels of protections, which kept imports low, and by large EU concessions in NTBs. EU 
NTB concessions will notably increase imports from India by almost 11 percent.
Japanese agricultural imports from the world will increase by 5.7 percent, mostly due to cuts in 
tariﬀ  s (4.7 percent) rather than in NTBs (1 percent). Japan will see greater import increases from the 
European Union, the United States, Brazil, and China.
Th   e United States will experience a smaller increase in agricultural imports, 2.3 percent, with a 
majority (1.6 percent) because of concessions in NTBs. US agricultural imports will grow particularly 
from developing countries, a 4.3 percent increase from Brazil, 4.4 percent from China, and 2.9 percent 
15. Note that the calculations are not symmetrical: While import numbers have been calculated for imports from the 
world, the data did not allow us to calculate exports to the world, so the table reports exports to the group of 22 countries 
in the sample.15
from India.  Brazil, China, and India will see small import increases due to tariﬀ   cuts, below $0.2 billion 
for each country, though this represents a signiﬁ  cant percentage increase in agricultural imports for India 
(3.5 percent from the world, as much as 6 percent from developed countries, and almost 10 percent from 
Brazil), all from a low base.
Results for NAMA
Nonagricultural market access (NAMA) products account for around 90 percent of world exports. Th  ey 
are the “big boy” in world merchandise trade. 
Table 10 shows the pre- and post-Doha bound tariﬀ   rates (trade-weighted averages) in NAMA for 
the entire group of 22 countries and the 6 major trading nations. Th   e group of 22 countries will cut its 
average bound rate from 8.6 to 3.7 percent. Th   e United States and Japan have higher average levels of 
bound rates than the European Union. After the Swiss formula is applied, however, all three countries 
will have roughly similar average bound rates. 
Among the developing countries, China commits to small cuts in its average NAMA bound tariﬀ  s 
because, as a recently acceded country to the WTO, China has signiﬁ  cantly reduced its bound rates over 
the past few years. In fact, while the pre-Doha bound rate for China is only 4.1 percent, the comparable 
ﬁ  gures for Brazil and India are 30.3 and 30.4 percent, respectively. Brazil and India stand out for making 
substantial concessions in their average NAMA bound tariﬀ  s, reductions of roughly 18 percentage points 
each. Th   ese are evenly spread out between diﬀ  erent trading partners (see tables A1 and A2 of appendix A 
for a breakdown by partner).
Tables A1 and A2 present bilateral detail of pre- and post-Doha bound rates, with the cuts in bound 
rates expressed in percentage points. Both the United States and Japan will make important reductions to 
their bound rates on NAMA imports from LDCs. 
Column 3 of table 10 provides the weighted average of pre-Doha applied duties for NAMA 
goods. Applied rates in NAMA are cut according to the methodology in appendix B only if the current 
applied rate is higher than the post-Doha bound rate. Th   e “water level” in NAMA is much lower than in 
agriculture (see table A3). Only Brazil and India maintain high water levels. 
As in agriculture, applied rates are lower than bound rates because of unilateral trade liberalization 
in NAMA goods since 2001. In fact, table A4 shows that all of the 15 developing countries in the sample 
decreased their NAMA MFN rates between 2001 and 2006. Some countries that undertook particularly 
steep liberalization include India, whose MFN rate dropped from 21 to 8 percent, Pakistan from 
20.9 to 12.8 percent, Taiwan from 3.5 to 1.6 percent, and China from 11.2 to 3.6 percent. Compared 
with other developing countries, China has relatively low tariﬀ   barriers to world NAMA imports 
(3.5 percent as a weighted average, table A5), as a result of the liberalization undertaken when it acceded 16
to the WTO in late 2001. Because its applied rates are already low, China could aﬀ  ord to cut its existing 
rates even further without signiﬁ  cantly changing its competitive situation. 
Column 4 of table 10 shows the post-Doha applied rates. On average, the group of 22 countries 
reduces its applied rate from 2.4 to 1.8 percent. Th   e applied rates of each of the 6 major trading nations 
on NAMA imports are signiﬁ  cantly lower than on agricultural imports. However, despite low trade-
weighted averages, relatively high tariﬀ   peaks still persist on some tariﬀ   lines. Th   e United States, 
the European Union, and Japan arrive at similar levels of applied rates after the cuts (0.7, 0.8, and 
0.5 percent, respectively). Developing countries start at higher applied rates, but on a percentage point 
basis, all 6 major trading nations commit to comparable cuts in NAMA applied rates, with Brazil slightly 
ahead.
Table A6 in appendix A presents the cuts in applied rates broken down by partner. US NAMA 
exports will beneﬁ  t from larger tariﬀ   cuts by Brazil and China. Th   e United States will cut tariﬀ  s on 
NAMA imports from LDCs by 3 percentage points, much higher than on any other import category. 
China and Brazil, and to a lesser extent India, will cut tariﬀ  s on NAMA imports from the European 
Union, United States, and Japan more than on other imports. 
Looking at South-South trade, the progress in lowering NAMA applied rates by Brazil, China, 
and India on imports from the 15 developing countries is quite small (table 11). Th   e lack of progress on 
liberalizing South-South trade remains a major obstacle to achieving the goals of a development round.
Reciprocity Measure 
Th  e  reciprocity measure gains from liberalization of NAMA are calculated in table 7, and the breakdown 
by trading partner is shown in table A10 in appendix A. In terms of concessions given, China and Brazil 
stand out in NAMA, compared with their concessions in agriculture. In terms of concessions received, 
China will be by far the main beneﬁ  ciary of NAMA liberalization (over $12 billion in reciprocity measure 
terms, so $12 billion less of tariﬀ  s to pay, or 29 percent of gains). Th   e European Union and Japan will 
also reap signiﬁ  cant gains (around $7 billion and $6 billion in reciprocity measure terms, or 17 and 
15 percent, respectively). Th   e United States reaps about 6 percent of NAMA gains, in reciprocity measure 
terms. Th   e modest ﬁ  gure for the United States reﬂ  ects the fact that several countries covered in the 
sample already have free trade agreements with the United States—namely, Australia, Canada, and 
Mexico.16 Table A10 shows that developing countries will see the greatest reciprocity measure gains from 
the European Union and the United States, with China capturing more than $4 billion from each.
As can be seen in table 8, it is in NAMA that developing countries account for the highest share of 
16. Th   e European Union had agreements with Norway and Switzerland through the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and with Mexico, Turkey, and South Africa, but the latter three are small trading partners of the 
European Union.  17
concessions (36 percent) and capture the highest share of gains (57 percent), in reciprocity measure terms. 
All three key emerging markets studied—China, India, and Brazil—make larger concessions in NAMA 
than in agriculture, although the numbers are roughly equal for India. India captures higher gains in 
NAMA than in agriculture. 
Trade Gains
NAMA trade gains for the group of 22 countries will be an increase in trade ﬂ  ows among the group 
(exports from the 22 to the rest of the group) of $40 billion. Despite contributing only one-third of 
concessions, developing countries see an increase in NAMA imports equal to that of the developed 
countries, 0.7 percent (table 9 and appendix table A12). Th   e increased exports by developing countries 
are mostly to the European Union and Japan. US export gains are small, but again, the United States 
has already liberalized trade with important countries in the sample. We estimate that LDCs will see 
a 3 percent increase in NAMA exports to the United States. Chinese NAMA exports will see sizeable 
increases to the European Union, Japan, the United States, and Brazil. Indian NAMA exports will grow 
by roughly 3 percent to the European Union and by 2 percent to the United States. Th  e  European 
Union, Japan, and the United States will all see signiﬁ  cant increases in their exports to Brazil and China. 
Th   e statistical analysis in this paper does not cover NTBs in NAMA. Progress in cutting NTBs on 
NAMA goods will emerge largely out of the sector discussions. Th   is is the main open issue in NAMA. 
Sector agreements would provide deeper cuts and reforms of NTBs, on a comprehensive or partial basis. 
At the Hong Kong ministerial in December 2005, the parties suggested that participation in sector 
agreements would be voluntary. Fourteen sectors are being considered for sector agreements.17 In later 
sections of this paper, we analyze two of those sectors where progress would yield sizeable beneﬁ  ts: 
chemicals and electronic products. In addition, we study the environmental goods sector, which is being 
discussed in the negotiating group on rules and where topping up NAMA liberalization could also 
produce large gains.
GDP Gains
Table 12 estimates the GDP impact of the trade gains. Th   e calculations in table 12 are based on the trade 
gains in table 9 for agricultural tariﬀ   cuts, agricultural NTB concessions, and NAMA formula tariﬀ   cuts. 
Both imports and exports raise a country’s GDP through a variety of channels, and so far as econometric 
evidence indicates, the positive impact of large imports is about the same as the positive impact from 
17. Th   e 14 sectors are: automotive and related parts, bicycles and related parts, chemicals, electronics/electrical 
products, ﬁ  sh and ﬁ  sh products, forestry products, gems and jewelry products, raw materials, sports equipment, 
healthcare, pharmaceutical and medical devices, hand tools, toys, textiles, clothing and footwear, and industrial 
machinery.18
an equivalent rise in exports. Hence the GDP metric reﬂ  ects the gains from both increased exports and 
increased imports. Th   e GDP calculations use an elasticity of trade openness to GDP of 0.2 for developed 
countries and 0.5 for developing countries.18 For example, in the case of a country with a GDP of $100, if 
trade goes from $40 to $50, trade openness rises from 0.4 to 0.5, a 25 percent increase. Th   en the elasticity 
implies that the GDP will increase by 5 percent (0.2*0.25) if it is a developed country or by 12.5 percent 
(0.5*0.25) if it is a developing country. 
Th  e  GDP impact for the European Union is $35 billion (0.21 percent), for the United States 
$17 billion (0.12 percent), and for China $20 billion (0.60 percent). For the United States and China, 
the gains come primarily from NAMA. Th   e European Union, on the other hand, beneﬁ  ts equally 
from both. Th   e weighted average of the percent increase in GDP for all 22 countries is 0.20 percent 
(0.06 percent from agriculture and 0.14 percent from NAMA). Th   e total dollar gain calculated from 
the formula tariﬀ   cuts in agriculture and NAMA, and from NTB concessions, for all 22 countries in the 
study comes to about $100 billion ($30 billion from agriculture and $69 billion from NAMA). Since 
the sample countries represent 88 percent of world GDP, we project the annual increase in global GDP 
from the formula tariﬀ   liberalization in agriculture and NAMA to be $114 billion. Th   is gain would be 
fully realized after a few years. Th  is  ﬁ  gure, however, is probably an underestimate as it does not include 
gains from the reduction of nontariﬀ   barriers in NAMA nor additional liberalization that could arise 
from sector negotiations and from scheduling deeper cuts in speciﬁ  c products. Also, it does not reﬂ  ect the 
possible GDP gains from the liberalization of services trade or from trade facilitation, discussed later.
Diff  erent Negotiating Scenarios
Tables 13 to 15 show the trade impact if a major emerging economy chooses a diﬀ  erent negotiating 
scenario for NAMA tariﬀ   cuts (see appendix B for a description of the various scenarios). What comes out 
quite clearly is that—in the aggregate—a change in the negotiating scenario would have limited impact 
on the total trade gains from NAMA tariﬀ   cuts but could aﬀ  ect the distribution of tariﬀ   and NTB cuts 
for politically sensitive products.
SERVICES
Of the three areas of market access negotiations, services could oﬀ  er the largest gains for both developed 
and developing countries. How large remains unclear because services negotiations have barely begun, but 
recent empirical work indicates that the potential gains from meaningful liberalization of services trade 
barriers substantially outweigh those from merchandise trade liberalization.19 
18. Th   e estimate for developed countries is taken from OECD (2003) and the estimate for developing countries from 
Cline (2004). Th   e method for calculating GDP gains follows that of Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer (2005). 
19. Brown, Kiyota, and Stern (2005) calculate that the removal of agriculture protection, manufacturing tariﬀ  s, and 19
In 2007, world services exports, as conventionally measured, were valued at roughly $3.3 trillion; 
merchandise exports (i.e., agriculture and NAMA) were more than four times larger at $13.6 trillion 
(WTO 2008a).20 While some services are inherently nontradable, part of the imbalance between services 
and merchandise trade can be explained by the poor quality of data on services, which leads to the 
underreporting of services trade in oﬃ   cial statistics, and another part by high barriers to services trade. 
Despite the importance of services in modern economies, and despite the mandate to start new 
negotiations a decade ago to liberalize trade in services, WTO talks have not been fully engaged. To 
date, most WTO countries have not put oﬀ  ers on the table; some have submitted oﬀ  ers that would not 
even bind current practices. While there have been more than 100 oﬀ  ers for services liberalization in 
the Round, most can be classiﬁ  ed as pro forma with limited value (Gootiiz and Mattoo 2009). Some 
developing countries have insisted that developed countries must oﬀ  er to liberalize trade in temporary 
labor services (Mode 4) before developing countries issue counteroﬀ  ers on other services sectors (WTO 
2008b).
In large measure, services have been relegated to the second division of Doha negotiations for 
tactical reasons. WTO members agreed informally at the 2005 Hong Kong ministerial that negotiations 
on services would not go full-bore until decisions were made on modalities for liberalization of agriculture 
and NAMA.21 Th   is understanding was a huge mistake, indeed counterproductive, for developing 
countries. Instead of increasing their leverage to gain US and EU concessions on agriculture and NAMA, 
it eﬀ  ectively reduced domestic political support for the overall Doha deal and thus limited the scope for 
additional policy reform.
Th   ere are few useful precedents in terms of services negotiations. Th   e Uruguay Round established 
a framework of rights and obligations in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) but 
little was achieved in liberalizing existing barriers. Sector agreements on basic telecommunications and 
ﬁ  nancial services were concluded a few years after the Uruguay Round, and these reduced some barriers 
maintained by signatory countries. Simply put, the Doha Round is only the second time countries have 
negotiated services multilaterally. Moreover, many bilateral FTAs address services issues superﬁ  cially or 
not at all (Martin and Mattoo 2009). 
Services barriers are also opaque. Unlike merchandise trade barriers, they cannot be easily 
quantiﬁ  ed. It is clear that regulations like licensing, permits, temporary visas, and nationality 
services barriers for the whole world would increase world welfare by $53.9 billion, $701.6 billion, and $1,661.8 billion, 
respectively. 
20. Th   e conventional measures of services trade do not include services furnished locally by the foreign subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations, for example, by a US subsidiary of a Swiss re-insurance company (i.e., Mode 3 of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services). 
21. Contrary to popular belief, this procedural “agreement” is not included in the ministerial declaration.20
requirements for corporate boards impede services trade, but by how much is unclear. Unlike agriculture 
or NAMA, WTO members cannot apply a Swiss formula or any other ready device to cut through the 
web of services trade restrictions. Th   ere appears to be no substitute for a detailed review of national 
laws and regulations. Th   is process is burdensome, and in any event regulators are reluctant to tie their 
hands against future contingencies. As a practical matter, most WTO countries are not asked to engage 
in detailed services negotiations. Th   e “free pass” for developing countries, so prevalent in the GATT 
era, is still available to most of them in the Doha services talks. However, middle income and successful 
emerging countries like Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Th   ailand are expected to 
participate.
Th   e current services liberalization oﬀ  ers do have some value: Th   ey lock in a portion of the unilateral 
liberalization that countries have undertaken on their own. And just as in agriculture and NAMA talks, 
making services trade barriers clear and certain has value to ﬁ  rms doing business.22 Recent work by the 
World Bank shows that “applied” services trade barriers are far lower than “bound” services barriers under 
Uruguay Round commitments (see Gootiiz and Mattoo 2009). Th   e authors construct an index of services 
barriers (table 16). On their 100 point scale, where higher numbers indicate greater levels of restrictions, 
they ﬁ  nd that the actual level of world services barriers is an index of 21 out of 100, compared with an 
index of 48 for commitments bound in the Uruguay Round under the GATS.
Oﬀ  ers on the table in the Doha Round would eliminate some of the “water” between “bound” and 
“applied” services barriers, by bringing the overall “bound” index down to 42 out of 100. However, the 
fact remains that, as they stand now, Doha oﬀ  ers create very little new market access in services. Instead, 
they slightly lower the “bound” levels inherited at the end of the Uruguay Round. Th  e  oﬀ  ers by OECD 
countries come close to locking in “bound” levels to actual levels, but they still leave some “water”—the 
score for actual barriers is 15 out of 100, while the score for Doha oﬀ  ers is 19 out of 100. Current oﬀ  ers 
from developing countries do little to reduce the “water” between “bound” and “applied” barriers.
Without a more substantive result in the services negotiations, the Doha Round is unlikely to 
succeed; the deal would not be rich enough or attract suﬃ   cient political support in major trading nations 
to ensure ratiﬁ  cation by national legislatures. 
Table 17 displays estimates of the impact of a 10 percent reduction in the tariﬀ   equivalent of 
services barriers in the 22 countries. A 10 percent reduction in the tariﬀ   equivalent of services barriers—
admittedly an optimistic scenario given the current negotiations but conservative in terms of scope of 
policy reform that could be undertaken by the major trading nations—could be achieved by various 
changes in policies across countries. For our purposes, we assume that these changes would be binding 
commitments in GATS schedules that actually lower the applied level of services barriers. Th  e  tariﬀ   
22. Businesses routinely report that making barriers deﬁ  nitive has value; how much value is uncertain.21
equivalents we use were econometrically estimated by Rosen (2009); simply put they were determined on 
a country level by estimating the shortfall between actual and expected imports of services.
We ﬁ  nd that a 10 percent reduction in services barriers would increase exports by the sample 
countries to the rest of the sample by $42.9 billion or 3 percent. Increases in US and EU services exports 
account for more than half of this amount—both would increase by an estimated $10.8 billion each. 
Under the 10 percent scenario, world exports of services to the 21 countries (i.e., total imports from the 
world by the 21 countries) would increase by $55.7 billion or over 3 percent. For all 21 countries, the 
estimated GDP impact of the trade gains (exports and imports) resulting from a 10 percent reduction in 
services barriers is $100 billion (table 17). Bilateral trade relationships are explored in appendix C. 
Of course, given the current oﬀ  ers, a 10 percent reduction or even a 5 percent reduction in barriers 
seems optimistic. Some eﬀ  orts have been made to improve the current oﬀ  ers; a signaling exercise held 
during the July 2008 mini-ministerial at the WTO showed signs that countries might be willing to budge 
(Gootiiz and Mattoo 2009). However, the US services industry’s initial reading from the July meeting 
was that no “meaningful new market access” would be created (Vastine 2008). 
CHEMICALS
Th   e Chemical Tariﬀ  s Harmonization Agreement (CTHA), formulated in the Uruguay Round, serves as 
a starting point for Doha negotiators.23 Most tariﬀ  s on chemical products for CTHA signatory countries 
are set at 0, 5.5, or 6.5 percent (WTO 2005). An initiative that broadens the CTHA to more countries 
and deepens liberalization could produce substantial gains. Currently, Canada, the European Union, 
Japan, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United States have participated in Doha Round 
discussions on a sector initiative for chemicals (WTO 2008c).
Chemicals account for more than 10 percent of total merchandise imports by the 22 countries 
(table 18).24 Chemicals are also crucial to US trade, accounting for 17 percent of US merchandise exports 
(to the 21 partner countries) in 2007 and 9 percent of total US merchandise imports (from the world) in 
2007.25 EU trade also exhibits a concentration in chemicals: 21 percent of EU merchandise exports (to 
the 21 partner countries and 9 percent of total EU merchandise imports in 2007 were in chemicals.26
23. CTHA signatory countries include: Australia, Canada, Ecuador, the European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, Jordan, 
Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, China, Qatar, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Arab 
Emirates, and the United States (METI 2009). 
24. Chemical goods imports by the 22 countries from the world in 2007 were $862.5 billion; total merchandise imports 
by the 22 countries from the world were $8,308.3 billion.
25. US chemical goods exports in 2007 to the 21 partner countries were $156.6 billion; merchandise exports to the 
21 partner countries were $935.1 billion. US chemical goods imports in 2007 from the world were $179.3 billion; 
merchandise imports were $2,017.1 billion.
26. EU chemical goods exports in 2007 to the 21 partner countries were $219.8 billion; merchandise exports to the 
21 partner countries were $1,049.2 billion. EU chemical goods imports in 2007 from the world were $179.2 billion; 22
In 2008 the average US applied tariﬀ   on chemical products was 2.1 percent, the average EU applied 
tariﬀ   was 2.6 percent, and the average Chinese applied tariﬀ   stood at 6.7 percent. Th   e average chemical 
tariﬀ   across the 22 countries in 2008 was 3.3 percent. However, tariﬀ   peaks remain a problem, even in 
CTHA signatory countries. 
Assuming no tariﬀ   cut ﬂ  exibilities available to countries would be used on chemical goods, the tariﬀ   
cuts outlined in the NAMA modalities would bring down the US tariﬀ   on chemicals to an average of 
1.2 percent and lower the average tariﬀ   on chemicals in the 22 countries to 2.2 percent.27 Th  ese  cuts 
would increase world exports by $15.4 billion or roughly 2 percent from the current level of chemicals 
trade. Total trade within the 22 countries would increase by $12.3 billion with the increase in US and 
EU exports ($2.5 billion and $3.6 billion, respectively) accounting for half of the growth.28 
What more could be achieved in sector negotiations? We calculate, at the HS 6-digit level, the 
impact of reducing all tariﬀ  s at or below 2.5 percent, after the modality cuts, to zero; all tariﬀ  s above 
2.5 and equal to or below 5 percent, after the modality cuts, to a new tariﬀ   of 2.5 percent; and all tariﬀ  s 
above 5 percent, after the modality cuts, to a new tariﬀ   of 5 percent. We estimate that this scenario would 
increase world exports of chemicals to the 22 countries by $30.8 billion, twice the impact 
from the modality tariﬀ   cuts alone. Th  e  trade gains from this sector agreement would be an increase of 
$25.1 billion (3 percent) in exports just among the 22 countries, which is also about twice the impact 
from the modality cuts. Nearly half the sector increase can be accounted for by increased US and EU 
exports ($4.6 billion and $6.9 billion, respectively); or, looking at the trade ﬂ  ows from the opposing 
direction, by increased US and Chinese imports ($4.6 billion and $8 billion, respectively). Th   e US export 
gain in chemicals ($4.6 billion) represents a 0.5 percent increase in US merchandise exports (to the 
21 other countries); the import gains ($4.6 billion) represent a 0.2 percent increase in total US 
merchandise imports. For the group of 22 countries, the estimated GDP gain resulting from the 
trade increase attributable to a sector initiative in chemicals is $26.6 billion. Bilateral trade and tariﬀ   
relationships are detailed in appendix D.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ELECTRONIC/ELECTRICAL GOODS
In 1996, at a ministerial conference of the WTO—i.e., not during a multilateral trade round—29 
WTO members agreed to the Information Technology Agreement (ITA). Th   e ITA committed 
merchandise imports were $1,954.0 billion.
27. We assume that if countries are going to participate in certain sector negotiations (e.g., chemicals, electronics/electrical, 
or environmental goods), they are not going to utilize any of their tariﬀ   cut ﬂ  exibilities in those sectors. In reality, countries 
might exclude some sensitive products from sector negotiations and use their tariﬀ   cut ﬂ  exibilities on those same products. 
28. Th   e modality impacts described here do not correspond with the impacts for all NAMA products because of diﬀ  erent 
elasticities and the use of tariﬀ   cut ﬂ  exibilities. Speciﬁ  cally, the price elasticity used here is –2.09, while the earlier 
calculations used an elasticity of –1.19. Also, in the full NAMA calculations we assume tariﬀ   cut ﬂ  exibilities are utilized on 
some chemical products; in the sector calculation, we assume no ﬂ  exibilities are utilized. 23
signatory countries to reduce tariﬀ  s to zero or near-zero in computers, software, telecom equipment, 
semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and scientiﬁ  c instruments by January 2000. 
Th   e ITA is considered to be a “remarkably successful agreement” (Mann and Liu 2009). Th  e  agreement 
has grown to over 70 members, including the United States, the European Union (27), Japan, India, 
Korea, Taiwan, and China (which joined in 2003 as part of its WTO accession). Notable nonsignatories 
include Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa (WTO 2009a). 
Th   e Doha Round could supplement that ITA by expanding the country coverage and deepening 
the tariﬀ   liberalization under the current agreement. Because of the potential large boost to world trade, 
expanded product coverage in the ITA is another possible outcome, even though product coverage has been 
a contentious issue since the beginning of the ITA.29 One proposal by Dreyer and Hindley (2008) to expand 
the products covered by the ITA would almost double the amount of world trade covered by the ITA. 
World exports of current ITA goods in 2007 to the 22 countries used in this study were $1,127 billion; 
world exports (to the 22 countries) under Dreyer and Hindley’s (2008) product list were $2,028 billion.30 
While the Dreyer and Hindley proposal seems unlikely, a sector deal that goes beyond IT products 
already has been discussed in the Doha Round. Rather than pursuing an IT-only sector initiative, WTO 
negotiators have actually devised a broader electronics/electrical goods sector initiative, which largely 
encompasses the ITA and many new IT products. Th   e proposed product list for the electronics/electrical 
goods sector initiative covers roughly 50 percent more world trade than the ITA.31 Th   e proposed product 
list for the electronics/electrical goods sector initiative does exclude some of the products that would be 
most contentious in ITA talks—most notably televisions—yet it is still a step forward from the ITA. 
Currently, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Th   ailand, and the United States have participated in 
the electronics/electrical goods sector initiative (WTO 2008c). On a related note, an agreement might 
be negotiated on “digital goods” to facilitate electronic commerce, the electronic delivery of services, and 
exports of information and communication technology (ICT) products. Th   is is a promising possibility, 
one that we do not explore in this paper. 
Th   e ITA is a unique agreement because the product list is not entirely made up of explicitly listed 
Harmonized System (HS) tariﬀ   lines. Realizing that product coverage would be an issue, negotiators 
included a “positive list” of IT products according to their functionality so that new products, regardless 
29. A recent WTO dispute settlement case brought by the United States and Japan (among others) against the European 
Union concerns whether televisions with multifuctionality (i.e., IT and non-IT functions) should be covered by the 
agreement (European Commission 2008). 
30. Dreyer and Hindley’s (2008) proposal is to include an entire HS 4-digit category (with a few exceptions) if at least one 
HS 6-digit tariﬀ   line under the HS 4-digit category is currently included in the ITA. 
31. Recent world exports of electronic/electrical goods (as deﬁ  ned by the WTO December 2008 NAMA modalities) to 
the 22 countries used in this study were $1,688 billion, while recent world exports to the 22 countries of ITA goods (as 
deﬁ  ned by the US ITA schedule and Finger 2007) were $1,127 billion. 24
of where they were included in a tariﬀ   schedule, could be covered. Many new products have thus been 
covered, but leaving product coverage open to interpretation, has, in the end, created as much contention 
(by giving a basis for litigation) as it has prevented. Th   e positive list approach means ITA coverage 
might not be exactly the same from one country to the next. For our calculations we assume that any 
product included in the US ITA schedule or by Finger (2007) is an ITA good for all countries. By taking 
this approach, we assume resolution of one of the outstanding issues with the ITA, namely product 
convergence, as well as the issues of country coverage and further tariﬀ   liberalization.
Like all NAMA products, ITA goods would be subject to the Swiss formula modality tariﬀ   cuts. In 
other words, even without sector agreement, there would be some liberalization of ITA trade. Assuming 
no ﬂ  exibilities are utilized, tariﬀ   cuts under the Swiss formula would bring the average applied tariﬀ   in the 
22 countries on ITA goods down to 0.9 percent from the current 1.1 percent (table 19). Th  ese  cuts  would 
increase exports by the 22 sample countries to each other by $5.8 billion. Chinese ITA imports would 
increase by $1.9 billion or just over 1 percent. World exports of ITA goods (i.e., imports by the 
22 countries) would increase by $6 billion from the modality tariﬀ   cuts.32
An additional sector initiative in ITA goods, which brings tariﬀ  s in the 22 countries down 
from their current level (an average of 1.1 percent) to zero, would spur substantially more trade. Trade 
within the 22 countries would increase by $27.9 billion, with an increase in Chinese imports of 
$8.5 billion accounting for about a third of the total increase (table 19). US gains would be modest, a 
$3.3 billion gain in exports and a $1.5 billion gain in imports. Th   e additional gain in world exports to 
the 22 countries would be $23.3 billion or a 0.3 percent increase in world merchandise exports. Th  e 
estimated GDP gains for the 22 countries of the ITA goods sector initiative is $43.2 billion.
Gains under a sector initiative in electronics/electrical goods would be still larger. Free trade 
in electronics/electrical goods would increase world exports to the 22 countries by an additional 
$35.4 billion above the increase from the modality tariﬀ   cuts (table 20)—this is $12.2 billion more 
than the increase under an ITA-only sector initiative. Among the 22 countries, Chinese imports again 
dominate the increase in trade. Under the electronics/electrical goods sector initiative, Chinese imports 
would increase by an estimated $14.9 billion. Chinese exports would increase by $8.6 billion. US total 
trade gains would almost double those from the ITA-only sector initiative: US exports would increase by 
$4.4 billion and imports by $4 billion. For the group of 22 countries, the estimated GDP gains based on 
the trade gains of the sector initiative in electronics/electrical goods is $66 billion, which is $22.8 billion 
more than the ITA goods sector initiative alone. Bilateral trade and tariﬀ   relationships under the ITA-
only and electronics/electrical goods sector initiatives are detailed in appendix E. 
32. Th   e modality impacts described here do not correspond with the impacts for all NAMA products because of diﬀ  erent 
elasticities and the use of tariﬀ   cut ﬂ  exibilities. Speciﬁ  cally, the price elasticity used here is –2.01, while the earlier 
calculations used an elasticity of –1.19. Also, in the full NAMA calculations we assume tariﬀ   cut ﬂ  exibilities are utilized on 
some ITA products; in the sector calculation we assume no ﬂ  exibilities are utilized.25
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS 
Th   e Doha Declarations call for “the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariﬀ   and nontariﬀ   barriers 
to environmental goods and services.” Tariﬀ  s on environmental goods will be reduced to some extent 
under the NAMA formula cuts: Additional liberalization could arise from a sui generis sector initiative. To 
estimate this “additionality” we limit our assessment to the potential trade growth that would result from 
eliminating tariﬀ  s on environmental goods entering bilateral trade between the 22 countries in our study 
(the same countries used in the agriculture and NAMA analysis). While liberalization of nontariﬀ   barriers 
and services barriers—if pursued—would generate substantial gains, we have focused our attention on the 
area where substantial progress seems most likely, namely merchandise trade.33 
Liberalization in environmental goods is more than just a “feel-good” proposition. In 2007 total 
imports by the 22 countries of environmental goods were $135.6 billion or roughly 1.6 percent of all 
merchandise imports. For the United States, close to 2 percent of both merchandise exports and imports 
are contained in the 45 tariﬀ   lines identiﬁ  ed by the World Bank as environmental goods (table F1).34 
Considering the United States exported and imported products in roughly 5,000 tariﬀ   lines in 2007, 
the large amount of trade in the few environmental tariﬀ   lines is quite exceptional (UNCTAD TRAINS 
Database, 2009). 
Negotiations on environmental goods have taken place at the tariﬀ   line level rather than the product 
level—i.e., 6-digit codes rather than 8- or 10-digit codes. Under any given tariﬀ   line (6-digit codes) 
there could be scores of products (8- or 10-digit codes). Th   e likely outcome in the environmental goods 
negotiations is that all products under an environmental tariﬀ   line will be accorded special treatment, 
whether or not all of the products are “environmentally friendly.”35 We follow this approach in our 
calculations. 
In terms of product inclusion, a recent unoﬃ   cial proposal by the Japanese delegation could 
drastically raise the stakes for the environmental goods negotiations. Th   e proposal seeks to include 
environmentally friendly automobiles (e.g., hybrid cars) in the negotiations (Japan 2009). Details are 
sketchy at the point, but depending on what types of cars are included it could vastly increase the amount 
of trade covered by the negotiations. We do not include environment-friendly automobiles in our 
calculations.
33. Kirkpatrick (2006) reviews the environmental services negotiations and ﬁ  nds limited progress. Political tensions are the 
biggest hurdle for all services liberalization; environmental services liberalization is no diﬀ  erent. 
34. In 2007 US exports of environmental goods (to the 21 partner countries) were $17 billion; US environmental goods 
imports from the world were $33.7 billion. All US merchandise exports (to the 21 partner countries) in 2007 were $935.1 
billion; total US merchandise imports were $2,017.1 billion (table 20).
35. Tariﬀ  s are internationally consistent only at the HS 6-digit level; “overinclusiveness”—i.e., including all products under 
an environmental tariﬀ   line—has been adopted to avoid contentious disagreements over product deﬁ  nitions. Th  e  United 
States supports overinclusiveness in negotiating environmental goods (Howse and Bork 2006). 26
We ﬁ  rst estimate the impact of the NAMA modality tariﬀ   cuts. Th   e Swiss formula with a coeﬃ   cient 
of 20 for developing countries and 8 for developed countries is applied to the simple average of 2008 
bound product-level tariﬀ  s at the tariﬀ   line level. If the resulting new bound tariﬀ   is lower than the 2008 
applied tariﬀ   there is a tariﬀ   reduction—i.e., new market access. To calculate the impact of the tariﬀ   
cuts—the applied tariﬀ  s before the modality reductions minus the applied tariﬀ  s after the reductions—we 
multiply the tariﬀ   cut expressed in percentage points by the same price elasticity of imports, namely 
–2.10, for every bilateral trade relationship.36 One minus the resulting ﬁ  gure (expressed as a percent) 
is then multiplied by current trade to estimate new trade after the tariﬀ   cut.37 Actual tariﬀ   cuts in 
environmental goods from the modality discussions are minimal. For example, for the United States, 
EU tariﬀ  s on environmental goods drop from 2.5 to 1.8 percent and Chinese tariﬀ  s drop from 9.3 to 
6.1 percent (table F2). Th   e modest tariﬀ   cuts produce modest trade gains; world exports of environmental 
goods will increase by only $1.5 billion (or 1 percent) after the modality tariﬀ   cuts. Th   e modality cuts will 
increase US exports (to the 21 other countries) by $ 0.1 billion and US imports (from the world) by 
$0.3 billion (table 21).38
Under a sector initiative in environmental goods, since tariﬀ  s would drop to zero, the gains from 
such an initiative would be much larger than the modality tariﬀ   cuts. We estimate the impact of complete 
tariﬀ   elimination on environmental goods for the 22 countries. Th   e calculation procedure is identical to 
that for the modality tariﬀ   cuts, just with larger tariﬀ   reductions. Th   e result of a sector initiative would 
be an additional $6.3 billion increase in world exports of environmental goods. Th   erefore, in total, the 
increase in world exports of environmental goods to the 22 countries could reach close to $8 billion from 
the modality and sector tariﬀ   cuts combined. A trade increase of this size would increase total world trade 
by roughly one-tenth of one percent (0.1 percent). Free trade in environmental goods would increase 
trade within the 22 countries by an additional $4.5 billion above the increase from the modality tariﬀ   cuts 
alone. Together, the sector and modality tariﬀ   cuts would increase US exports (to the 21 other countries) 
by $0.6 billion and US imports (from the world) by $0.6 billion; this amounts to a 3.5 and 1.8 percent 
increase, respectively, above current levels of US environmental goods trade. Trade gains associated with 
free trade in environmental goods would yield GDP gains of $11 billion for the group of 22 countries. 
Bilateral trade and tariﬀ   relationships are detailed in appendix F.
36. Th   is elasticity is calculated as the simple average of all environmental good observations in Kee et al. (2004). See table 
F1 for a list of environmental goods. 
37. For example, if imports of environmental goods totaled $100 with a 10 percent tariﬀ  , and then the tariﬀ   is removed, 
new trade would be: $100 * (1 – (10 * –2.10) /100) = $121. 
38. Th   e modality impacts described here do not correspond with the impacts for all NAMA products because of diﬀ  erent 
elasticities and the use of tariﬀ   cut ﬂ  exibilities. Speciﬁ  cally, the price elasticity used here is –2.10, while the earlier 
calculations used an elasticity of –1.19. Also, in the full NAMA calculations we assume tariﬀ   cut ﬂ  exibilities are utilized on 
some environmental products; in the sector calculation we assume no ﬂ  exibilities are utilized.27
TRADE FACILITATION
Trade facilitation was added to the Doha Round agenda in 2004, three years after the start of the Round 
in 2001. Despite the late start, it has become one of the more successful aspects of the Round. To date, 
WTO members have put forward over 70 new provisions on the issue (see table 22). A representative 
from the Global Express Association—an organization representing private express delivery companies 
(e.g., DHL, FedEx, and UPS)—partially attributes the success to “a growing recognition on the part of 
developing countries that trade facilitation is not a zero sum proposition” (Simpson 2009). Negotiations 
have been so positive that some WTO members—including the European Union—have expressed an 
interest in a separate plurilateral agreement on trade facilitation should the Doha Round ultimately fail 
(Simpson 2009).
Th   e trade facilitation negotiations have a narrow scope. Only three GATT articles are aﬀ  ected: 
Article V, on freedom of transit (of particular interest to landlocked countries); Article VIII, on limiting 
border fees and formalities; and Article X, on making trade regulations transparent (Eglin 2008). Th  ese 
articles, especially Article VIII, cover a wide range of topics that may constrict trade but are not tariﬀ  s, 
quotas, or other formal barriers. Proposals thus far range from the use of international standards on 
customs documents, to limits on import and export fees, to the online publication of customs procedures 
and policies. Table 22 contains a list of proposed provisions currently included in the trade facilitation 
negotiations. 
Most consumers in the developed world regard trade facilitation and customs procedures as third-
tier issues. But even in the United States, which has some of the best practices in the world according to a 
recent World Bank study, trade facilitation costs can be signiﬁ  cant. To export a standard cargo container, 
with contents valued at $20,000, from the United States, it costs around $990, almost 5 percent of the 
shipment value. Th   e cost of importing a standard container into the United States is higher, around 
$1,245, or an additional 6 percent of the value (World Bank 2009). Th   ese costs are oﬃ   cial charges (i.e., 
not including any bribes) incurred from completing all necessary documents, plus inland transportation, 
customs clearance and inspection, and port handling. Th   e additional 5 to 6 percent ad valorem costs 
exceed the average ad valorem tariﬀ  s that US exports and imports face, and they tell only half the trade 
facilitation story. US exports face an additional cost when they arrive in the destination country, and US 
imports face costs in the originating country. While additional trade costs can never go to zero—even 
the top performing country, Singapore, adds costs, of $456 and $439, respectively, to each container 
exported and imported—the possible gains from improved trade facilitation are clearly large. 
Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (2005) take on the heroic task of estimating the potential gains in trade 
of manufactured goods from improved trade facilitation among a group of 75 countries. Th   e authors look 
at the impact of a modestly optimistic scenario for improved trade facilitation: Any country whose trade 28
facilitation policies fall below the global average in one of four areas would (with productive negotiations) 
be brought up halfway to the global average in that area.39 Th   e four trade facilitation areas covered by 
Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (2005) are port eﬃ   ciency, customs environment, own regulatory environment, 
and service-sector infrastructure (eﬀ  ective use of information technology). Th   e authors argue that these 
four sectors, and the data used to analyze them in the diﬀ  erent countries, map directly into the trade 
facilitation agenda in the Doha Round. Th   ey argue that port eﬃ   ciency, which is measured by the eﬃ   cacy 
of air and sea port facilities and inland waterways, is related to GATT Article V; customs environment, 
measured by hidden import barriers and the extent of bribery, is relevant to GATT Article VIII; regulatory 
environment, measured by transparency of government policies and corruption control, is relevant to 
GATT Article X; and services infrastructure, which is measured by the eﬃ   cacy of internet access, is related 
broadly to trade in services in the trade facilitation agenda (Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki 2005). 
Th   e simulation results of Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (2005) are shown in table A13 of appendix 
A. Th   eir estimates of increased trade due to improvements in trade facilitation are very large for some 
regions. For example, exports might rise as much as 40 percent for South Asia. We chose to interpret 
the underlying coeﬃ   cients in a conservative manner: We apply the OECD trade eﬀ  ect, which is the 
lowest, to all countries in our sample. As a result, our calculations of the payoﬀ   from trade facilitation for 
developing countries are much lower than the ﬁ  gures estimated by Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki. 
Table 23 shows the trade gains for selected countries and the total for the sample. Imports from the 
world will increase by $340 billion, mostly imports by the United States, the European Union, 
and China. Exports to the group of 22 countries will rise by $115 billion, including almost $30 billion 
more from the European Union and $20 billion more from the United States. GDP gains will total 
$385 billion for the 22 countries. Th  e  positive  GDP impact reaches almost $100 billion for the United 
States and the European Union. In terms of percentage of GDP, however, the major developing nations 
reap the most beneﬁ  ts, between 1.2 and 1.6 percent. 
Th   ese numbers should be taken with a tablespoon of salt as this method is less rigorous than 
methods used in other sections of this paper. However, the broad thrust should not be dismissed. 
Trade facilitation is key to boosting global commerce and the gains would be very large, especially for 
developing countries.
CONCLUSION
Th   e Doha Round has limped along since its inception. Nearing its eighth birthday, the Round is now 
older than its immediate predecessor, the Uruguay Round, which lasted what seemed at the time like a 
marathon (7 years, 7 months) from inception to signing. Owing to its longevity, the Doha Round has 
39. For example, if the global average was an index score of 50 and a country had a score of 20, that country would be 
brought up to a score of 35 for the purpose of the simulation.29
often been pronounced a victim of terminal illness, but this diagnosis seems premature. Our analysis 
reveals large potential gains from proposals now on the table, and when gains are at hand, interested 
parties will continue to talk. Moreover, we expect that current proposals in key areas, namely service-
sector agreements and trade facilitation, will improve as negotiations draw to a close.
Our analysis examines gains from diﬀ  erent topics that are at varying levels of completeness and 
certainty in the Doha Round talks. Th  e  tariﬀ   and subsidy cuts in agriculture and NAMA are written into 
the current negotiating modalities; the gains in these areas are thus the foundation of a Doha Round 
liberalization package. Th   e gains from the sector negotiations in chemicals, electronics/electrical goods, 
and environmental goods are less certain. Agreements in these sectors will likely emerge in some form; 
however, the country participation, product coverage, and depth of liberalization in each sector are 
uncertain. We assume, for the purpose of our calculations, optimistic but plausible scenarios for each of 
the sectors. 
Th   e services negotiations, perhaps the lynchpin of the Round, currently do not establish new 
market access. Our calculations of potential gains in services are thus based on a dose of wishful thinking, 
recognizing that, unless the current oﬀ  ers for liberalizing services barriers are improved, the Doha Round 
will probably not reach a successful conclusion. Th   e trade facilitation negotiations have been among the 
most productive in the Round. Our estimated gains from improved trade facilitation, however, are not 
directly tied to the negotiations. Th   us, our calculations of gains could just as easily be underestimates as 
overestimates, depending on the success of the negotiations and implementation of the results.
For agricultural products, the tariﬀ   cuts prescribed by the current negotiating modalities create 
new market access. US and EU applied tariﬀ  s would be almost halved (1.3 percent down to 0.7 percent 
for the United States and 6 percent down to 3.4 percent for the European Union). Developing-country 
applied tariﬀ  s decline slightly; this is actually a signiﬁ  cant accomplishment given the high levels of “water” 
between bound and applied agricultural tariﬀ  s in most developing countries. Agricultural tariﬀ   cuts 
contemplated in the Round, along with new caps on tariﬀ   rate quotas, export subsidies, and domestic 
subsidies, would increase world exports (in the tables, this corresponds to imports from the world by the 
22 countries) by $20.5 billion and boost annual world GDP by $29.9 billion (GDP gains are calculated 
based on export and import gains for each country). 
On the whole, tariﬀ  s on NAMA products are low. Pre-Doha average applied tariﬀ  s in the European 
Union, Japan, and the United States are all less than 2 percent. Average applied tariﬀ  s are less than 
8 percent in Brazil, India, and China. Low initial applied tariﬀ  s make the task of creating new market 
access in NAMA more challenging—the average applied tariﬀ   cut in our sample is only 0.6 percentage 
points (from an average tariﬀ   of 2.4 percent to a level of 1.8 percent). Since NAMA trade is so vast, 
however, the trade gains are also large, despite the small tariﬀ   cuts. In total, we estimate annual world 
exports will increase $45.6 billion from the NAMA concessions and boost annual world GDP by 30
$69.4 billion. Moreover, any reduction in bound tariﬀ   levels, even if bound rates remain above applied 
rates, reduces the risk of backsliding into protectionist policies.
In services, recent research by Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009) ﬁ  nds that current proposals would create 
no new market access. Th   e proposals are a small step forward from Uruguay Round commitments, but 
far more work needs to be done to produce real gains. Th   e July 2008 “signaling exercise” gave some 
indication that countries would be willing to liberalize further, but substantive new oﬀ  ers have yet to be 
submitted. We estimate that the possible gains from meaningful liberalization of services barriers are large. 
A 10 percent reduction in the tariﬀ   equivalent of applied services barriers would increase annual world 
exports by an estimated $56 billion and boost annual world GDP by an estimated $100 billion. 
Th   e potential trade and GDP gains from the sector agreements outweigh the gains from the NAMA 
modality concessions. Th   e gains from sector agreements are above and beyond the NAMA formula cuts. 
We estimate the impact of free trade in electronics/electrical goods and in environmental goods across 
the 22 countries used in the study. We estimate the impact of freer trade in chemicals across the same 
countries. A sector agreement in chemicals would increase world exports by $15.4 billion. An electronics/
electrical goods sector agreement would boost world exports by $35.4 billion, and an environmental 
goods sector agreement would boost world exports by $6.3 billion. All told, we estimate the three 
sector agreements would increase annual world exports by $57.1 billion and annual world GDP by 
$103.6 billion.
Trade facilitation negotiations have been championed as one of the most successful subjects in the 
Doha Round. Over 70 provisions on topics ranging from publication standards to new restrictions on fees 
connected to importation and exportation have been put forward. Th   ese negotiations might go forward 
even if the Doha Round ﬂ  ops. Quantifying the possible gains from each of the roughly 70 proposals is 
at best diﬃ   cult, so we turn to an estimate of potential gains from a modestly optimistic trade facilitation 
improvement scenario made by Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (2005). Drawing from the work of these 
authors, we use conservative coeﬃ   cients to calculate that world exports could increase by $340 billion 
if underperforming countries are brought up to the global average in four key areas of trade facilitation 
(port eﬃ   ciency, customs environment, own regulatory environment, and service-sector infrastructure). 
Th   ese trade gains would increase annual world GDP by roughly $385 billion annually.
Our ﬁ  ndings contradict the critics who argue that the world should trash the Doha Round because 
the payoﬀ   is too small. World export gains already on the table (i.e., agriculture and NAMA) are over 
$65 billion annually, and world export gains on the table and in the oven (i.e., agriculture, NAMA, and 
sectors) are over $120 billion. World export gains from improved trade facilitation could double the 
impact of the Round; however, this bonus depends on the depth of commitments and implementation. 
Th   e services negotiations, another potential source of large export gains, are struggling, but the potential 
gains in other areas could inspire key countries to improve their oﬀ  ers. 31
All told we estimate that the Doha Round could yield potential annual world GDP gains of 
between $300 billion and as much as $700 billion. While this ﬁ  gure represents optimistic thinking on 
our part, it is not a “pie-in-the-sky” number. It may take a decade to reach this ﬁ  gure once negotiations 
are concluded, because concessions will be implemented gradually and trade facilitation measures 
will take time to become routine. But, the scenarios used in this paper to calculate this ﬁ  gure are not 
straightforward. Bringing countries up to the current global average in trade facilitation will be hard work, 
but new rules on trade facilitation can speed up the process. A 10 percent reduction in applied services 
barriers will take long hours at the negotiating table but might be achieved with the right combination 
of “sticks and carrots.” Many countries are anxious to complete sector agreements, which we estimate to 
deliver large trade and GDP gains; others will have to be pulled in through hard bargaining. Finally, we 
estimate that roughly $100 billion in annual world GDP gains can come just from the agriculture and 
NAMA negotiations. Th   ese gains are written into the negotiating modalities and thus are the most certain 
portion of our projected Doha outcome. 
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Table 1     Total gains in trade (billions of dollars)
Country/region
“On the table” Potential gains from services, sectorals, and trade facilitation
Agriculture
Nonagricultural 





From tariff   
and nontariff   
barriera cuts From tariff   cuts
From 10 percent 
liberalization
From sector         
initiative
From sector         
initiative
From sector         
initiative
From Wilson, 
Mann, and Otsuki,  
(2005)
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
All 22 countries 20.5 14.1 45.6 40.3 55.7 42.9 15.4 12.8 35.4 33.5 6.3 4.5 340.0 115.7
European Union 15.3 1.7 11.0 7.5 5.2 10.8 1.4 3.3 3.0 5.7 0.3 1.4 69.9 29.5
Japan 2.4 0.5 2.5 6.7 3.5 2.7 0.2 2.2 0.0 6.5 0.0 0.9 20.7 13.7
United States 1.6 3.3 12.7 2.7 3.5 10.8 2.3 2.1 2.6 3.4 0.6 0.6 93.3 19.0
Brazil 0.0 2.0 1.0 0.3 2.8 0.7 1.0 0.1 3.9 0.1 0.5 0.0 4.4 1.6
China 0.2 1.1 6.7 13.2 14.3 3.7 4.5 1.3 11.3 6.7 1.7 0.7 40.2 16.0
India 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.4 10.5 0.7 0.8 0.3 1.7 0.2 0.8 0.1 5.9 1.2
a. Consist of tariff   rate quotas, export subsidies, and domestic support.
b. Only 21 countries are included in the services calculations; Taiwan is excluded.
c. Applied tariff  s on all chemicals (as defi  ned by the WTO 2008c) are reduced to 0, 2.5, or 5 percent in this simulation.
d. Applied tariff  s on all electronics and electrical goods (as defi  ned by the WTO 2008c) are reduced to zero in this calculation.
e. Applied tariff  s on all environmental goods (as defi  ned by the World Bank 2007) are reducted to zero in this calculation.
Note: Trade gains from agricultural nontariff   barriers are calculated using a prorata impact of the trade gains of agricultural tariff   cuts. The trade gains refl  ect each country’s increased imports from the world and increased 
exports to the other 21 countries in the sample. The asymmetry is due to methodology. Agricultural trade calculations refl  ect both tariff   and nontariff   barrier cuts. Nonagricultural market access trade calculations refl  ect 
only tariff   cuts.
Source: Authors’ calculations.3
5
Table 2     Impact of trade gains on GDP
Country/region
“On the table” in agriculture 
and NAMA
Potential gains from a 
10 percent reduction in 
services barriers Potential gains from sectorals
Potential gains from 






















European Union 0.21 35.07 0.09 15.77 0.09 14.94 0.59 98.32
Japan 0.18 7.84 0.09 3.97 0.14 6.36 0.51 22.30
United States 0.12 16.94 0.09 11.97 0.07 9.74 0.68 94.03
Brazil 0.66 8.94 0.70 9.48 1.12 15.02 1.19 16.05
China 0.60 19.64 0.51 16.72 0.74 24.34 1.59 52.20
India 0.42 4.75 1.97 22.40 0.67 7.67 1.26 14.29
Total 0.20 99.26 0.21 100.38 0.21 103.62 0.79 385.08
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
Notes: GDP impacts in dollars are calculated based on 2007 GDP data and trade impacts shown in table 1. Taiwan is excluded from services calculations. GDP impacts are calculated using the methodology 




Table 3     Total gains in trade, with exports to the world (billions of dollars) 
“On the table” Potential gains from services, sectorals and trade facilitation
Agriculture
Nonagricultural 






From tariff   and non-
tariff   barriera cuts From tariff   cuts
From 10 percent 
liberalization
From sector            
initiative
From sector            
initiative
From sector            
initiative
From Wilson, Mann, 
and Otsuki, 
(2005)
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
All 22 countries 20.5 17.1 45.6 50.6 55.7 60.7 15.4 15.8 35.4 49.2 6.3 5.9 340.0 115.7
European Union 15.3 2.8 11.0 10.6 5.2 18.4 1.4 4.7 3.0 8.8 0.3 2.1 69.9 29.5
Japan 2.4 0.5 2.5 7.5 3.5 4.0 0.2 2.3 0.0 7.8 0.0 1.0 20.7 13.7
United States 1.6 3.8 12.7 3.8 3.5 13.7 2.3 2.4 2.6 4.9 0.6 0.8 93.3 19.0
Brazil 0.0 2.3 1.0 0.4 2.8 0.8 1.0 0.1 3.9 0.2 0.5 0.0 4.4 1.6
China 0.2 1.3 6.7 15.6 14.3 4.8 4.5 1.6 11.3 12.0 1.7 0.9 40.2 16.0
India 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.6 10.5 2.6 0.8 0.4 1.7 0.2 0.8 0.1 5.9 1.2
a. Consist of tariff   rate quotas, export subsidies, and domestic support.
b. Only 21 countries are included in the services calculations; Taiwan is excluded.
c. Applied tariff  s on all chemicals (as defi  ned by the WTO 2008c) are reduced to 0, 2.5, or 5 percent in this simulation.
d. Applied tariff  s on all electronics and electrical goods (as defi  ned by the WTO 2008c) are reduced to zero in this calculation.
e. Applied tariff  s on all environmental goods (as defi  ned by the World Bank 2007) are reduced to zero in this calculation.
Note: Imports are taken from table 1. Trade facilitation exports are also taken from table 1. All other exports are calculated by adding the corresponding export results from table 1 to an estimate of gains in 
exports to nonsample countries in each category. This estimate is made by assuming all nonsample countries have pre- and post-Doha applied tariff  s equal to the average of the 22 sample countries displayed 
in tables 5, 10, 17, 18, 20, and 21. A partial equilibrium method, which follows the method used in tables 17 to 21, is used to determine the impact of the tariff   cuts on exports of the 22 countries. The elastici-
ties for the calculations are the same as those employed throughout the paper. Trade gains from agricultural NTBs are calculated using a pro-rata impact of the trade gains of agricultural tariff   cuts. Agricultural 
trade calculations refl  ect both tariff   and nontariff   barrier cuts. NAMA trade calculations refl  ect only tariff   cuts.
Source: Authors’ calculations.37










Countries that are in both the sample group and G-20
Argentina 69.8 53.2 Argentina 69.8 53.2
Australia 185.7 211.0 Australia 185.7 211.0
Brazil 199.8 185.3 Brazil 199.8 185.3
Canada 457.3 448.9 Canada 457.3 448.9
China 1,484.1 1,190.0 China 1,484.1 1,190.0
European Union 1,986.3 2,296.5 European Union 1,986.3 2,296.5
India 187.4 300.5 India 187.4 300.5
Indonesia 155.1 137.6 Indonesia 155.1 137.6
Japan 783.1 761.8 Japan 783.1 761.8
Korea 417.5 435.0 Korea 417.5 435.0
Mexico 269.7 304.2 Mexico 269.7 304.2
South Africa 82.4 104.3 South Africa 82.4 104.3
Turkey 132.3 202.0 Turkey 132.3 202.0
United States 1,300.2 2,166.0 United States 1,300.2 2,166.0
Subtotal 7,710.5 8,796.5 Subtotal 7,710.5 8,796.5
Other members
Colombia 38.7 41.4 France* 606.6 706.7
Malaysia 217.4 187.2 Germany* 1,465.2 1,204.8
Norway 168.0 89.1 Italy* 539.9 556.3
Pakistan 21.8 46.3 Russia 464.0 276.0
Philippines 64.6 76.9 Saudi Arabia 280.2 110.7
Switzerland 189.5 228.4 United Kingdom* 459.9 2,166.0
Taiwan 233.0 229.4
Thailand 173.2 178.5
Total trade of sample 
group
8,816.7 9,873.6 Total trade of G-20 8,454.7 9,183.1
Total trade of sample 
group as a share of 
world trade (percent)
72.5 76.2 Total trade of G-20 
as a share of world 
trade (percent)
69.5 70.9
Subtotal as a share of 
total trade of sample 
group (percent)
87.5 89.1 Subtotal as a share 
of total trade of 
G-20 (percent)
91.2 95.8
* = These individual member states of the European Union are listed in this table since they are part of the G-20, but their trade numbers are not 
added to the total since EU trade numbers are already included.
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics June 2009, for all countries except Taiwan; UN Comtrade Database via WITS (2009) for Taiwan.38
Table 5     Tariff  s in agriculture (percent)
Bound Applied
Country/region Pre-Doha Post-Doha Pre-Doha Post-Doha
All 22 countries 25.0 18.2 7.6 5.3
European Union 7.8 4.2 6.0 3.4
Japan 10.7 4.5 10.4 4.5
United States 3.0 1.6 1.3 0.7
Brazil 40.6 31.0 4.1 3.9
China 16.1 14.7 9.6 8.9
India 167.0 130.4 60.2 55.7
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 6     Bound and applied tariff   rates in agriculture
  imposed by Brazil, China, and India on imports
  from the group of 15 developing countries in the
 sample (percent)
Bound Applied
Country Pre-Doha Post-Doha Pre-Doha Post-Doha
Brazil 44.2 35.2 1.4 1.4
China 11.8 10.9 8.4 7.9
India 206.2 169.8 75.5 70.8
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 7     Gains in agriculture and NAMA expressed in terms of the reciprocity measure 
  (billions of dollars)
Country/region
Agriculture NAMA
Total cuts Tariff   cuts
Nontariff   barrier 
cutsa Tariff   cuts only
Given Received Given Received Given Received Given Received
All 22 members 22.7 15.9 7.4 5.9 15.3 9.9 42.4 37.6
Developed (7) 21.1 8.5 5.9 3.4 15.2 5.1 26.9 16.4
Developing (15) 1.6 7.4 1.5 2.6 0.1 4.8 15.5 21.2
European Union 14.5 1.8 2.1 1.2 12.4 0.6 10.0 7.1
Japan 3.0 0.5 2.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 2.3 6.2
United States 1.4 3.2 0.4 0.8 1.0 2.4 11.7 2.5
Brazil 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.6 1.0 0.2
China 0.2 1.1 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.6 6.1 12.2
India 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.3
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
a. Consist of tariff   rate quotas, export subsidies, and domestic support.
Source: Authors’ calculations.39
Table 8     Share of concessions given and received (measured by reciprocity measure) by developed
  and developing countries (percent)
Country/sector
Concessions given Concessions received
Developed (7) Developing (15) Developed (7) Developing (15)
All countries
Agriculture 93 7 37 48
NAMA 64 36 39 57

























NAMA = nonagricultural market access
Source: Authors’ calculations.4
0
Table 9     Calculated increase in trade due to tariff   cuts and nontariff   barrier cuts
Country/region
Agriculture Nonagricultural market access
Total cuts Tariff   cuts Nontariff   barrier cutsa Tariff   cuts only

















All 22 countries 20.5 6.2 14.1 5.2 6.7 2.0 5.3 2.0 13.8 4.2 8.8 3.3 45.6 0.7 40.3 1.6
Developed (7) 19.2 8.5 7.6 5.0 5.4 2.4 3.0 2.0 13.8 6.1 4.6 3.0 29.5 0.7 17.6 0.6
Developing (15) 1.4 1.3 6.4 5.6 1.3 1.2 2.2 2.0 0.1 0.1 4.2 3.7 16.1 0.7 22.8 1.0
European Union 15.3 18.7 1.7 3.8 2.2 2.7 1.1 2.5 13.1 16.0 0.6 1.2 11.0 0.8 7.5 0.8
Japan 2.4 5.7 0.5 27.3 2.0 4.7 0.0 2.4 0.4 1.0 0.5 24.9 2.5 0.5 6.7 1.2
United States 1.6 2.3 3.3 5.2 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.1 1.6 2.5 3.9 12.7 0.7 2.7 0.4
Brazil 0.0 0.2 2.0 8.3 0.0 0.2 0.5 2.2 0.0 0.0 1.5 6.1 1.0 1.2 0.3 0.3
China 0.2 0.6 1.1 6.5 0.2 0.6 0.5 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 3.7 6.7 1.0 13.2 1.5
India 0.2 3.5 0.3 4.8 0.2 3.5 0.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 3.8 0.7 0.1 1.4 1.9
a. Consist of tariff   rate quotas, export subsidies, and domestic support.
Notes: Trade gains from agricultural nontariff   barriers are calculated using a pro-rata impact of the trade gains of agricultural tariff   cuts.
Agricultural trade calculations refl  ect both tariff   and nontariff   barrier cuts. Nonagricultural market access (NAMA) trade calculations refl  ect only tariff   cuts.
Source: Authors’ calculations.41
Table 10     Tariff  s in nonagricultural market access (NAMA) (percent)
Bound Applied
Country/region Pre-Doha Post-Doha Pre-Doha Post-Doha
All 22 countries 8.6 3.7 2.4 1.8
European Union 2.4 1.2 1.5 0.8
Japan 5.7 1.9 0.9 0.5
United States 4.2 1.6 1.4 0.7
Brazil 30.3 12.4 7.0 5.9
China 4.1 2.9 3.5 2.6
India 30.4 11.8 7.8 7.7
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 11     Bound and applied tariff   rates in NAMA imposed by Brazil, 
  China, and India on imports from the group of 15 developing 
  countries in the sample (percent)
Bound Applied
Country Pre-Doha Post-Doha Pre-Doha Post-Doha
Brazil 32.2 13.1 7.5 6.3
China 3.7 2.6 3.0 2.3
India 29.0 11.2 7.9 7.8
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
Source: Authors’ calculations.42
Table 12     GDP impacts of trade gains in agriculture and
  NAMA, using  OECD-Cline coeffi   cients





































NAMA = nonagricultural market access
Sources: OECD (2003); Cline (2004).43
Table 13     Trade eff  ects of China choosing various NAMA fl  exibility options (billions of 
 dollars)
Country
China-20 half cut China-20 no cut
Change in exports Change in imports  Change in exports  Change in imports
Australia 0.90 1.12 0.90 1.12
Canada 0.31 1.57 0.31 1.57
European Union 8.63 13.24 8.62 13.24
Japan 6.71 4.51 6.71 4.51
Norway 0.11 0.28 0.09 0.28
Switzerland 0.43 1.03 0.43 1.03
United States 3.52 13.15 3.47 13.15
Argentina 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.24
Brazil 0.79 1.05 0.79 1.05
China 13.63 6.92 13.63 6.65
Colombia 0.10 0.24 0.10 0.24
India 1.46 0.67 1.46 0.67
Indonesia 1.08 0.08 1.05 0.08
Korea 2.75 1.32 2.75 1.32
Malaysia 0.48 1.45 0.43 1.45
Mexico 0.17 1.67 0.17 1.67
Pakistan 0.51 0.58 0.51 0.58
Philippines 0.42 0.05 0.42 0.05
South Africa 0.22 0.74 0.22 0.74
Taiwan 1.77 1.12 1.78 1.12
Thailand 1.11 1.01 1.06 1.01
Turkey 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.20
Total 45.60 52.22 45.41 51.95
China-22 no cut China-22 half cut
Change in exports Change in imports  Change in exports  Change in imports 
Australia 0.90 1.12 0.90 1.12
Canada 0.31 1.57 0.31 1.57
European Union 8.53 13.24 8.55 13.24
Japan 6.60 4.51 6.62 4.51
Norway 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.28
Switzerland 0.42 1.03 0.42 1.03
United States 3.44 13.15 3.49 13.15
Argentina 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.24
Brazil 0.79 1.05 0.79 1.05
China 13.63 6.26 13.63 6.57
Colombia 0.10 0.24 0.10 0.24
India 1.46 0.67 1.46 0.67
Indonesia 1.05 0.08 1.08 0.08
Korea 2.70 1.32 2.70 1.32
(continued on next page)44
Table 13     Trade eff  ects of China choosing various NAMA fl  exibility options (billions of 
 dollars)  (continued)
China-22 no cut China-22 half cut
Country Change in exports Change in imports  Change in exports  Change in imports 
Malaysia 0.43 1.45 0.47 1.45
Mexico 0.17 1.67 0.17 1.67
Pakistan 0.51 0.58 0.51 0.58
Philippines 0.41 0.05 0.42 0.05
South Africa 0.22 0.74 0.22 0.74
Taiwan 1.74 1.12 1.74 1.12
Thailand 1.05 1.01 1.10 1.01
Turkey 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.20
Total 45.05 51.56 45.28 51.87
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
Source: Authors’ calculations.45
Table 14     Trade eff  ects of Brazil choosing various NAMA fl  exibility options (billions of 
 dollars)
Country
Brazil-20 half cut Brazil-20 no cut
Change in exports Change in imports Change in export Change in imports
Australia 0.90 1.12 0.90 1.12
Canada 0.31 1.57 0.32 1.57
European Union 8.63 13.24 8.69 13.24
Japan 6.71 4.51 6.73 4.51
Norway 0.11 0.28 0.11 0.28
Switzerland 0.43 1.03 0.43 1.03
United States 3.52 13.15 3.56 13.15
Argentina 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.24
Brazil 0.79 1.05 0.79 1.21
China 13.63 6.92 13.65 6.92
Colombia 0.10 0.24 0.10 0.24
India 1.46 0.67 1.46 0.67
Indonesia 1.08 0.08 1.08 0.08
Korea 2.75 1.32 2.75 1.32
Malaysia 0.48 1.45 0.48 1.45
Mexico 0.17 1.67 0.17 1.67
Pakistan 0.51 0.58 0.51 0.58
Philippines 0.42 0.05 0.42 0.05
South Africa 0.22 0.74 0.23 0.74
Taiwan 1.77 1.12 1.77 1.12
Thailand 1.11 1.01 1.11 1.01
Turkey 0.25 0.20 0.26 0.20
Total 45.60 52.22 45.77 52.39
Brazil-22 no cut Brazil-22 half cut
Change in exports Change in imports Change in exports Change in imports
Australia 0.90 1.12 0.90 1.12
Canada 0.31 1.57 0.31 1.57
European Union 8.62 13.24 8.58 13.24
Japan 6.71 4.51 6.70 4.51
Norway 0.11 0.28 0.11 0.28
Switzerland 0.42 1.03 0.42 1.03
United States 3.52 13.15 3.49 13.15
Argentina 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.24
Brazil 0.79 1.00 0.79 0.92
China 13.62 6.92 13.61 6.92
Colombia 0.10 0.24 0.10 0.24
India 1.46 0.67 1.46 0.67
Indonesia 1.08 0.08 1.08 0.08
Korea 2.74 1.32 2.74 1.32
Malaysia 0.47 1.45 0.47 1.45
(continued on next page)46
Table 14     Trade eff  ects of Brazil choosing various NAMA fl  exibility options (billions of 
 dollars) (continued)
Country
Brazil-22 no cut Brazil-22 half cut
Change in exports Change in imports Change in exports Change in imports
Mexico 0.17 1.67 0.17 1.67
Pakistan 0.51 0.58 0.51 0.58
Philippines 0.42 0.05 0.42 0.05
South Africa 0.22 0.74 0.22 0.74
Taiwan 1.77 1.12 1.77 1.12
Thailand 1.11 1.01 1.11 1.01
Turkey 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.20
Total 45.56 52.18 45.48 52.09
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 15     Trade eff  ects of India choosing various NAMA fl  exibility options (billions of 
 dollars)
Country
India-22 no cut India-22 half cut
Change in exports Change in imports Change in exports Change in imports
Australia 0.90 1.12 0.90 1.12
Canada 0.31 1.57 0.31 1.57
European Union 8.51 13.24 8.63 13.24
Japan 6.67 4.51 6.71 4.51
Norway 0.10 0.28 0.11 0.28
Switzerland 0.42 1.03 0.43 1.03
United States 3.48 13.15 3.52 13.15
Argentina 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.24
Brazil 0.79 1.05 0.79 1.05
China 13.59 6.92 13.63 6.92
Colombia 0.10 0.24 0.10 0.24
India 1.46 0.36 1.46 0.67
Indonesia 1.08 0.08 1.08 0.08
Korea 2.74 1.32 2.75 1.32
Malaysia 0.47 1.45 0.48 1.45
Mexico 0.17 1.67 0.17 1.67
Pakistan 0.51 0.58 0.51 0.58
Philippines 0.42 0.05 0.42 0.05
South Africa 0.22 0.74 0.22 0.74
Taiwan 1.77 1.12 1.77 1.12
Thailand 1.11 1.01 1.11 1.01
Turkey 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.20
Total 45.32 51.91 45.60 52.22
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
Note: “20 half cut” and “20 no cut” simulations were not conducted for India.
Source: Authors’ calculations.47
Table 16     Restrictiveness indexes for services policies: Uruguay Round commitments, current 
  Doha Round off  ers, and applied levels
Overall Financial Telecom Retail Maritime Professional
Region Uruguay Round commitments
South Asia 84 67 38 100 100 100
East Asia 63 40 57 79 57 76
Middle East 58 38 28 70 65 81
Africa 70 34 71 83 89 93
Latin America 65 62 39 61 96 75
OECD 28 14 9 15 85 56
Eastern Europe 21 19 10 0 64 47
W o r l d 4 83 33 04 68 27 0
Doha off  ers
South Asia 68 48 33 83 80 87
East Asia 61 40 57 75 50 74
Middle East 54 38 25 60 55 81
Africa 70 33 69 83 89 92
Latin America 59 61 31 56 80 66
OECD 19 13 9 9 20 41
Eastern Europe 15 14 10 0 13 38
W o r l d 4 23 12 84 14 86 1
Applied levels
South Asia 36 24 25 33 33 58
East Asia 37 33 32 25 35 59
Middle East 37 38 10 25 29 64
Africa 17 7 17 4 4 47
Latin America 17 13 6 3 13 44
OECD 15 3998 4 1
Eastern Europe 11 5008 3 7
W o r l d 2 11 31 31 11 54 7
OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
0 = completely open; 100 = completely closed
Source: Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009).4
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Table 17     Impact of services trade negotiationsa (trade in billions of US dollars; tariff  s in percent)
Country/region




Increase after Doha off  ersd 
(billions of dollars)
Increase after 10 percent cute
(billions of dollars)
































European Unionf 6.7 6.7 6.0 421.3 567.1 988.4 0 0 0 10.8 5.2 16.0 10.8 5.2 16.0
Japan 16.8 16.8 15.1 81.9 150.5 232.4 0 0 0 2.7 3.5 6.1 2.7 3.5 6.1
United Statesg 6.7 6.7 6.0 394.2 378.4 772.6 0 0 0 10.8 3.5 14.3 10.8 3.5 14.3
Brazil 55.5 55.5 50.0 19.0 37.2 56.2 0 0 0 0.7 2.8 3.5 0.7 2.8 3.5
China 80.8 80.8 72.7 84.8 129.3 214.1 0 0 0 3.7 14.3 18.0 3.7 14.3 18.0
India 98.5 98.5 88.6 24.8 77.6 102.4 0 0 0 0.7 10.5 11.1 0.7 10.5 11.1
Other 15 22.4 22.4 20.2 370.4 437.2 807.6 0 0 0 13.6 15.9 29.5 13.6 15.9 29.5
All 21 21.3 21.3 19.1 1396.4 1777.3 0 0 42.9 55.7 42.9 55.7





European Unionf 15.8 0.09
Japan 4.0 0.09




Other 15 20.1 0.27
All 21 100.4 0.21
a. The 21 countries included are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Turkey, and the United States.
b. Tariff   equivalents provided from Rosen (2009). “Other 15” and “All 21” tariff   equivalents are weighted averages (by total services imports).
c. Where bilateral services trade data was available from UNSD (2009), OECD (2009), or BEA (2009) 2007 bilateral data was used. Where bilateral data was not available a bilateral services trade fl  ow was estimated by multiply-
ing total services imports by the relevant proportion of bilateral merchandise trade from 2007. 
d. Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009) fi  nd “no new market access” in the current Doha services trade off  ers. We assume that trade will not increase if the off  ers are implemented as they now stand.
e. An import price elasticity of –1.37 is applied here for every bilateral trade fl  ow. This elasticity is the simple average of the general instrumental variable estimate of the elasticity of US service exports (–1.12) and the elastic-
ity of US service imports (–1.62) from Marquez (2005).
f. Measured as the weighted average of service tariff   equivalents for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, using 2008 US exports to each country as weights.
g. Set equal to the EU tariff   equivalent. Rosen (2009) assumes a US tariff   equivalent of service barriers of zero.
Sources: Applied tariff   equivalents: Rosen (2009); Trade: BEA (2009), UNSD (2009), OECD (2009), UN Comtrade Database via WITS (2009); Elasticity: Marquez (2005); authors’ calculations.4
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Table 18    Impact of sector initiatives in chemicalsa (trade in billions of US dollars; tariff  s in percent)




Increase after modality cutse 
(billions of dollars)
Increase after sectoral cutse 
(billions of dollars)
Impact of only sectoral 
(billions of dollars)

























European Union 2.6 1.5 1.0 219.8 179.2 399.0 3.6 2.9 6.5 6.9 4.3 11.2 3.3 1.4 4.7
Japan 1.7 0.8 0.4 74.0 50.3 124.2 2.0 0.8 2.8 4.1 1.0 5.2 2.2 0.2 2.4
United States 2.1 1.2 0.6 156.6 179.3 335.9 2.5 2.3 4.8 4.6 4.6 9.1 2.1 2.3 4.4
Brazil 8.0 5.9 3.3 8.7 21.7 30.4 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.1 1.8 1.9 0.1 1.0 1.1
China 6.7 4.9 3.0 68.1 111.3 179.4 1.2 3.6 4.7 2.5 8.0 10.5 1.3 4.5 5.8
India 8.7 7.0 4.7 14.1 17.7 31.8 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.5 1.3 1.8 0.3 0.8 1.1
Other 16 3.2 2.3 1.4 208.6 303.2 511.7 2.8 4.6 7.4 6.4 9.8 16.1 3.6 5.2 8.7
All 22b 3.3 2.2 1.3 749.9 862.5 12.3 15.4 25.1 30.8 12.8 15.4
Memorandum: GDP impact of new chemicals 
trade











European Union 4.7 0.03 European Union 1,049.2 1,954.0 3,003.2
Japan 1.5 0.04 Japan 628.0 622.2 1,250.2
United States 3.7 0.03 United States 935.1 2,017.1 2,952.2
Brazil 2.9 0.22 Brazil 135.5 120.6 256.2
China 5.4 0.16 China 1,097.6 956.0 2,053.6
India 2.3 0.20 India 104.4 218.6 323.1
Other 16 6.1 0.08 Other 16 2,322.2 2,419.7 4,741.9
All 22 26.6 0.05 All 22 6,272.0 8,308.3
a. All HS 6-digit traded tariff   lines in HS codes 28 through 39 are included. The chapter headings are as follows: HS 28 - Inorganic chemicals; HS 29 - Organic chemicals; HS 30 - Pharmaceutical products; HS 31 - Fertilizers; HS 
32 - Tanning or dyeing extracts; HS 33 - Essential oils; HS 34 - Soap, lubricating preparations, candles, etc.; HS 35 - Albuminoidal substances, modifi  ed starches, glues; HS 36 - Explosives; HS 37 - Photographic or cinemato-
graphic goods; HS 38 - Miscellaneous chemical products; HS 39 - Plastics and articles thereof.  
b. The 22 countries included are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, and the United States.
c. Listed tariff   rates are the weighted average (weighted by bilateral imports) of the simple average of applied HS 6-digit tariff  s on all traded chemical goods in each bilateral relationship. 
d. Trade data from the following years and bilateral pairs are used: Norway - all countries (2008); Pakistan - all countries (2008); Thailand - all countries (2006); Indonesia - India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines and 
Taiwan (2005); Indonesia - all other countries (2007); Mexico - Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines and Taiwan (2006); Mexico - all other countries (2007); All other bilateral relationships (2007).
e. An import price elasticity of –2.09 is applied here for every product and bilateral trade fl  ow. This elasticity is the simple average of all chemical goods observations in Kee et al. (2004).
Sources: UN Comtrade Database via WITS (2009), UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009), Kee et al. (2004), and authors’ calculations.5
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Table 19     Impact of sector initiatives in Information Technology Agreement (ITA) goodsa (trade in billions of US dollars; tariff  s in percent)




Increase after modality cutse 
(billions of dollars)
Increase after sectoral cutse 
(billions of dollars)
Impact of only sectoral 
(billions of dollars)
























European Union 0.4 0.3 0.0 166.4 211.3 377.7 1.0 0.9 1.8 5.2 2.1 7.3 4.3 1.2 5.5
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 181.8 67.0 248.9 1.6 0.0 1.6 6.3 0.0 6.4 4.8 0.0 4.8
United States 0.6 0.4 0.0 157.3 195.1 352.4 0.7 0.5 1.2 3.3 1.5 4.8 2.6 1.0 3.6
Brazil 9.9 8.8 0.0 2.7 16.8 19.5 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 3.5 3.6 0.0 3.3 3.3
China 1.7 1.2 0.0 218.0 193.4 411.3 0.5 1.9 2.4 2.8 8.7 11.5 2.3 6.8 9.1
India 3.4 2.8 0.0 4.1 21.2 25.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.4 1.5 0.1 1.1 1.2
Other 16 1.6 1.3 0.0 321.2 422.3 743.5 2.1 2.2 4.3 10.0 12.0 22.0 7.9 9.8 17.8
All 22b 1.1 0.9 0.0 1,051.4 1,127.1 5.8 6.0 27.9 29.2 22.1 23.2
Memorandum: GDP impact of new ITA goods 
trade











European Union 5.4 0.03 European Union 1,049.2 1,954.0 3,003.2
Japan 3.1 0.07 Japan 628.0 622.2 1,250.2
United States 3.0 0.02 United States 935.1 2,017.1 2,952.2
Brazil 8.8 0.66 Brazil 135.5 120.6 256.2
China 8.5 0.26 China 1,097.6 956.0 2,053.6
India 2.5 0.22 India 104.4 218.6 323.1
Other 16 11.9 0.15 Other 16 2,322.2 2,419.7 4,741.9
All 22 43.2 0.09 All 22 6,272.0 8,308.3
a. See table E1 for product list. Calculations are made using all traded tariff   lines listed in table E1 at the HS 6-digit level.
b. See notes at table 18.
c. Listed tariff   rates are the weighted average (weighted by bilateral imports) of the simple average of applied HS 6-digit tariff  s on all traded ITA goods in each bilateral relationship. 
d. See notes at table 18.
e. An import price elasticity of –2.01 is applied here for every product and bilateral trade fl  ow. This elasticity is the simple average of all existing and new IT goods observations in Kee et al. (2004).
Sources: UN Comtrade Database via WITS (2009), UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009), Kee et al. (2004), and authors’ calculations.5
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Table 20     Impact of sector initiatives in electronic and electrical goodsa (trade in billions of US dollars; tariff  s in percent)




Increase after modality cutse 
(billions of dollars)
Increase after sectoral cutse 
(billions of dollars)
Impact of only sectoral
(billions of dollars)
























European Union 0.9 0.6 0.0 175.8 342.0 517.8 1.3 1.7 3.0 7.0 4.7 11.7 5.7 3.0 8.6
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 197.6 109.5 307.1 2.3 0.0 2.3 8.8 0.0 8.8 6.5 0.0 6.5
United States 1.0 0.6 0.0 198.2 350.9 549.1 0.9 1.4 2.3 4.4 4.0 8.4 3.4 2.6 6.1
Brazil 11.2 9.1 0.0 5.9 22.8 28.7 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.1 4.4 4.5 0.1 3.9 4.0
China 6.6 4.6 0.0 393.7 306.9 700.6 1.9 3.6 5.5 8.6 14.9 23.5 6.7 11.3 18.0
India 6.4 5.7 0.0 5.4 28.9 34.3 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.2 2.1 2.3 0.2 1.7 1.8
Other 16 2.8 2.3 0.0 584.0 526.7 1,110.7 3.1 2.3 5.4 14.0 15.3 29.3 10.9 13.0 23.9
All 22b 2.3 1.8 0.0 1,560.7 1,687.7 9.6 9.9 43.1 45.4 33.5 35.4
Memorandum: GDP impact of new electronics 
trade











European Union 8.5 0.05 European Union 1,049.2 1,954.0 3,003.2
Japan 4.2 0.10 Japan 628.0 622.2 1,250.2
United States 5.1 0.04 United States 935.1 2,017.1 2,952.2
Brazil 10.7 0.80 Brazil 135.5 120.6 256.2
China 16.7 0.51 China 1,097.6 956.0 2,053.6
India 3.7 0.33 India 104.4 218.6 323.1
Other 16 17.0 0.22 Other 16 2,322.2 2,419.7 4,741.9
All 22 66.0 0.14 All 22 6,272.0 8,308.3
a. See table E6 for product list. Calculations are made using all traded tariff   lines listed in table E6 at the HS 6-digit level.
b. See notes at table 18.
c. Listed tariff   rates are the weighted average (weighted by bilateral imports) of the simple average of applied HS 6-digit tariff  s on all traded electronic and electrical goods in each bilateral relationship. 
d. See notes at table 18.
e. An import price elasticity of –2.01 is applied here for every product and bilateral trade fl  ow. This elasticity is the simple average of all electronic and electrical goods in Kee et al. (2004).
Sources: UN Comtrade Database via WITS (2009), UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009), Kee et al. (2004), and authors’ calculations.5
2
Table 21     Impact of sectoral initiatives in environmental goodsa (trade in billions of US dollars; tariff  s in percent)




Increase after modality cutse 
(billions of dollars)
Increase after sectoral cutse 
(billions of dollars)
Impact of only sectoral 
(billions of dollars)
























European Union 1.6 1.2 0.0 26.4 23.7 50.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 1.7 0.4 2.1 1.4 0.3 1.8
Japan 0.3 0.2 0.0 15.8 6.5 22.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 1.2 0.0 1.2 0.9 0.0 0.9
United States 1.2 0.8 0.0 17.0 33.7 50.7 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.6 0.6 0.6 1.2
Brazil 11.7 9.8 0.0 0.4 2.3 2.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.5
China 9.0 6.0 0.0 18.0 18.9 36.9 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.9 2.3 3.1 0.7 1.7 2.4
India 8.5 8.2 0.0 1.3 5.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.8
Other 16 4.0 3.3 0.0 26.3 45.4 71.7 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9 2.8 3.7 0.7 2.4 3.2
All 22b 3.3 2.5 0.0 105.2 135.6 1.0 1.5 5.5 7.8 4.5 6.3
Memorandum: GDP impact of new 
environmental goods trade











European Union 1.7 0.01 European Union 1,049.2 1,954.0 3,003.2
Japan 0.6 0.01 Japan 628.0 622.2 1,250.2
United States 1.0 0.01 United States 935.1 2,017.1 2,952.2
Brazil 1.3 0.10 Brazil 135.5 120.6 256.2
China 2.2 0.07 China 1,097.6 956.0 2,053.6
India 1.7 0.15 India 104.4 218.6 323.1
Other 16 2.4 0.03 Other 16 2,322.2 2,419.7 4,741.9
All 22 11.0 0.02 All 22 6,272.0 8,308.3
a. See table F1 for product list. Calculations are made using all traded tariff   lines listed in table F1 at the HS 6-digit level.
b. See notes at table 18.
c. Listed tariff   rates are the weighted average (weighted by bilateral imports) of the simple average of applied HS 6-digit tariff  s on all traded environmental goods in each bilateral relationship. 
d. See notes at table 18.
e. An import price elasticity of –2.10 is applied here for every product and bilateral trade fl  ow. This elasticity is the simple average of all environmental goods observations in Kee et al. (2004).
Sources: UN Comtrade Database via WITS (2009), UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009), Kee et al. (2004), and authors’ calculations.53
Table 22    Brief summary of Doha Round trade facilitation proposals
Sector Description Proposing members
Cross cutting Small economies/developing countries may use institutions 
under regional trade agreements or customs unions to aid in the 
implementation of new trade facilitation measures.
Barbados, Cuba, Fiji, Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands
Publication Members shall publish all rules pertaining to import and export 
procedures, duties, classifi  cation rules, prohibitions, fees, penalties, and 
appeal procedures.
Hong Kong, Japan, 
Mongolia, Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey
Internet publication Members shall publish and update a full description of their customs 
procedures and make available the forms and documents required for 
importation and exportation on the Internet.
United States
Members shall publish and update a description of import/export 
and transit procedures and all required forms thereof on the internet. 
Whenever practical the language of publication should be one of the 
offi   cial languages of the WTO.
Hong Kong, Japan, 
Mongolia, Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey
Enquiry points Members shall ensure that enquiry points regarding trade procedures 
exist. If fees exist for enquiries they shall not exceed the cost of service.
Hong Kong, Japan, 
Mongolia, Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey
Small economies/developing countries who are party to regional 
agreements may establish regional enquiry points.
Barbados, Cuba, Fiji, Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands
Comment period Except in urgent circumstances, members shall provide information to 
interested parties on new trade facilitation policies with a reasonable 
period of time to comment.
Hong Kong, Japan, 
Mongolia, Switzerland
Members shall allow for a certain, predetermined number of days 
between publication and implementation of new customs procedures.
Turkey
Consults Members shall hold regular consultations between border agencies and 
traders within their territories.
Hong Kong, Japan, 
Mongolia, Switzerland
Advance rulings A member shall issue an advance ruling to an applicant submitting a 
request regarding a good’s classifi  cation, customs valuation, and  the 
application of duties or quotas.
Australia, Canada, Turkey, 
United States
Appeals Each member shall provide that any person to whom customs or other 
border agency issues a decision has the right to an administrative appeal 
and a judicial appeal of the decision.
Japan, Mongolia
There shall be a mechanism for an appeal of adverse fi  ndings of 
inspection authorities at the import points of a customs union.
India
Import alerts Import warnings and any resulting prohibitions must be applied 
uniformly across the issuing country, a warning may only be issued 
after positive evidence, and warnings and prohibitions may not be 
maintained once the situation is resolved.
India
Goods detention  When imported goods are detained for inspection by customs, 
information regarding the detention shall be provided to the importer or 
agent promptly.
India
Test procedure In the event that an import is found to be contaminated or otherwise 
not compliant, members shall grant a second confi  rmatory test of the 
import upon request.
India
Import/export fees Import and export fees shall only be imposed for services provided 
in direct connection with the specifi  c importation or exportation; not 
exceed the approximate cost of the services; not be calculated on an ad 
valorem basis; and not be imposed with respect to consular services and 
equivalent measures. 
European Union, Korea, 
Switzerland
(continued on next page)54
Table 22     Brief summary of Doha Round trade facilitation proposals (continued)
Sector Description Proposing members
Pre-arrival Members shall maintain or introduce pre-arrival processing for imports. 
Where applicable, members shall draw on international standards as a 
basis for pre-arrival processing.
Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, 
Mongolia, Switzerland
Declaration procedures for vessels shall be applied prior to the vessels’ 
arrival, or as rapidly as not to unduly delay the vessel and its cargo. 
Members will also provide for advance electronic lodging of documents 
and for pre-arrival processing of such documents.
European Union
Return of goods Members shall have procedures authorizing an importer to remove 
goods from customs’ control prior to the fi  nal determination of customs 
duties, taxes, and fees when these are not determined at or prior to 
arrival.
Canada, Switzerland
Risk assessment A customs union shall generally apply a harmonized risk-management 
system across the entire customs union.
India
For the purpose of risk management members shall concentrate 
examinations on higher risk goods, thereby facilitating the movement of 
lower-risk goods.
Taiwan, Korea, Switzerland
Members shall apply risk-management techniques with the purpose 
to reduce physical inspections on goods. Members shall concentrate 
physical inspections on high-risk goods.
China
Postclearance audit Members shall conduct postclearance audits on the account books, 
vouchers, commercial documents, customs declaration forms, and other 
related information of trading enterprises.
China, Indonesia, Korea
Average time Members shall measure and publish their own average time for the 
release of goods in a consistent manner on a periodic basis. Members 
shall try to reduce average release time.
Korea, Japan
Authorized traders Members shall apply further simplifi  ed import and export formalities for 
certain authorized traders.
European Union, Mongolia
Norms for authorized trader status shall be applied uniformly by all 
member states of a customs union.
India
Expedited shipments Each member shall adopt or maintain customs procedures allowing for 
expedited shipments while maintaining customs control and selection.
United States
Consular transactions A member shall not require a consular transaction, including any related 
fee or charge, in connection with the importation of any good.
Uganda, United States
Border agencies Members shall ensure that their authorities and agencies involved in 
border and other import and export controls cooperate and coordinate 
their procedures.
Canada, Norway
Transshipped goods may be declared, by the relevant party, at the port 
or place of destination for customs evaluation at that location.
European Union 
Periodic review Each member shall make periodic reviews of its policies, taking into 
account new business practices, techniques, technologies, international 
best practices, and outside input.
Hong Kong, Switzerland
Reducing requirements Members shall minimize the incidence and complexity of import 
and export formalities and decrease and simplify import and export 
documentation requirements.
Hong Kong, Switzerland
Members shall ensure that documentation requirements are no more 
administratively burdensome or trade restrictive than necessary to 
achieve their legitimate objectives.
Mongolia, Norway, 
Switzerland
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Table 22     Brief summary of Doha Round trade facilitation proposals (continued)
Sector Description Proposing members
International standards Members shall use relevant international standards or parts thereof as a 
basis for their laws, regulations, and administrative procedures that lay 
down requirements for formalities and procedures in connection with 
importation, exportation, or transit.
Mongolia, Norway, 
Switzerland
Available information Customs and other border agencies shall require only those documents 
necessary to permit control of the operation and to ensure that all 
requirements relating to the application of relevant laws have been 
complied with.
Hong Kong, Korea, 
Switzerland
Single window Members shall maintain or establish a “single window “ where 
documentation and/or data requirements for exportation, importation, 
and transit are submitted one time only.
Korea, Singapore, Thailand
Preshipment  Members shall not require the use of preshipment inspections or their 
equivalent.
European Union, Taiwan
Members shall not require the provision of shipping notes and 
associated documents as a condition for the import, unloading or 
transshipment of cargos.
European Union
Customs brokers Members shall not require the use of customs brokers. European Union, Mongolia, 
Taiwan, Switzerland
Customs unions For border clearance of goods, member states of a customs union shall 
adopt the same border procedures. 
India
All documentation requirements relating to import clearance shall be 
uniform for all member states of a customs union.
India
Returned goods In case of rejection of a food consignment on account of failure to meet 
certain standards, an option shall fi  rst be given to the exporter to return 
the rejected goods to the exporter.
India
Scope of goods transit Defi  nition of traffi   c in transit: Goods shall be deemed to be in transit 
across the territory of a member when the passage across such territory 
is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and ending beyond 
the frontier of the member whose territory the traffi   c passes.
Macedonia, Mongolia, 
Switzerland, Swaziland
Consignments that are being transshipped shall not be subject to transit 
procedures
European Union
Freedom of transit There shall be nondiscriminatory freedom of transit through the territory 
of each member via the routes most convenient for international transit.
Macedonia, Mongolia, 
Switzerland, Swaziland
Regulations on freedom 
   of transit
All regulation imposed by a member on traffi   c in transit to or from the 
territories of other members shall be reasonable, having regard to the 
conditions of the traffi   c.
Macedonia, Mongolia, 
Switzerland, Swaziland
Traffi   c in transit shall not be subject to any restrictions unless a member 
takes a measure to fulfi  ll one of the objectives laid down in GATT Articles 
XX and XXI.
Cuba, Georgia, Moldova, 
Paraguay, Turkey
Members shall not apply discriminatory measures to goods in transit, 
or to vessels or other means of transport of other members, for non-
commercial reasons.
Cuba
With respect to traffi   c charges, each member shall accord to traffi   c 
in transit to or from the territory of any member treatment no less 
favorable than that accorded to its own traffi   c or the treatment aff  orded 
to traffi   c from the most-favored nation, whichever is more favorable. 
Macedonia, Mongolia, 
Switzerland, Swaziland
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Table 22     Brief summary of Doha Round trade facilitation proposals (continued)
Sector Description Proposing members
Fees and charges on transit Members shall publish promptly information on transit charges. Macedonia, Mongolia, 
Switzerland, Swaziland
Each member shall periodically review its charges to ensure that they 
are in line with WTO commitments and with a view to reducing their 
number and diversity, where appropriate.
Macedonia, Mongolia, 
Switzerland, Swaziland
Members shall exempt traffi   c in transit from customs duties and from all 
transit duties and other fees and charges imposed in respect of transit, 
except for charges like road tolls.
Macedonia, Mongolia, 
Switzerland, Swaziland
Members shall accord to traffi   c in transit to or from the territory of any 
Member, treatment no less favorable than that accorded to domestic 
traffi   c, under like conditions, within the territory of that member.
Cuba, Georgia, Moldova, 
Paraguay, Turkey
Documents for goods 
   transit
Each member shall publish all transit formalities and documentation 
requirements, and regional transit agreements or arrangements.
Macedonia, Mongolia, 
Switzerland, Swaziland
Each member shall periodically review its transit formalities and 




Any member may require that traffi   c in transit through its territory be 




Bonded transport regime Where a member requires a guarantee to avoid inland diversion of 
goods in transit, any person required to provide security shall be allowed 
to choose any form of security provided that it is acceptable to the 




   agreements
Members shall promote bilateral and regional transit agreements or 




Transit cooperation Members shall ensure cooperation and coordination between all 




Members shall provide opportunities for interested traders or their 
representatives to comment on the transit regime and its operation.
Macedonia, Mongolia, 
Switzerland, Swaziland
Customs cooperation Members shall, upon request, exchange information and documents 
on matters such as Harmonized System (HS) classifi  cation, description, 
quantity, country of origin, and valuation of goods in identifi  ed cases of 
import or export where there is reason to doubt the truth or accuracy of 
a declaration fi  led by the importer or exporter.
India, South Africa, Sri Lanka
Members may seek assistance from other members in accordance 
with the following requirements: A member shall seek to obtain and 
review the relevant and necessary documentation from the importer 
respecting the declared value of goods and shall conduct a verifi  cation 
before it requests assistance from another member; and if the member 
has reasonable grounds to doubt the truth or accuracy of supporting 
documentation it may request assistance from the exporting member 
on mutually agreed terms consistent with the requirements of this 
proposal. However, a member shall not require an original or copy of 
export declarations issued by the authorities of the exporting member 
as a requirement for importation.
Canada
(continued on next page)57
Table 22     Brief summary of Doha Round trade facilitation proposals (continued)
Sector Description Proposing members
Implementation of trade
   facilitation 
Cross-cutting measure containing provisions on the following: 
capacity self-assessment, notifi  cation procedures, entry into force 
of the agreement, special and diff  erential treatment, formulation 
of capacity building plans, notifi  cation of capacity building plans, 
timing of implementation of commitments, verifi  cation of capacity 
acquisition, notifi  cation of capacity acquisition, full implementation of 
the agreement, technical assistance, cooperation and coordination in 
implementation, technical assistance in capacity building.
A group of 23 members; 
prominent members 
include the European Union, 
Japan, Mexico, Canada, and 
Switzerland
Cross-cutting measure containing provisions on the following: 
special and diff  erential treatment, the establishment of the WTO’s 
Trade Facilitation Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Support 
Unit (TFTACBSU), capacity self-assessment, notifi  cation procedures, 
formulation of capacity building plans, preparations and notifi  cations of 
capacity building plans, entry into force of the agreement, applicability 
of the agreement, implementation of capacity building plans, 
verifi  cation of capacity acquisition, developed member obligations 
relating to technical assistance and capacity building, cooperation and 
coordination in implementation.
Core Group of Developing 
Countries on Trade 
Facilitation
Cross-cutting measures containing provisions on the following: linking 
technical assistance and capacity building to trade facilitation, needs 
assessments before the trade facilitation agreement, needs assessments 
after the trade facilitation agreement, special and diff  erential treatment 
in levels of commitments, exceptions for least developed countries, early 
warning mechanisms and dispute settlement.
Core Group of Developing 
Countries; African, 
Caribbean, and Pacifi  c 
Group; African Group; Least 
Developed Countries Group
Members and the WTO, within its competence, shall provide technical 
and fi  nancial assistance, on mutually agreed terms, to small economies/
developing countries to support the establishment, modifi  cation, and 
maintenance of these national and regional enquiry points.
Barbados, Cuba, Fiji, Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands
A Committee on Trade Facilitation is hereby established. The committee 
shall be open for participation by all members.  The committee shall 
elect its own chairman. The committee shall meet as needed and 
envisaged by the relevant provisions of the agreement, but no less than 
once a year.
Guatemala, Honduras, Hong 
Kong, Nicaragua, Norway, 
Taiwan, Switzerland
In order to facilitate the process of domestic coordination of trade 
facilitation needs, priorities, and implementation, members shall 
establish a national committee or a similar mechanism on trade 
facilitation with the objective of assisting in the implementation of the 
Agreement on Trade Facilitation.
Honduras, Norway, 
Switzerland
Note: In the interest of brevity, proposals have been shortened and paraphrased in several instances. The offi   cial proposals should be consulted for actual 
text.
Source: WTO (2009c).58
Table 23     Trade and GDP gains from trade facilitation improvements
Country/region




(billions of dollars) Percent Billions of dollars
European Union 70.0 29.5 0.6 98.3
Japan 20.7 13.7 0.5 22.3
United States 93.3 19.0 0.7 94.0
Brazil 4.4 1.6 1.2 16.1
China 40.2 16.0 1.6 52.2
India 5.9 1.2 1.3 14.3
Total 340.0 115.0 0.8 385.1
Notes: Imports are imports from the world and exports are exports to the 22 countries in the sample. Trade gains 
are calculated using coeffi   cients from Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (2005). GDP gains are calculated using OECD-Cline 
coeffi   cients.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.5
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States Brazil China India
Pre-Doha bound rates
All 22 countries
Agriculture 25.0 23.0 30.2 18.7 42.7 20.7 21.4 28.4 21.1 41.1 34.9
NAMA 8.6 8.5 7.2 13.8 12.5 9.0 7.7 10.6 10.7 6.9 7.7
Total 9.4 9.2 8.3 14.0 14.1 9.5 7.7 12.0 13.1 7.6 9.8
Developed (7)
Agriculture 8.4 8.5 8.1 8.8 6.1 12.7 4.8 4.5 8.4 7.4 4.0
NAMA 3.9 2.9 3.9 8.2 14.1 2.5 3.1 2.8 2.8 3.6 5.3
Total 4.2 3.2 4.1 8.3 13.8 3.1 3.1 2.9 4.2 3.7 5.2
Developing (15)
Agriculture 60.5 49.2 77.3 63.7 81.0 46.0 29.9 53.2 49.9 134.9 72.3
NAMA 17.0 17.7 14.2 22.2 9.6 19.2 11.7 21.0 22.2 19.2 13.3
Total 18.9 19.2 17.3 23.2 14.8 20.0 11.8 24.0 27.3 22.0 19.8
European Union
Agriculture 7.8 5.7 7.2 10.4 4.7 ... 7.2 4.0 6.7 7.0 5.3
NAMA 2.4 1.8 3.5 2.4 7.2 ... 3.4 1.5 1.8 3.5 5.1
Total 2.7 2.0 3.8 3.4 7.0 ... 3.4 1.6 3.6 3.5 5.1
Japan
Agriculture 10.7 9.1 13.9 8.3 1.0 8.3 ... 3.6 9.0 9.5 1.6
NAMA 5.7 1.5 2.9 14.7 31.7 1.7 ... 1.0 1.0 3.2 7.6
Total 6.1 2.6 3.5 14.7 29.3 2.4 ... 1.5 3.5 3.5 7.0
United States
Agriculture 3.0 2.3 3.8 3.5 4.0 1.6 3.1 ... 3.8 2.7 1.5
NAMA 4.2 2.7 3.9 9.5 18.0 1.6 1.7 ... 3.9 3.0 4.6
Total 4.1 2.6 3.9 9.2 17.9 1.6 1.7 ... 3.9 3.0 4.4
Brazil
Agriculture 40.6 32.9 44.1 41.2 53.0 32.5 14.6 34.9 ... 33.5 33.9
NAMA 30.3 28.9 32.2 30.7 34.8 29.6 31.6 28.8 ... 32.6 32.2
Total 30.8 29.1 33.1 31.3 35.2 29.7 31.5 28.9 ... 32.6 32.3
China
Agriculture 16.1 17.9 11.8 21.9 36.2 12.8 18.2 17.1 6.2 ... 30.6
NAMA 4.1 5.4 3.7 1.7 0.2 6.5 5.5 4.5 1.3 ... 2.7
Total 4.6 5.9 4.0 2.2 1.9 6.7 5.6 6.0 2.8 ... 5.6
India
Agriculture 167.0 77.4 206.2 110.1 105.9 104.8 106.9 70.0 113.0 103.0 ...
NAMA 30.4 30.8 29.0 31.6 31.7 30.2 32.8 22.9 34.1 26.7 ...
Total 32.3 31.1 36.3 31.9 42.6 30.4 32.9 23.4 51.3 27.1 ...
(continued on next page)
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States Brazil China India
Post-Doha bound rates
All 22 countries
Agriculture 18.2 16.2 23.1 12.8 30.9 12.1 16.3 22.2 15.2 32.4 28.6
NAMA 3.7 3.8 3.2 5.1 4.3 4.1 3.8 4.6 4.9 3.0 3.5
Total 4.4 4.5 4.2 5.5 5.7 4.5 3.9 6.1 7.3 3.6 5.4
Developed (7)
Agriculture 3.9 3.6 3.9 4.5 2.9 5.2 2.3 2.1 4.4 3.6 1.9
NAMA 1.6 1.4 1.7 2.6 4.3 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.6 2.4
Total 1.7 1.5 1.8 2.7 4.2 1.5 1.6 1.5 2.1 1.7 2.3
Developing (15)
Agriculture 48.7 38.9 63.9 50.1 60.1 33.9 23.6 43.1 39.8 112.6 61.0
NAMA 7.5 7.9 6.4 9.0 4.2 8.7 5.8 8.9 10.2 8.1 6.1
Total 9.2 9.4 9.2 10.0 8.2 9.5 5.8 12.1 15.6 10.6 12.1
European Union
Agriculture 4.2 2.8 3.9 5.7 2.5 ... 3.4 2.0 3.9 3.5 2.5
NAMA 1.2 1.1 1.7 1.1 3.0 ... 1.8 0.9 1.0 1.8 2.5
Total 1.4 1.1 1.9 1.7 2.9 ... 1.8 1.0 2.1 1.8 2.5
Japan
Agriculture 4.5 3.9 5.7 3.5 0.6 4.0 ... 1.7 4.2 4.6 0.8
NAMA 1.9 0.7 1.2 4.3 4.4 0.9 ... 0.5 0.4 1.5 2.5
Total 2.1 1.2 1.5 4.2 4.1 1.2 ... 0.7 1.6 1.7 2.3
United States
Agriculture 1.6 1.2 2.0 1.7 2.0 0.8 1.5 ... 1.8 1.3 0.8
NAMA 1.6 1.3 1.6 2.8 5.3 1.0 1.2 ... 1.6 1.4 2.1
Total 1.6 1.3 1.6 2.8 5.2 1.0 1.2 ... 1.6 1.4 2.0
Brazil
Agriculture 31.0 21.9 35.2 32.4 35.8 21.9 9.0 22.0 ... 20.8 21.8
NAMA 12.4 12.2 13.1 11.9 12.7 12.4 13.2 12.1 ... 13.9 12.5
Total 13.2 12.4 14.9 12.9 13.2 12.8 13.2 12.3 ... 13.9 12.7
China
Agriculture 14.7 16.1 10.9 19.7 32.6 11.1 14.7 15.5 6.0 ... 27.7
NAMA 2.9 3.7 2.6 1.3 0.2 4.4 3.8 3.2 1.0 ... 2.0
Total 3.4 4.2 3.0 1.7 1.7 4.5 3.8 4.7 2.4 ... 4.7
India
Agriculture 130.4 47.3 169.8 70.1 62.9 66.3 60.9 43.1 61.6 59.0 ...
NAMA 11.8 11.6 11.2 12.5 12.9 11.5 13.1 9.0 12.7 10.4 ...
Total 13.4 11.8 17.8 12.7 20.2 11.7 13.1 9.4 23.3 10.7 ...
… = not applicable
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
LDCs = least developed countries
Note: Rows are tariff  s applied to imports; columns are tariff  s applied to exports.
Source: Author’s calculations.6
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States Brazil China India
All 22 countries
Agriculture 6.8 6.8 7.2 6.0 11.8 8.6 5.1 6.2 5.9 8.7 6.3
NAMA 4.9 4.6 4.0 8.6 8.2 4.8 3.9 5.9 5.8 3.9 4.2
Total 5.0 4.7 4.2 8.5 8.4 5.0 3.9 5.9 5.8 4.0 4.4
Developed (7)
Agriculture 4.5 4.8 4.2 4.3 3.2 7.5 2.5 2.4 4.0 3.8 2.2
NAMA 2.3 1.5 2.2 5.6 9.9 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.5 2.0 2.9
Total 2.4 1.7 2.3 5.5 9.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 2.2 2.0 2.9
Developing (15)
Agriculture 11.8 10.3 13.4 13.6 20.9 12.1 6.4 10.1 10.1 22.3 11.3
NAMA 9.6 9.8 7.8 13.2 5.4 10.5 5.9 12.1 12.0 11.1 7.2
Total 9.7 9.8 8.1 13.2 6.5 10.5 5.9 11.9 11.7 11.3 7.7
European Union
Agriculture 3.6 2.9 3.3 4.8 2.3 ... 3.8 2.0 2.8 3.6 2.8
NAMA 1.2 0.8 1.8 1.2 4.2 ... 1.5 0.5 0.8 1.7 2.6
Total 1.3 0.8 1.9 1.7 4.0 ... 1.5 0.6 1.5 1.8 2.6
Japan
Agriculture 6.2 5.3 8.2 4.9 0.4 4.3 ... 1.9 4.8 4.9 0.8
NAMA 3.8 0.8 1.7 10.5 27.2 0.9 ... 0.5 0.6 1.7 5.1
Total 4.0 1.5 2.0 10.4 25.2 1.2 ... 0.7 1.9 1.8 4.7
United States
Agriculture 1.5 1.1 1.8 1.8 2.0 0.8 1.5 ... 2.0 1.4 0.8
NAMA 2.5 1.4 2.3 6.6 12.8 0.6 0.5 ... 2.3 1.6 2.5
Total 2.5 1.4 2.3 6.4 12.7 0.6 0.5 ... 2.3 1.6 2.4
Brazil
Agriculture 9.6 11.0 9.0 8.8 17.3 10.6 5.6 12.9 ... 12.7 12.1
NAMA 18.0 16.8 19.1 18.9 22.2 17.2 18.4 16.6 ... 18.7 19.7
Total 17.6 16.6 18.3 18.4 22.1 16.9 18.4 16.5 ... 18.7 19.6
China
Agriculture 1.5 1.8 0.9 2.2 3.6 1.7 3.4 1.6 0.3 ... 3.0
NAMA 1.2 1.7 1.0 0.4 0.1 2.1 1.7 1.3 0.3 ... 0.7
Total 1.2 1.7 1.0 0.4 0.2 2.1 1.7 1.4 0.3 ... 0.9
India
Agriculture 36.6 30.1 36.5 40.0 43.0 38.6 46.1 26.9 51.4 44.0 ...
NAMA 18.6 19.2 17.7 19.1 18.9 18.6 19.7 13.9 21.4 16.3 ...
Total 18.8 19.2 18.5 19.2 22.4 18.7 19.8 14.1 28.0 16.5 ...
… = not applicable
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
LDCs = least developed countries
Note: Rows are cuts on tariff  s applied to imports; columns are cuts on tariff  s applied to exports.
Source: Authors’ calculations.6
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States Brazil China India
Pre–Doha “water level”
All 22 countries
Agriculture 17.5 16.3 21.4 12.1 35.9 12.0 7.7 23.9 13.4 32.8 30.7
NAMA 6.2 5.9 4.4 12.0 10.5 5.3 3.7 8.9 9.4 3.2 3.7
Total 6.7 6.4 5.3 12.0 12.0 5.6 3.7 10.2 10.3 3.8 5.8
Developed (7)
Agriculture 2.9 3.3 2.3 3.4 5.4 5.9 0.5 1.9 2.1 0.9 0.8
NAMA 2.6 1.8 1.8 7.5 11.9 1.0 0.6 2.1 1.9 0.5 1.2
Total 2.6 1.9 1.8 7.3 11.6 1.3 0.6 2.1 2.0 0.5 1.2
Developing (15)
Agriculture 48.5 39.7 62.0 51.2 67.8 31.3 11.3 46.6 38.9 121.8 66.8
NAMA 12.7 12.6 10.1 18.7 8.3 12.1 6.4 18.2 20.3 13.3 9.6
Total 14.2 13.9 12.6 19.5 12.6 12.7 6.4 20.8 23.8 15.9 15.9
European Union
Agriculture 1.8 0.6 1.4 3.4 4.5 ... 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.4 0.0
NAMA 0.9 0.5 0.9 1.6 7.0 ... 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0
Total 0.9 0.5 1.0 1.9 6.8 ... 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0
Japan
Agriculture 0.3 –0.0 0.9 0.7 0.2 –0.0 ... 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.6
NAMA 4.8 0.5 1.5 14.6 31.6 0.1 ... 0.3 0.7 0.9 6.7
Total 4.5 0.5 1.5 14.4 29.2 0.0 ... 0.3 0.6 0.9 6.1
United States
Agriculture 1.7 1.4 2.0 2.4 4.0 0.0 0.0 ... 0.3 0.0 0.7
NAMA 2.8 1.7 2.0 8.6 13.8 0.1 0.0 ... 2.8 0.0 1.3
Total 2.7 1.7 2.0 8.3 13.7 0.1 0.0 ... 2.5 0.0 1.3
Brazil
Agriculture 36.5 21.6 42.8 40.3 45.5 20.2 8.7 26.2 ... 24.5 27.3
NAMA 23.3 19.4 24.7 30.0 34.4 18.6 19.6 20.7 ... 20.2 27.4
Total 23.9 19.5 26.2 30.5 34.7 18.7 19.6 20.8 ... 20.3 27.4
China
Agriculture 6.6 7.5 3.4 7.2 30.8 0.8 0.2 11.2 0.6 ... 24.7
NAMA 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.2 ... 0.8
Total 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.4 1.5 0.6 0.7 1.9 0.4 ... 3.3
India
Agriculture 106.9 40.4 130.7 79.8 76.6 56.0 77.2 40.2 50.4 71.1 ...
NAMA 22.5 21.0 21.0 25.4 25.8 20.1 21.3 15.2 27.9 18.2 ...
Total 23.7 21.1 25.6 25.6 33.2 20.2 21.3 15.5 32.8 18.5 ...
(continued on next page)6
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States Brazil China India
Post-Doha “water level”
All 22 countries
Agriculture 12.9 11.7 16.5 8.2 24.5 6.1 5.0 18.9 9.9 26.8 25.4
NAMA 1.9 1.8 1.3 3.6 3.4 1.3 0.9 3.4 3.9 0.7 1.3
Total 2.4 2.3 2.1 3.9 4.5 1.5 1.0 4.6 5.3 1.2 3.1
Developed (7)
Agriculture 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.4 2.5 1.4 0.1 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.3
NAMA 0.9 0.7 0.6 2.3 3.6 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.7 0.1 0.5
Total 0.9 0.7 0.6 2.2 3.5 0.4 0.1 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.5
Developing (15)
Agriculture 38.1 30.8 49.7 39.1 47.4 20.9 7.5 37.6 30.3 101.1 55.7
NAMA 3.7 3.7 2.9 5.7 3.0 2.8 1.7 6.5 8.5 3.0 3.1
Total 5.2 5.0 5.2 6.5 6.2 3.4 1.7 9.4 12.5 5.4 8.9
European Union
Agriculture 0.7 0.3 0.5 1.4 2.3 ... 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0
NAMA 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 2.9 ... 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0
Total 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.8 2.8 ... 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
Japan
Agriculture 0.0 –0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 –0.0 ... 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
NAMA 1.4 0.1 0.5 4.2 4.4 0.0 ... 0.1 0.2 0.4 2.0
Total 1.3 0.1 0.5 4.1 4.1 0.0 ... 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.8
United States
Agriculture 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.1 2.0 0.0 0.0 ... 0.2 0.0 0.4
NAMA 0.9 0.7 0.8 2.5 4.0 0.0 0.0 ... 1.0 0.0 0.8
Total 0.9 0.7 0.8 2.5 4.0 0.0 0.0 ... 0.9 0.0 0.8
Brazil
Agriculture 27.1 11.2 33.8 31.5 28.3 10.3 3.2 13.4 ... 11.8 15.2
NAMA 6.5 4.3 6.8 11.1 12.4 3.5 3.6 5.3 ... 3.4 8.4
Total 7.4 4.5 9.0 12.2 12.7 3.8 3.6 5.5 ... 3.5 8.5
China
Agriculture 5.8 6.7 3.0 6.3 27.2 0.7 0.2 9.9 0.6 ... 21.8
NAMA 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1 ... 0.3
Total 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 1.3 0.3 0.3 1.5 0.3 ... 2.6
India
Agriculture 74.8 17.8 99.0 43.3 34.6 23.9 31.5 20.1 12.9 28.8 ...
NAMA 4.1 2.1 3.4 6.3 7.1 1.8 2.1 1.6 6.5 2.1 ...
Total 5.0 2.2 7.4 6.5 11.1 1.8 2.2 1.8 7.9 2.3 ...
… = not applicable
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
LDCs = least developed countries
Note: Rows are tariff  s applied to imports; columns are tariff  s applied to exports.
Source: Authors’ calculations.64





Bound MFN Applied Bound MFN Applied Bound MFN Applied
Argentina
Agriculture 31.0 12.5 12.5 31.9 9.7 2.9 21.1 9.6 2.9
NAMA 32.2 15.1 15.1 32.0 11.8 5.1 13.9 9.2 4.3
Total 32.1 15.0 15.0 32.0 11.7 5.0 14.1 9.2 4.2
Brazil
Agriculture 41.2 12.2 12.2 40.6 11.1 4.1 31.0 10.6 3.9
NAMA 30.3 10.5 10.5 30.3 8.7 7.0 12.4 6.9 5.9
Total 30.8 10.6 10.6 30.8 8.8 6.9 13.2 7.1 5.8
China
Agriculture 10.1 49.0 49.0 16.1 16.1 9.6 14.7 14.6 8.9
NAMA 4.7 11.2 11.2 4.1 3.6 3.5 2.9 2.6 2.6
Total 4.9 12.7 12.7 4.6 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.8
Colombia
Agriculture 113.8 14.8 14.8 118.6 18.1 10.5 85.5 18.0 10.5
NAMA 35.6 11.0 11.0 35.2 11.1 8.7 14.0 9.5 7.6
Total 42.9 11.4 11.4 43.0 11.8 8.9 20.7 10.3 7.9
India
Agriculture 155.3 58.9 58.9 167.0 61.3 60.2 130.4 56.6 55.7
NAMA 27.4 21.0 21.0 30.4 8.0 7.8 11.8 7.8 7.7
Total 29.2 21.5 21.5 32.3 8.7 8.6 13.4 8.5 8.4
Indonesia
Agriculture 59.0 5.2 5.2 56.2 4.2 3.1 43.1 4.2 3.1
NAMA 36.5 3.7 3.7 36.5 3.3 2.5 13.2 3.0 2.3
Total 38.8 3.9 3.9 38.5 3.4 2.5 16.2 3.1 2.4
Korea
Agriculture 85.2 79.2 79.2 84.9 14.1 13.9 70.8 10.9 10.9
NAMA 6.1 4.6 4.6 11.8 4.0 4.0 5.9 3.7 3.7
Total 9.2 7.6 7.6 14.7 4.4 4.4 8.5 4.0 4.0
Malaysia
Agriculture 11.3 2.2 2.2 236.8 15.9 13.7 199.2 13.3 12.6
NAMA 7.0 4.5 4.5 10.3 4.2 3.6 4.9 2.4 2.1
Total 7.2 4.4 4.4 22.7 4.8 4.1 15.5 3.0 2.6
Mexico
Agriculture 37.6 34.4 14.5 56.3 23.9 4.8 43.9 18.1 3.4
NAMA 35.4 13.9 3.5 35.8 11.1 3.6 14.3 9.0 3.0
Total 35.5 15.2 4.2 37.1 11.9 3.7 16.2 9.6 3.0
Pakistan
Agriculture 94.1 14.3 14.3 99.2 15.4 15.2 78.4 15.1 14.9
NAMA 58.9 20.9 20.9 58.5 12.8 12.8 16.7 9.7 9.7
Total 63.4 20.1 20.1 63.7 13.2 13.1 24.7 10.4 10.4
(continued on next page)65





Bound MFN Applied Bound MFN Applied Bound MFN Applied
Philippines
Agriculture 30.0 11.1 11.1 26.3 13.0 11.8 18.9 12.7 11.6
NAMA 11.5 3.4 3.4 17.9 3.3 2.6 7.7 3.0 2.5
Total 13.2 4.1 4.1 18.7 4.2 3.5 8.8 3.9 3.3
South Africa
Agriculture 51.1 8.3 7.9 53.3 9.5 8.6 40.9 8.9 8.0
NAMA 15.6 6.1 6.0 18.6 6.4 6.3 9.4 4.7 4.6
Total 17.5 6.2 6.1 20.5 6.5 6.4 11.1 4.9 4.8
Taiwan
Agriculture 14.4 14.4 14.4 17.6 11.3 11.3 15.4 10.1 10.1
NAMA 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.1
Total 3.9 3.9 3.9 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.4 1.4
Thailand
Agriculture 49.4 9.9 9.9 47.3 13.8 9.2 38.1 11.1 7.9
NAMA 17.1 5.2 5.2 20.4 4.5 4.0 8.8 3.5 3.1
Total 18.3 5.3 5.3 21.4 4.9 4.2 10.0 3.8 3.3
Turkey
Agriculture 37.9 15.5 14.3 37.6 16.7 16.6 24.2 12.6 12.5
NAMA 17.2 3.9 1.5 21.2 3.5 3.0 10.6 3.4 2.9
Total 18.0 4.4 2.1 22.0 4.1 3.6 11.2 3.8 3.3
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
LDCs = least developed countries
MFN = most favored nation
a. WTO Integrated Data Base, accessed through World Integrated Trade Solution. Tariff   year for Thailand is 2004.
b. Dataset compiled by the WTO (on fi  le with authors).
Notes: Averages based on HS 2-digit categories and bilateral import values for 2006 reported by WTO dataset.6
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States Brazil China India
Pre-Doha applied rates
All 22 countries
Agriculture 7.6 6.7 8.8 6.7 6.8 8.7 13.7 4.5 7.7 8.3 4.2
NAMA 2.4 2.6 2.8 1.8 1.9 3.7 4.0 1.6 1.3 3.7 4.0
Total 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.0 2.2 3.9 4.0 1.9 2.7 3.8 4.0
Developed (7)
Agriculture 5.5 5.2 5.8 5.4 0.6 6.8 4.3 2.6 6.2 6.6 3.2
NAMA 1.4 1.1 2.1 0.7 2.3 1.5 2.5 0.7 0.9 3.1 4.1
Total 1.6 1.3 2.3 1.0 2.2 1.8 2.5 0.9 2.3 3.2 4.0
Developing (15)
Agriculture 12.0 9.5 15.3 12.5 13.2 14.7 18.6 6.6 10.9 13.1 5.5
NAMA 4.4 5.1 4.2 3.4 1.3 7.1 5.3 2.8 1.9 5.9 3.7
Total 4.7 5.3 4.7 3.7 2.2 7.3 5.4 3.2 3.5 6.1 3.9
European Union
Agriculture 6.0 5.1 5.8 7.1 0.2 ... 7.2 4.0 6.4 5.7 5.3
NAMA 1.5 1.3 2.6 0.7 0.2 ... 3.4 1.5 0.6 3.5 5.1
Total 1.7 1.4 2.8 1.5 0.2 ... 3.4 1.6 2.7 3.5 5.1
Japan
Agriculture 10.4 9.1 13.0 7.6 0.8 8.3 ... 3.6 8.7 9.1 1.0
NAMA 0.9 1.0 1.4 0.2 0.1 1.7 ... 0.6 0.3 2.3 0.9
Total 1.6 2.2 2.0 0.3 0.1 2.3 ... 1.2 3.0 2.6 0.9
United States
Agriculture 1.3 0.9 1.8 1.0 0.0 1.6 3.1 ... 3.5 2.7 0.8
NAMA 1.4 1.0 1.9 0.9 4.2 1.5 1.7 ... 1.1 3.0 3.3
Total 1.4 1.0 1.9 0.9 4.2 1.5 1.7 ... 1.4 3.0 3.2
Brazil
Agriculture 4.1 11.3 1.4 0.9 7.6 12.3 5.9 8.7 ... 9.0 6.6
NAMA 7.0 9.5 7.5 0.8 0.4 11.0 12.0 8.0 ... 12.4 4.9
Total 6.9 9.6 7.0 0.8 0.5 11.0 12.0 8.1 ... 12.3 4.9
China
Agriculture 9.6 10.3 8.4 14.7 5.4 12.0 17.9 5.9 5.6 ... 5.9
NAMA 3.5 4.8 3.0 1.4 0.1 6.0 4.9 3.9 1.1 ... 1.9
Total 3.7 5.0 3.2 1.7 0.3 6.1 4.9 4.1 2.4 ... 2.3
India
Agriculture 60.2 37.0 75.5 30.3 29.3 48.8 29.7 29.8 62.6 32.0 ...
NAMA 7.8 9.8 7.9 6.2 6.0 10.1 11.5 7.7 6.2 8.5 ...
Total 8.6 10.0 10.7 6.3 9.4 10.2 11.6 8.0 18.5 8.6 ...
(continued on next page)6
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States Brazil China India
Post-Doha applied rates
All 22 countries 5.3 4.5 6.6 4.5 6.4 6.0 11.3 3.3 5.4 5.6 3.2
Agriculture 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.5 0.9 2.9 2.9 1.3 1.0 2.3 2.2
NAMA 2.0 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.2 3.0 2.9 1.4 2.0 2.3 2.3
Total
Developed (7) 2.9 2.6 3.0 3.1 0.4 3.8 2.1 1.2 3.6 3.4 1.5
Agriculture 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.6 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.9
NAMA 0.8 0.8 1.2 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.6 0.5 1.3 1.6 1.8
Total
Developing (15) 10.6 8.1 14.2 10.9 12.7 13.0 16.0 5.4 9.5 11.4 5.3
Agriculture 3.7 4.2 3.5 3.3 1.2 5.9 4.1 2.4 1.7 5.1 3.0
NAMA 4.0 4.4 4.0 3.5 2.0 6.1 4.1 2.7 3.1 5.3 3.2
Total
European Union 3.4 2.5 3.4 4.2 0.1 ... 3.4 2.0 3.8 3.3 2.5
Agriculture 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.4 0.1 ... 1.8 0.9 0.5 1.7 2.5
NAMA 1.0 0.8 1.5 0.9 0.1 ... 1.8 1.0 1.7 1.8 2.5
Total
Japan 4.5 3.9 5.6 3.4 0.5 4.0 ... 1.7 4.1 4.6 0.6
Agriculture 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.9 ... 0.4 0.2 1.1 0.6
NAMA 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 1.2 ... 0.6 1.4 1.3 0.6
Total
United States 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.8 1.5 ... 1.7 1.3 0.4
Agriculture 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.3 1.3 1.0 1.2 ... 0.6 1.4 1.3
NAMA 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.3 1.3 0.9 1.2 ... 0.7 1.4 1.2
Total
Brazil 3.9 10.7 1.4 0.9 7.5 11.5 5.8 8.6 ... 9.0 6.6
Agriculture 5.9 7.9 6.3 0.7 0.3 8.9 9.6 6.8 ... 10.5 4.1
NAMA 5.8 7.9 5.9 0.7 0.4 9.0 9.6 6.9 ... 10.5 4.1
Total
China 8.9 9.4 7.9 13.4 5.4 10.4 14.5 5.6 5.4 ... 5.9
Agriculture 2.6 3.4 2.3 1.1 0.1 4.1 3.5 2.8 0.8 ... 1.7
NAMA 2.8 3.7 2.6 1.4 0.3 4.2 3.5 3.1 2.2 ... 2.1
Total
India 55.7 29.5 70.8 26.8 28.3 42.4 29.4 23.0 48.7 30.3 ...
Agriculture 7.7 9.5 7.8 6.1 5.8 9.8 10.9 7.4 6.1 8.3 ...
NAMA 8.4 9.7 10.4 6.2 9.1 9.9 10.9 7.6 15.4 8.4 ...
Total
… = not applicable
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
LDCs = least developed countries
Note: Rows are tariff  s applied to imports; columns are tariff  s applied to exports.
Source: Authors’ calculations.68












States Brazil China India
All 22 countries
Agriculture 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 0.4 2.7 2.4 1.2 2.3 2.7 1.0
NAMA 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.3 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.3 0.3 1.4 1.8
Total 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.7 1.4 1.7
Developed (7)
Agriculture 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.2 0.3 3.0 2.1 1.3 2.7 3.1 1.7
NAMA 0.6 0.4 1.1 0.4 1.6 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.4 1.6 2.2
Total 0.7 0.5 1.2 0.5 1.5 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.9 1.6 2.2
Developing (15)
Agriculture 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.6 0.5 1.7 2.6 1.1 1.4 1.7 0.3
NAMA 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.2 1.2 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.7
Total 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.2 1.2 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.7
European Union
Agriculture 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.8 0.1 ... 3.8 2.0 2.6 2.4 2.8
NAMA 0.7 0.5 1.3 0.3 0.1 ... 1.5 0.5 0.2 1.7 2.6
Total 0.8 0.6 1.3 0.6 0.1 ... 1.5 0.6 1.0 1.7 2.6
Japan
Agriculture 6.0 5.3 7.4 4.2 0.3 4.3 ... 1.9 4.6 4.5 0.4
NAMA 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.8 ... 0.2 0.1 1.2 0.4
Total 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.1 0.1 1.2 ... 0.6 1.5 1.3 0.4
United States
Agriculture 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.8 1.5 ... 1.9 1.4 0.4
NAMA 0.7 0.3 1.1 0.6 2.9 0.5 0.5 ... 0.5 1.6 2.0
Total 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.6 2.9 0.5 0.5 ... 0.7 1.6 2.0
Brazil
Agriculture 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.1 ... 0.0 0.0
NAMA 1.2 1.7 1.2 0.1 0.1 2.1 2.4 1.2 ... 1.9 0.8
Total 1.1 1.7 1.1 0.1 0.1 2.0 2.4 1.2 ... 1.9 0.8
China
Agriculture 0.7 0.9 0.4 1.3 0.0 1.6 3.4 0.3 0.2 ... 0.1
NAMA 0.9 1.4 0.7 0.3 0.0 1.9 1.3 1.1 0.2 ... 0.2
Total 0.9 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.0 1.9 1.3 1.0 0.2 ... 0.2
India
Agriculture 4.5 7.5 4.7 3.5 1.0 6.5 0.3 6.8 13.9 1.7 ...
NAMA 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 ...
Total 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 3.1 0.2 ...
… = not applicable
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
Note: Rows are cuts in tariff  s applied to imports; columns are cuts in tariff  s applied to exports.
Source: Authors’ calculations.6
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Table A7     Reciprocity measure gains from domestic support concessions (millions of dollars) 
Concessions given by
Concessions given to Australia Canada European Union Japan Norway Switzerland United States Argentina Korea Thailand
World 8 235 5,546 511 67 118 556 1 32 85
Australia … 41 156 71 1 5 50081
Canada 0 … 156 n.a. 2 9 17010
European Union 3 27 … 0 35 57 50003
Japan 0 0 462 … n.a. 0 0000
Norway 0 0 16 n.a. … 0 1000
Switzerland 0 0 31 n.a. 0 … 2000
United States 1 85 635 294 1 10 … 0 18 17
Argentina 1 10 55 n.a. 0 3 77 … 0 1
Brazil 0 27 373 28 8 15 56020
Bulgaria/Romania/Iceland n.a. n.a. 10 n.a. 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
China 0 6 380 17 0 1 60 0 1 10
Colombia 0 0 76 n.a. n.a. 0 6 0 n.a. 0
Korea 0 0 154 0 n.a. 0 1 0 … 0
India 0 3 119 0 n.a. 0 25 0 0 24
Indonesia n.a. n.a. 79 n.a. 0 0 0 0 0
Malaysia 0 0 64 n.a. n.a. 0 0000
Mexico 0 2 307 n.a. n.a. 0 12000
Pakistan 0 0 23 n.a. n.a. 0 7 0 0 13
Philippines n.a. 0 56 n.a. n.a. 0 8 0 0 n.a.
South Africa 0 0 57 n.a. 0 2 11000
Taiwan 0 0 102 0 n.a. 0 1 0 n.a. 0
Thailand 0 0 170 15 n.a. 0 5 0 0 …
Turkey 0 1 114 n.a. n.a. 0 8000
Other developing countries 1 14 1,022 7 14 4 86 0 0 14
Least developed countries 0 1 140 0 0 0 45000
Non WTO 2 17 791 78 3 11 27011
… = not applicable
n.a. = not available
Note: Rows are cuts in tariff  s applied to imports; columns are cuts in tariff  s applied to exports.
Source: Authors’ calculations.70
Table A8     Reciprocity measure gains from concessions in export subsidies (millions of dollars)
Concessions given by
Concessions  given to Canada
European 
Union Norway Switzerland United States
World 21 2,882 42 151 21
Australia 3 363 5 11 3
Canada … 184 2 4 1
European Union 8 … 18 43 7
Japan 0 16 0 1 0
Norway 0 14 … 1 0
Switzerland 0 63 2 … 0
United States 1 559 3 11 …
Argentina 1 97 1 9 0
Brazil 0 197 1 8 1
Bulgaria 0 8 0 0 0
China 0 91 1 2 0
Colombia 0 16 0 1 0
Hong Kong 0 23 0 1 0
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0
India 0 43 0 1 0
Indonesia 0 6 0 3 0
Korea 0 11 0 0 0
Malaysia 0 18 0 12 0
Mexico 0 39 0 1 0
New Zealand 4 538 6 17 5
Pakistan 0 7 0 0 0
Philippines 0 6 0 1 0
Romania 0 3 0 0 0
Singapore 0 28 0 1 0
South Africa 0 31 0 1 0
Taiwan 0 6 0 0 0
Thailand 0 138 0 3 0
Turkey 0 14 0 1 0
Other developing countries 1 263 2 14 1
Least developed countries 0 11 0 1 0
Non-WTO members 1 88 1 3 1
… = not applicable
Source: Author’s calculations.71
Table A9    Reciprocity measure gains from tariff   rate quota expansion (millions of of dollars)
Concessions given by
Concessions given to Canada
European 
Union Norway Switzerland United States
World 329.9 3,979.0 112.8 177.1 407.6
Australia 5.1 74.2 1.5 0.9 47.3
Canada … 124.9 0.0 n.a. 9.8
European Union 97.0 … 60.1 92.8 93.6
Japan 0.0 0.6 n.a. 1.8 0.0
Norway n.a. 11.5 … n.a. 0.0
Switzerland n.a. 159.7 0.1 … 2.7
United States 152.7 587.0 0.0 3.4 …
Argentina 5.1 346.9 0.1 0.5 17.5
Brazil 0.0 817.6 2.9 20.9 17.0
Bulgaria/Romania/Iceland 0.3 303.8 2.0 n.a. 0.4
China n.a. 25.7 0.0 0.0 0.6
Colombia n.a. 0.2 n.a. n.a. 3.4
Korea n.a. 0.0 n.a. n.a. 0.0
India 0.0 8.0 n.a. 0.0 0.1
Indonesia n.a. 0.0 n.a. n.a. 0.3
Malaysia n.a. 0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mexico 0.0 26.5 n.a. 0.0 132.6
Pakistan n.a. 0.1 n.a. 0.0 n.a.
Philippines 0.4 0.3 n.a. 0.0 0.3
South Africa n.a. 0.2 n.a. 0.9 0.0
Taiwan 0.0 0.0 n.a. n.a. 0.0
Thailand 7.9 0.8 n.a. 0.8 n.a.
Turkey 0.0 12.2 n.a. 0.0 0.0
Other developing countries 0.4 805.2 10.2 0.7 42.7
Least developed countries n.a. 37.1 n.a. 0.0 n.a.
Others 60.7 289.3 35.8 54.3 38.8
Non WTO 0.2 347.3 0.1 0.0 0.1
… = not applicable
n.a. = not available
Source: Author’s calculations.7
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Table A10     Overall gains in agriculture and NAMA expressed in terms of reciprocity measure (billions of dollars)
Exporters







Union Japan United States Brazil China India
All 22 countries
Agriculture total 22.7 8.5 7.4 3.2 0.3 1.8 0.5 3.2 2.1 1.1 0.3
Tariff  s 7.4 3.4 2.6 0.9 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.1
NTBs 15.3 5.1 4.8 2.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 2.4 1.6 0.6 0.2
NAMA 42.4 16.4 21.2 2.2 0.7 7.1 6.2 2.5 0.2 12.2 1.3
Total 65.1 24.9 28.6 5.4 0.9 8.9 6.8 5.6 2.4 13.2 1.6
Developed (7)
Agriculture total 21.1 7.6 6.9 3.1 0.2 1.6 0.5 2.8 2.0 1.0 0.3
Tariff  s 5.9 2.6 2.2 0.8 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1
NTBs 15.2 5.1 4.8 2.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 2.3 1.6 0.6 0.2
NAMA 26.9 6.8 16.4 1.7 0.6 3.0 2.4 1.1 0.2 10.7 1.2
Total 48.0 14.4 23.4 4.8 0.9 4.6 2.9 3.9 2.2 11.7 1.4
Developing (15)
Agriculture total 1.6 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0
Tariff  s 1.5 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0
NTBs 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NAMA 15.5 9.6 4.8 0.5 0.0 4.1 3.8 1.4 0.1 1.4 0.2
Total 17.0 10.4 5.2 0.6 0.0 4.3 3.8 1.8 0.2 1.5 0.2
European Union
Agriculture total 14.5 4.0 4.9 2.7 0.2 ... 0.5 1.9 1.7 0.6 0.2
Tariff  s 2.1 0.4 0.9 0.6 0.0 ... 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0
NTBs 12.4 3.6 4.1 2.1 0.2 ... 0.5 1.8 1.4 0.5 0.2
NAMA 10.0 2.4 6.2 0.5 0.0 ... 1.4 0.9 0.0 4.0 0.7
Total 24.4 6.4 11.2 3.2 0.2 ... 1.8 2.9 1.7 4.6 0.9
Japan
Agriculture total 3.0 1.7 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 ... 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.0
Tariff  s 2.5 1.3 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 ... 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0
NTBs 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 ... 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
NAMA 2.3 0.6 1.6 0.1 0.0 0.4 ... 0.1 0.0 1.3 0.0
Total 5.3 2.3 2.6 0.2 0.0 0.7 ... 0.7 0.1 1.6 0.0
(continued on next page)7
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Table A10     Overall gains in agriculture and NAMA expressed in terms of reciprocity measure (billions of dollars)
Exporters







Union Japan United States Brazil China India
United States
Agriculture total 1.4 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 ... 0.1 0.1 0.0
Tariff  s 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 ... 0.1 0.0 0.0
NTBs 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 ... 0.1 0.1 0.0
NAMA 11.7 2.3 7.2 1.1 0.6 1.5 0.7 ... 0.1 4.5 0.4
Total 13.1 2.8 7.9 1.2 0.6 1.8 0.7 ... 0.2 4.5 0.4
Brazil
Agriculture total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ... 0.0 0.0
Tariff  s 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ... 0.0 0.0
NTBs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ... 0.0 0.0
NAMA 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 ... 0.2 0.0
Total 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 ... 0.2 0.0
China
Agriculture total 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ... 0.0
Tariff  s 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ... 0.0
NTBs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ... 0.0
NAMA 6.1 3.9 1.8 0.1 0.0 1.6 1.5 0.6 0.0 ... 0.0
Total 6.3 4.0 1.8 0.2 0.0 1.7 1.5 0.6 0.0 ... 0.0
India
Agriculture total 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 ...
Tariff  s 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 ...
NTBs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ...
NAMA 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 ...
Total 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 ...
… = not applicable
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
NTBs = nontariff   barriers
Source: Authors’ calculations.74
Table A11     Calculations of a single trade elasticity for trade impact calculations
Country
Kee et al. (2004) 
estimated import 
elasticity
2006 total merchandise 
imports
(billions of dollars) Import weight Elasticity weight
Argentina –1.26 34 0.00 –0.01
Australia –1.19 133 0.02 –0.02
Brazil –1.34 91 0.01 –0.02
Canada –1.13 350 0.05 –0.05
China –1.13 791 0.11 –0.12
Colombia –1.16 26 0.00 –0.00
European Union –1.08 1,698 0.23 –0.25
India –1.33 185 0.03 –0.03
Indonesia –1.14 61 0.01 –0.01
Japan –1.37 579 0.08 –0.11
Korea –1.10 309 0.04 –0.05
Malaysia –1.05 131 0.02 –0.02
Mexico –1.11 256 0.03 –0.04
Norway –1.11 64 0.01 –0.01
Pakistan –1.16 30 0.00 –0.00
Philippines –1.07 54 0.01 –0.01
South Africa –1.16 68 0.01 –0.01
Switzerland –1.10 141 0.02 –0.02
Taiwan –1.16 203 0.03 –0.03
Thailand –1.08 129 0.02 –0.02
Turkey –1.14 140 0.02 –0.02
United States –1.30 1,919 0.26 –0.34
Total 7,394 Average –1.19
Source: Kee et al. (2004); UN Comtrade Database via WITS (2009).7
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States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 22 countries
Agriculture total 20.5 7.6 6.4 3.2 0.2 1.7 0.5 3.3 2.0 1.1 0.3
   Tariff  s 6.7 3.0 2.2 0.9 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.1
   NTBs 13.8 4.6 4.2 2.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 2.5 1.5 0.6 0.2
NAMA 45.6 17.6 22.8 2.4 0.7 7.5 6.7 2.7 0.3 13.2 1.4
Total 66.1 25.2 29.2 5.5 0.9 9.2 7.2 6.0 2.3 14.2 1.7
Developed (7)
Agriculture total 19.2 6.8 6.1 3.1 0.2 1.5 0.5 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.3
   Tariff  s 5.4 2.3 1.9 0.8 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.1
   NTBs 13.8 4.5 4.2 2.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 2.6 1.6 0.6 0.2
NAMA 29.5 7.7 17.8 1.9 0.7 3.3 2.7 1.2 0.2 11.7 1.2
Total 48.7 14.4 23.9 5.0 0.8 4.8 3.3 4.3 2.2 12.7 1.5
Developing (15)
Agriculture total 1.4 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0
   Tariff  s 1.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0
   NTBs 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NAMA 16.1 9.9 5.0 0.5 0.0 4.2 3.9 1.5 0.1 1.5 0.2
Total 17.4 10.7 5.3 0.6 0.0 4.3 3.9 1.8 0.2 1.5 0.2
European Union
Agriculture total 15.3 4.3 5.1 2.9 0.2 … 0.6 2.1 1.7 0.6 0.2
   Tariff  s 2.2 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.0 … 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0
   NTBs 13.1 3.9 4.2 2.3 0.2 … 0.6 2.0 1.4 0.5 0.2
NAMA 11.0 2.7 6.9 0.5 0.0 … 1.5 1.1 0.0 4.4 0.7
Total 26.3 7.0 11.9 3.5 0.2 … 2.1 3.2 1.7 5.0 0.9
Japan
Agriculture total 2.4 1.4 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.3 … 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.0
   Tariff  s 2.0 1.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.3 … 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0
   NTBs 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
NAMA 2.5 0.7 1.7 0.1 0.0 0.5 … 0.1 0.0 1.4 0.0
Total 4.9 2.1 2.5 0.1 0.0 0.7 … 0.7 0.1 1.7 0.0
(continued on next page)7
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States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
United States
Agriculture total 1.6 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 … 0.1 0.1 0.0
   Tariff  s 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 … 0.1 0.0 0.0
   NTBs 1.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 … 0.1 0.1 0.0
NAMA 12.7 2.7 7.7 1.2 0.6 1.8 0.8 … 0.1 4.8 0.4
Total 14.2 3.2 8.5 1.4 0.6 2.1 0.8 … 0.3 5.0 0.5
Brazil
Agriculture total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.0 0.0
   Tariff  s 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.0 0.0
   NTBs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.0 0.0
NAMA 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 … 0.2 0.0
Total 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 … 0.2 0.0
China
Agriculture total 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.0
   Tariff  s 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.0
   NTBs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.0
NAMA 6.7 4.3 2.0 0.2 0.0 1.8 1.7 0.6 0.0 … 0.0
Total 6.9 4.4 2.0 0.2 0.0 1.8 1.7 0.6 0.0 … 0.0
India
Agriculture total 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 …
   Tariff  s 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 …
   NTBs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 …
NAMA 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 …
Total 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 …
Percent increase from 2006 trade levels
All 22 countries
Agriculture total 6.2 5.0 5.6 7.4 5.8 3.8 27.3 5.2 8.3 6.5 4.8
   Tariff  s 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 0.3 2.5 2.4 1.3 2.2 2.8 1.1
   NTBs 4.2 3.0 3.7 5.3 5.5 1.2 24.9 3.9 6.1 3.7 3.8
NAMA 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.3 1.1 0.8 1.2 0.4 0.3 1.5 1.9
Total 0.9 0.8 1.2 0.7 1.4 1.0 1.3 0.8 2.2 1.6 2.1
(continued on next page)7
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States Brazil China India
Percent increase from 2006 trade levels
Developed (7)
Agriculture total 8.5 10.3 7.8 9.0 10.2 4.5 82.7 9.4 12.0 8.3 7.9
   Tariff  s 2.4 3.5 2.5 2.3 0.2 2.8 2.3 1.4 2.7 3.3 1.7
   NTBs 6.1 6.9 5.4 6.7 10.0 1.6 80.4 7.9 9.3 5.0 6.2
NAMA 0.7 0.4 1.2 0.4 1.6 0.6 1.1 0.3 0.4 1.7 2.4
Total 1.1 0.8 1.5 1.0 2.0 0.8 1.3 1.0 3.4 1.8 2.7
Developing (15)
Agriculture total 1.3 1.4 1.0 1.3 0.4 1.6 2.4 1.2 1.1 1.7 1.1
   Tariff  s 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.2 0.4 1.6 2.4 1.1 1.1 1.5 0.3
   NTBs 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.9
NAMA 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.2 1.2 1.3 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.7
Total 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.2 1.2 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.7
European Union
Agriculture total 18.7 29.2 14.2 13.5 12.8 … 348.9 28.0 15.2 17.5 13.5
   Tariff  s 2.7 2.7 2.4 3.1 0.1 … 4.3 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.9
   NTBs 16.0 26.5 11.7 10.4 12.7 … 344.6 25.8 12.6 15.0 10.5
NAMA 0.8 0.6 1.4 0.3 0.1 … 1.7 0.6 0.2 1.9 2.8
Total 1.7 1.5 2.2 1.9 1.2 … 2.4 1.8 5.6 2.1 3.5
Japan
Agriculture total 5.7 5.6 5.7 3.5 0.0 4.5 … 4.5 6.4 5.1 0.5
   Tariff  s 4.7 4.4 5.4 3.2 0.0 4.5 … 2.1 4.6 4.7 0.5
   NTBs 1.0 1.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 … 2.4 1.8 0.3 0.0
NAMA 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.9 … 0.3 0.1 1.3 0.4
Total 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.1 0.1 1.2 … 1.1 2.1 1.5 0.4
United States
Agriculture total 2.3 1.5 3.1 2.1 0.0 1.9 1.7 … 4.3 4.4 2.9
   Tariff  s 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.9 1.7 … 2.0 1.6 0.5
   NTBs 1.6 1.0 2.1 1.6 0.0 1.1 0.0 … 2.3 2.8 2.4
NAMA 0.7 0.4 1.1 0.7 3.1 0.6 0.6 … 0.6 1.7 2.1
Total 0.8 0.4 1.2 0.7 3.0 0.7 0.6 … 1.0 1.7 2.2
(continued on next page)7
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States Brazil China India
Percent increase from 2006 trade levels
Brazil
Agriculture total 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 … 0.0 0.0
   Tariff  s 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 … 0.0 0.0
   NTBs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.0 0.0
NAMA 1.2 1.8 1.2 0.1 0.1 2.1 2.5 1.3 … 2.0 0.8
Total 1.2 1.7 1.1 0.1 0.1 2.1 2.5 1.3 … 1.9 0.8
China
Agriculture total 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.6 3.4 0.3 0.2 … 0.1
   Tariff  s 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.6 3.4 0.3 0.2 … 0.1
   NTBs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 0.0
NAMA 1.0 1.5 0.7 0.3 0.0 2.0 1.5 1.2 0.2 … 0.2
Total 1.0 1.5 0.7 0.3 0.0 2.0 1.5 1.1 0.2 … 0.2
India
Agriculture total 3.5 6.0 3.6 0.3 0.9 4.5 0.0 6.0 9.7 1.5 …
   Tariff  s 3.5 6.0 3.6 0.3 0.9 4.5 0.0 6.0 9.7 1.5 …
   NTBs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 …
NAMA 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 …
Total 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.4 2.2 0.2 …
… = not applicable
NAMA = nonagricultural market access; LDCs = least developed countries; NTBs = nontariff   barriers
Note: Rows = imports; columns = exports.
Source: Authors’ calculations.79
Table A13     Trade gains from improved trade facilitation: Simulation results from Wilson, Mann, and
 Otsuki  (2005)  (percent change of trade fl  ow)
Region
Port 











East Asia 7.6 0.8 3.9 11.7 24.0
East Europe and Central Asia 9.5 0.9 6.1 13.5 30.0
Latin America and Caribbean 7.9 0.9 4.4 6.8 20.0
Middle East and North Africa 0.6 0.7 0.6 1.4 3.3
OECD 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.0 3.8
South Asia 12.1 0.8 7.4 20.0 40.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.4 0.6 3.3 5.6 10.9
Total 2.8 0.8 2.1 4.0 9.7
Importers
East Asia 4.2 2.2 3.3 7.0 16.7
East Europe and Central Asia 4.9 3.2 4.0 7.7 19.8
Latin America and Caribbean 4.2 3.5 3.8 4.7 16.1
Middle East and North Africa 1.3 1.3 1.2 2.8 6.6
OECD 2.2 0.1 1.6 3.0 6.9
South Asia 4.5 5.8 4.8 9.3 24.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.0 3.0 3.1 6.1 15.2
Total 2.8 0.8 2.1 4.0 9.7
OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Source: Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (2005).80
APPENDIX B METHODOLOGY
Agriculture
Tariff   and Tariff   Quotas
In agriculture, the reductions in bound rates follow a tiered formula detailed in table B1. A “half 
deviation” is applied to out-of-quota tariﬀ  s for sensitive products.1 If the tariﬀ   on a sensitive product 
remains above 100 percent after the tariﬀ   cut, the quota for that product is expanded by 0.5 percent of 
domestic consumption. For in-quota tariﬀ  s, the tiered formula is applied (table B1). Tariﬀ   caps of 100 
and 150 percent are imposed, respectively, on non-“sensitive” tariﬀ   lines for developed countries and on 
non-“special” tariﬀ   lines for developing countries and recently acceded member-countries (RAMs). 
For developed countries, 4 percent of the products are assumed to be “sensitive.” To compensate 
for lower tariﬀ   cuts in these products, developed countries must expand their quotas by 3.5 percent 
of domestic consumption. Japan, Norway, and Switzerland get a diﬀ  erent treatment for tariﬀ   quota 
expansion. After the cut, if tariﬀ   lines above 100 percent represent less than or up to 2 percent of all tariﬀ   
lines, the additional 2 percent of “sensitive” tariﬀ   lines will have their quotas expanded by 2 percent of 
domestic consumption. If there remain more than 2 percent of tariﬀ   lines with a tariﬀ   rate above 100 
percent, all tariﬀ   lines concerned will have a quota expansion of 4 percent of domestic consumption. 
For new or expanded tariﬀ   quotas, in-quota tariﬀ  s are assumed to be zero. Th   ese new or expanded 
tariﬀ   quotas are multiplied by the out-of-quota tariﬀ   to determine the value of concessions from reduced 
out-of-quota tariﬀ   revenues. For tariﬀ   quota simulations for the European Union, the United States, 
Japan, Canada, and Norway, a hypothetical list of “sensitive” products is made from agricultural tariﬀ   
lines for which the countries have provided consumption data. 
For developing countries, the “special” products consist of the 12 percent of agricultural tariﬀ   
lines with the highest bound tariﬀ  s. For RAMs the ﬁ  gure is 13 percent. For developing countries, an 11 
percent tariﬀ   cut is applied to these products, and for RAMs 10 percent. For developing countries and 
RAMs, no “sensitive” products are taken into account.2 
Domestic Support and Export Subsidies
For domestic support and export subsidies, the method consists of calculating tariﬀ   rate equivalents so as 
to be comparable with market access concessions detailed above. 
For domestic support, product-speciﬁ  c limits on aggregate measurement of support (AMS) are 
calculated based on the modalities for developed and developing countries, assuming that developing 
1. A “half deviation” means that the reductions required are divided by 2. If a tariﬀ   was to be reduced by 70 percent 
according to the tiered formula, then for sensitive products it will need to be reduced by only 35 percent.  
2. Th   e WTO methodology applies a tariﬀ   cut to some “special” products but not to “sensitive” products.81
countries would choose the methodology that would require the least cuts in their product-speciﬁ  c AMS. 
If the average of non-product-speciﬁ  c AMS over the last three years exceeds the Doha de minimis level, 
the surplus is allocated to individual products according to their share of average notiﬁ  ed product-speciﬁ  c 
support over the last three years for which data are available. After applying these modalities, if the sum 
of product-speciﬁ  c AMS limits is higher than the new ﬁ  nal bound total AMS, the new ﬁ  nal bound 
total AMS is allocated to the products according to their share of the average notiﬁ  ed product-speciﬁ  c 
support over the last three years for which data are available. However, if the allocated amount for a 
product exceeds the product-speciﬁ  c AMS limit, the latter is used as the “new” product-speciﬁ  c limit. 
Th  e  diﬀ  erence between the “new” product-speciﬁ  c AMS limits and the average notiﬁ  ed product-speciﬁ  c 
support over the last three years for which data are available is the cut that the country should apply to 
AMS. 
For each commodity, we determine the cuts in subsidy amounts per unit of production. Dividing 
per unit subsidy amounts by world unit values, we calculate the tariﬀ   rate equivalents. To determine the 
concessions made by the country, the tariﬀ   rate equivalent is multiplied by either imports or exports, 
depending on whether the country is a net importer or net exporter of the good. If it is a net importer 
of that good, a country’s concession is allocated to its trading partners according to their shares in 
the country’s market.  If it is a net exporter of that good, a country’s concession is allocated to other 
competing exporters according to their share in world exports of that commodity (excluding the country 
making the concession).  
Th   e same approach is followed for Blue Box payments. Simulations based on this methodology were 
carried out for the United States, the European Union, Japan, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Korea, South Africa, Taiwan, and Th  ailand.
A diﬀ  erent methodology is used for export subsidies. Notiﬁ  ed outlays are used as an estimate of 
concessions given by a country. Th   ese are calculated as the average amount notiﬁ  ed to the WTO during 
2000–04. Concessions are allocated to other exporting countries according to the WTO member’s share 
in world exports of that commodity (excluding the country making the concession). Th   is method was 
used for simulations of export subsidy reductions for Canada, the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, 
and the United States.
Nonagricultural Market Access (NAMA)
For NAMA, in the case of developed countries, in all tables we follow the scenario agreed in Doha, which 
assumes a Swiss coeﬃ   cient of 8, applied to all tariﬀ   lines with no exceptions.3  
3. Th   e Swiss formula is a linear mathematical formula that calculates the decrease in duty rates with a slope dependent 
on the original tariﬀ   rate. If the original tariﬀ   is high, the slope of decrease will be higher. If the original tariﬀ   is low, the 
slope of decrease will be lower. Th   erefore, the Swiss formula reduces tariﬀ   dispersion. Th   e exact formula is Z = AX / (A+X), 82
For developing countries, in tables 1 through 12, we assume that countries follow the “20 half cut” 
scenario, one of the ﬁ  ve options available to developing countries in Doha NAMA negotiations. Th  is 
scenario consists of applying a coeﬃ   cient of 20 to the Swiss formula, with the ﬂ  exibility of making smaller 
cuts on 14 percent of its most “sensitive” industrial tariﬀ   lines, provided that these tariﬀ   lines do not 
exceed 15 percent of the total value of NAMA imports. In tables 13 through 15, we allow China, India, 
and Brazil to select other tariﬀ   reduction scenarios.4 
We assume that the ﬁ  rst set of tariﬀ   lines subject to ﬂ  exibility are those with the highest applied 
tariﬀ  s. If there is added ﬂ  exibility, we assume it is applied to tariﬀ   lines with the highest bound tariﬀ  , and 
ﬁ  nally to those with the lowest import share. Th   e formula is generally applied to bound rates; it is used for 
applied rates only in the case where the current applied rate is higher than the new bound rate. Moreover, 
the NAMA reductions are compliant with the “anti-concentration clause,” which restricts developing 
countries from applying all the ﬂ  exibility granted to them in a single sector, thereby excluding that sector 
from the liberalization process.5 When a tariﬀ   line is unbound, for purposes of these calculations, an 
artiﬁ  cial bound rate is created at 25 percent above the most favored nation (MFN) applied rate. Finally, 
some countries had not yet implemented all their commitments by 2005. To omit the accession eﬀ  ect, 
MFN applied rates are simply set at the level of the ﬁ  nal bound rates. 
where Z is the reduced tariﬀ  , X is the initial tariﬀ  , and A is the negotiated coeﬃ   cient. For example, if we assume a Swiss 
coeﬃ   cient of 20, an initial tariﬀ   of 100 percent will be reduced to 16.6 percent, while an initial tariﬀ   of 5 percent will be 
reduced to 4 percent.
4. Th   e other four scenarios available to developing countries are: (1) “20 no cut” (a Swiss coeﬃ   cient of 20 with the 
ﬂ  exibility to make no cuts in bound rates on 6.5 percent of its most sensitive industrial tariﬀ   lines, provided they do 
not exceed 7.5 percent of the total NAMA import value); (2) “22 half cut” (a Swiss coeﬃ   cient of 22, which means tariﬀ   
reductions that are less steep than the 20 coeﬃ   cient, and a ﬂ  exibility of making smaller cuts in 10 percent of its most 
sensitive industrial products, provided they do not exceed 10 percent of the total NAMA import value); (3) “22 no cut” 
(a Swiss coeﬃ   cient of 22, and the ﬂ  exibility to make no cuts in tariﬀ   rates to 5 percent of its most sensitive industrial tariﬀ   
lines, provided they do not exceed 5 percent of the total NAMA imports); and (4) “25” (a Swiss coeﬃ   cient of 25 applied 
to all NAMA tariﬀ   lines). 
5. Th   e anti-concentration clause states that “full formula tariﬀ   reductions shall apply to a minimum of either 20 percent 
of national tariﬀ   lines or 9 percent of the value of imports of the Member in each HS Chapter” (WTO, paragraph 7(d) of 
“Fourth Revision of Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access,” TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3, December 6, 2008).83
Table B1     Tiered formula for tariff   reductions in market access (percent)
Developed countries Developing countries Recently acceded countries
Tier Reduction Tier Reduction Tier Reduction
0<=20 50 0<=30 33.5 0<=10 0
>20<=50 57 >30<=80 38 >10<=20 25.5
>50<=75 64 >80<=130 43 >20<=50 30
>75 70 >130 47 >50<=75 35
>75 39
Notes: A tariff   within a certain tier will be reduced by the corresponding reduction amount. For example, a developed country with a 
tariff   of 55 percent will decrease its tariff   rate by 64 percent (down to 19.8 percent), while a developing country will decrease the same 
tariff   rate by 38 percent (down to 34.1 percent), and a recently acceded country by 35 percent (down to 35.7 percent).84
APPENDIX C SERVICES
To estimate the potential trade gains from liberalization in services, we assume a 10 percent reduction in 
the econometrically estimated tariﬀ   equivalent of services barriers in the 21 countries studied (Taiwan is 
excluded from this exercise). Th   e initial tariﬀ   equivalents (table C1) are taken from Rosen (2009). Th  e 
tariﬀ   equivalents are calculated as the average across services sectors using an ordinary least squares gravity 
model estimation procedure.1
To determine the impact of a 10 percent tariﬀ   equivalent change we ﬁ  rst must determine bilateral 
services trade ﬂ  ows between the 21 countries. Only some of this data are publicly available (and some 
of it may not be collected at all). Essentially, only OECD countries’ bilateral ﬂ  ows with other OECD 
countries and major economies (e.g., China and India) are readily available. To ﬁ  ll in the missing data 
points, we estimate bilateral service ﬂ  ows between countries by assuming the share of a country’s services 
trade with a partner out of its total services trade is equal to the share of that country’s merchandise trade 
with the same partner out of its total merchandise trade. A collapsed version of the results from this 
estimation procedure is shown in table C2.
We use a partial equilibrium analysis to determine the impact of a 10 percent tariﬀ   equivalent 
reduction. For each bilateral trade ﬂ  ow, the percentage point diﬀ  erence in tariﬀ   equivalents for the 
importing country is multiplied by an elasticity of –1.37; one minus the resulting ﬁ  gure (as a percent) is 
then multiplied by the current trade ﬂ  ow to estimate trade after the 10 percent cut. Th   e results from this 
estimation procedure are displayed in table C3. Th   e results indicate a large jump in developing-country 
service imports ($40.9 billion). Only about a third of this increase would come from the United States 
and European Union ($7 billion and $7.6 billion, respectively). Developed-country imports would 
increase by only $14.8 billion; the smaller increase is due to the low levels of developed-country service 
barriers relative to developing-country barriers (as measured by the tariﬀ   equivalents shown in table C1).
1. Th   e gravity equation used is: Mi,j = ai + aj + a1ln(GDP)j + a2ln(PCI)j + εj. Where Mi,j represents existing services 
imports in sector i by country j, ai  and aj are sector and country eﬀ  ect variables, respectively, PCIj  represents per 
capita income in the importing country, GDPj  represents national GDP, and εj is an error term. To determine tariﬀ   
equivalents the following equation is used aj = -σ ln(Tj). Where Tj is the power of the tariﬀ   equivalent (1+t1 ) such 
that in free trade T0 =1, and σ is the trade substitution elasticity relative to domestic production, data for which are 
derived from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) (Rosen 2009).   85
Table C1     Tariff   equivalents of service barriers (percent)
Country 
Current tariff   
equivalent






















United Statesb 6.69 6.02
a. Measured as the weighted average of service tariff   equivalents for Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, using 2008 US ex-
ports to each country as weights.
b. Set equal to the EU tariff   equivalent. Rosen (2009) assumes a US tariff   equivalent 
of service barriers of zero.
Sources: Rosen (2009), authors’ calculations.86









States Brazil China India
All 21 countries 1,777.3 380.9 1,080.8 421.3 81.9 394.2 19.0 84.8 24.8
Developed (7) 1,284.3 282.2 827.3 322.3 51.0 294.3 10.5 39.4 18.5
Developing (14) 492.9 98.7 253.5 98.9 30.9 99.8 8.6 45.4 6.3
European Union 567.1 285.3 71.2 … 18.9 175.1 5.5 14.7 7.4
Japan 150.5 85.3 24.6 33.1 … 43.1 0.3 8.2 0.6
United States 378.4 223.6 59.2 145.9 26.2 … 4.1 8.8 9.7
Brazil 37.2 20.7 10.9 8.8 0.6 9.9 … 3.9 0.7
China 129.3 51.8 27.5 24.4 8.2 14.2 2.5 … 2.0
India 77.6 26.8 17.7 10.2 1.2 9.5 0.3 8.7 …
Note: Services import data availability (including reported exports by a partner) is as follows:
Argentina: All countries but Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Turkey
Australia: Only Canada, EU, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, USA
Brazil: Only Canada, EU, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, USA
Canada: All countries
China: Only Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, Korea, Norway, Pakistan, USA
European Union: All countries
India: Only Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, USA
Indonesia: Only Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, Pakistan, USA
Japan: All countries but Argentina, Colombia, Turkey
Korea: Only Australia, Canada, Colombia, EU, Japan, Pakistan, USA
Malaysia: Only Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, Pakistan, USA
Mexico: Only Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, Pakistan, USA
Norway: All countries but Argentina, Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines South Africa, Thailand
Pakistan: All countries
Philippines: Only Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, Pakistan, USA
South Africa: Only Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, Pakistan, USA
Switzerland: Only Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, Norway Pakistan, USA
Thailand: Only Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, Pakistan, USA
Turkey: Only Canada, EU, Norway, Pakistan
United States: All countries but Colombia, Turkey
All other bilateral relationships are estimated by multiplying each country’s total service imports by the relevant proportion of bilat-
eral merchandise trade from 2007. 
Sources: BEA (2009), UNSD (2009), OECD (2009), UN Comtrade Database via WITS (2009), authors’ calculations.87










States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 21 countries 55.7 15.0 27.9 10.8 2.7 10.8 0.7 3.7 0.7
Developed (7) 14.8 3.6 9.1 3.1 0.5 3.9 0.1 0.6 0.2
Developing (14) 40.9 11.4 18.8 7.6 2.2 7.0 0.6 3.1 0.5
European Union 5.2 2.6 0.7 … 0.2 1.6 0.1 0.1 0.1
Japan 3.5 2.0 0.6 0.8 … 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
United States 3.5 2.1 0.5 1.3 0.2 … 0.0 0.1 0.1
Brazil 2.8 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.0 0.8 … 0.3 0.1
China 14.3 5.7 3.0 2.7 0.9 1.6 0.3 … 0.2
India 10.5 3.6 2.4 1.4 0.2 1.3 0.0 1.2 …
Percent increase from current services trade
All 21 countries 3.1 3.9 2.6 2.6 3.3 2.7 3.7 4.4 2.6
Developed (7) 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.0
Developing (14) 8.3 11.5 7.4 7.7 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.9 7.5
European Union 0.9 0.9 0.9 … 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Japan 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 … 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
United States 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 … 0.9 0.9 0.9
Brazil 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 … 7.6 7.6
China 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 … 11.1
India 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 …
Sources: Rosen (2009), BEA (2009), UNSD (2009), OECD (2009), UN Comtrade Database via WITS (2009), Marquez (2005), authors’ calculations.88
APPENDIX D CHEMICALS 
Using the same partial equilibrium methodology detailed earlier, we determine the impact of the 
nonagricultural market access (NAMA) modality tariﬀ   cuts and a sectoral initiative on chemical trade 
between the 22 countries. Th   e simple averages of applied bilateral tariﬀ  s before and after the modality 
tariﬀ   cuts on all traded tariﬀ   lines are displayed in table D1. Th   e rates vary widely, even for one country’s 
tariﬀ  s, because of diﬀ  erent product coverage. Th   e average rate the United States applies before the 
modality cuts to Japanese and Chinese chemical imports is roughly the same, 3.28 and 3.24 percent, 
respectively, while the average rate on Brazilian and Indian imports is much lower, 0.70 and 0.85 percent, 
respectively. After the modality cuts, the US rates for chemical imports from Japan and China drop by 
about 1.5 percentage points while those for chemical imports from Brazil and India drop by a much 
smaller margin, about 0.3 percentage points. Under a sectoral initiative, we assume all chemical tariﬀ  s 
at or below 2.5 percent, after the modality cuts, will go to zero; all tariﬀ  s above 2.5 percent and equal to 
or below 5 percent, after the modality cuts, will go to a new tariﬀ   of 2.5 percent; and all tariﬀ  s above 5 
percent, after the modality cuts, will go to a new tariﬀ   of 5 percent.
Th   e modality cuts increase world chemical exports to the 22 countries by 1.79 percent over current 
levels of chemical trade (table D2). Chemical imports by the three main developed countries (the 
European Union, Japan, and the United States) all increase by less than 2 percent from the modality cuts. 
Chemical imports by the three main developing countries (Brazil, China, and India) all increase by over 
2.5 percent, with Brazilian and Chinese chemical imports increasing by over 3 percent. Of the $2.28 
billion increase in US chemical imports, over half ($1.15 billion) comes from the European Union. Of 
the EU increase in chemical imports, $2.89 billion, only about a third ($ 0.96 billion) comes from the 
United States.
Table D3 shows the estimated trade ﬂ  ows from the sector initiative tariﬀ   cuts, which encompass the 
modality cuts. Nearly every bilateral relationship at least doubles over the modality cuts alone. Table D4 
shows the additional increase in trade from the sectoral tariﬀ   cuts over the modality cuts. Th  e  modality 
and sectoral cuts each increase world chemical exports to the 22 countries by roughly $15.4 billion. 89










States Brazil China India
Current applied rates
All 22 countries 3.29 2.95 2.89 3.05 4.78 2.78 2.26 2.56 3.63
Developed (7) 2.05 1.77 1.43 2.01 3.38 2.05 0.73 1.67 2.37
Developing (15) 5.58 4.99 5.92 4.70 5.98 3.87 4.74 5.70 5.91
European Union 2.57 2.54 1.16 … 3.88 3.88 0.67 0.73 3.69
Japan 1.66 2.50 0.52 2.55 … 2.58 0.17 0.05 0.06
United States 2.13 1.88 1.98 2.92 3.28 … 0.70 3.24 0.85
Brazil 8.02 8.86 6.59 8.57 9.11 9.11 … 8.56 8.02
China 6.71 6.87 6.60 6.78 6.86 6.76 7.27 … 6.81
India 8.72 8.51 9.85 8.31 8.31 8.42 13.93 8.22 …
Post-modality applied rates
All 22 countries 2.24 1.99 2.06 2.09 3.25 1.83 1.72 1.76 2.51
Developed (7) 1.20 1.03 0.89 1.21 1.97 1.15 0.54 1.05 1.42
Developing (15) 4.16 3.64 4.49 3.45 4.36 2.84 3.63 4.27 4.49
European Union 1.52 1.46 0.80 … 2.24 2.23 0.59 0.63 2.14
Japan 0.83 1.27 0.27 1.28 … 1.29 0.10 0.03 0.04
United States 1.24 1.12 1.14 1.76 1.87 … 0.50 1.84 0.58
Brazil 5.91 6.47 4.96 6.29 6.64 6.64 … 6.30 6.84
China 4.95 4.98 4.98 4.91 4.98 4.95 5.24 … 4.99
India 7.04 6.74 8.18 6.66 6.66 6.72 11.98 6.62 …
Notes: Tariff  s are the simple average of 2008 (for most countries) applied tariff  s on all traded tariff   lines in each bilateral relationship. Applied tariff  s from 
2007 are used for Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Applied tariff  s from 2006 are used for Thailand. For Brazil 2008 applied tariff  s are used except for on 
imports from India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2007 applied tariff  s are used. For India 2008 applied tariff  s are 
used except for on imports from Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2007 applied tariff   are used. For Indonesia 
2007 applied tariff  s are used except for on imports from India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2006 applied tariff  s are used. 
For Mexico 2008 applied tariff  s are used except for on imports from Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2006 ap-
plied tariff  s are used. See table 18, footnote a,  for product coverage. Aggregate tariff  s are weighted by total 2007 imports for each country in the group.
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.90










States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 22 countries 15.41 8.63 3.66 3.57 1.99 2.48 0.05 1.15 0.22
Developed (7) 6.39 3.65 1.13 1.77 0.54 1.15 0.02 0.51 0.13
Developing (15) 9.02 4.97 2.54 1.80 1.45 1.34 0.03 0.65 0.09
European Union 2.89 1.26 0.33 … 0.27 0.96 0.01 0.02 0.11
Japan 0.79 0.64 0.11 0.38 … 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 2.28 1.48 0.61 1.15 0.25 … 0.00 0.44 0.02
Brazil 0.80 0.57 0.09 0.26 0.01 0.01 … 0.05 0.01
China 3.56 1.80 1.22 0.53 0.63 0.46 0.01 … 0.03
India 0.46 0.22 0.18 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.10 …
Percent increase from current chemicals trade
All 22 countries 1.79 1.56 1.86 1.63 2.68 1.59 0.56 1.69 1.56
Developed (7) 1.23 1.01 1.18 1.15 2.40 1.18 0.43 1.11 1.52
Developing (15) 2.64 2.59 2.49 2.74 2.81 2.24 0.74 2.85 1.63
European Union 1.61 1.17 0.94 … 2.58 1.88 0.67 0.15 2.49
Japan 1.58 2.11 0.64 2.38 … 1.70 1.43 0.01 0.20
United States 1.27 1.17 1.80 1.41 2.46 … 0.27 2.74 0.58
Brazil 3.68 4.35 1.85 4.29 3.61 3.61 … 3.24 1.14
China 3.20 3.48 2.74 3.75 3.14 3.82 3.41 … 2.23
India 2.62 3.29 0.00 3.25 2.61 3.14 2.49 2.20 …
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.91










States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 22 countries 30.79 16.69 8.42 6.90 4.15 4.56 0.14 2.47 0.52
Developed (7) 10.60 6.12 2.07 3.25 0.88 1.69 0.06 1.02 0.23
Developing (15) 20.19 10.57 6.34 3.65 3.26 2.86 0.09 1.45 0.29
European Union 4.30 1.88 0.59 … 0.40 1.42 0.04 0.11 0.16
Japan 1.01 0.79 0.16 0.45 … 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.00
United States 4.57 3.03 1.14 2.44 0.46 … 0.01 0.81 0.06
Brazil 1.80 1.24 0.26 0.56 0.03 0.03 … 0.11 0.04
China 8.03 3.75 3.07 1.08 1.39 0.92 0.03 … 0.09
India 1.30 0.49 0.05 0.26 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.26 …
Percent increase from current chemicals trade
All 22 countries 3.57 3.02 4.27 3.14 5.61 2.91 1.63 3.63 3.66
Developed (7) 2.03 1.70 2.18 2.11 3.94 1.75 1.15 2.26 2.73
Developing (15) 5.91 5.50 6.22 5.56 6.33 4.79 2.28 6.37 5.01
European Union 2.40 1.74 1.71 … 3.80 2.80 1.83 0.69 3.75
Japan 2.02 2.62 0.94 2.79 … 2.40 1.49 0.07 0.40
United States 2.55 2.40 3.40 2.99 4.46 … 0.93 5.06 1.96
Brazil 8.30 9.48 5.38 9.35 8.31 8.31 … 7.39 6.96
China 7.22 7.25 6.91 7.57 6.98 7.74 7.51 … 5.71
India 7.35 7.37 0.00 7.34 6.48 7.16 16.83 5.75 …
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.92










States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 22 countries 15.38 8.06 4.76 3.32 2.16 2.07 0.09 1.32 0.30
Developed (7) 4.21 2.47 0.95 1.47 0.34 0.55 0.04 0.52 0.10
Developing (15) 11.17 5.59 3.81 1.85 1.82 1.53 0.06 0.80 0.19
European Union 1.41 0.61 0.27 … 0.13 0.47 0.02 0.09 0.05
Japan 0.22 0.16 0.05 0.07 … 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 2.29 1.55 0.54 1.29 0.21 … 0.01 0.37 0.04
Brazil 1.00 0.67 0.17 0.30 0.02 0.02 … 0.06 0.03
China 4.47 1.95 1.86 0.54 0.77 0.47 0.01 … 0.05
India 0.84 0.27 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.16 …
Percent increase from current chemicals trade
All 22 countries 1.78 1.46 2.41 1.51 2.92 1.32 1.07 1.93 2.10
Developed (7) 0.81 0.68 1.00 0.96 1.54 0.56 0.72 1.14 1.21
Developing (15) 3.27 2.91 3.73 2.81 3.52 2.55 1.54 3.52 3.39
European Union 0.79 0.57 0.77 … 1.22 0.92 1.17 0.54 1.26
Japan 0.43 0.51 0.29 0.41 … 0.70 0.07 0.05 0.20
United States 1.28 1.23 1.59 1.58 2.00 … 0.66 2.33 1.38
Brazil 4.62 5.12 3.53 5.06 4.70 4.70 … 4.14 5.82
China 4.02 3.77 4.18 3.82 3.84 3.92 4.10 … 3.48
India 4.73 4.08 0.00 4.08 3.87 4.03 14.34 3.54 …
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.93
APPENDIX E   IT GOODS AND ELECTRONIC/ELECTRICAL GOODS 
Currently, WTO negotiators are working on a sectoral agreement covering electronics and electrical 
goods. Th   e agreement covers a large amount of trade, but several key players are absent from the 
negotiations, most notably the European Union and China. We are, therefore, skeptical that an 
electronic/electrical goods sectoral initiative can succeed. A more likely outcome is an expanded 
Information Technology Agreement (ITA). We calculate the trade impact of both scenarios. A list of the 
products included in the ITA sectoral calculations is displayed in table E1. A list of the products included 
in the electronic/electrical goods calculations is displayed in table E6.
Applied tariﬀ  s on ITA goods are low (table E2). Th   e developed-country average is 0.40 percent, 
and even China, which unlike Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa is an ITA member, has relatively low 
tariﬀ  s (1.73 percent). Currently, due to product coverage, the United States faces applied tariﬀ  s that are 
higher than the world average on ITA goods in the European Union (1.13 percent for the United States 
versus a world average of 0.87 percent), in China (1.84 percent versus 1.73 percent), and in Brazil (11.77 
percent versus 9.91 percent). After the modality tariﬀ   cuts, the average tariﬀ   on US ITA goods exported 
to China is equal to the average world applied tariﬀ  , while an imbalance persists for US ITA exports to 
the European Union and Brazil.
Japan experiences almost no increase in ITA goods trade from the modality tariﬀ   cuts or sectoral 
tariﬀ   cuts because its current tariﬀ  s are essentially all zero (tables E3 to E5). Brazil and India have very 
minimal export increases, because they currently export only a small amount of ITA goods. Under the 
sectoral tariﬀ   cuts, China gains the most, with an $8.72 billion increase in imports from the world and a 
$2.82 billion increase in exports to the 21 other countries included in this study (table E4). Th  e  increase 
in Chinese imports from Japan ($1.65 billion) account for about a ﬁ  fth of the increase in total Chinese 
imports of ITA goods (table E4). Th   e additional increase beyond the modality tariﬀ   cuts in US trade from 
a sectoral initiative in ITA goods is $3.62 billion. Close to three-quarters of this increase ($2.63 billion) is 
from US exports to the 21 other countries (table E5).
Tariﬀ  s on electronic/electrical goods are substantially higher than on ITA goods (table E7). For 
example, the average applied tariﬀ   on world exports of electronic/electrical goods to China is 6.62 
percent; for ITA goods the tariﬀ   rate is only 1.73 percent. Th   e impact of tariﬀ   cuts on trade could be 
substantial since initial tariﬀ  s are so high. Th   is is especially true in a sectoral initiative where, we assume, 
all electronic/electrical goods tariﬀ  s go to zero. A sectoral initiative in electronic/electrical goods could 
lead to a $45.4 billion increase in world exports to the 22 countries; this is $16.18 billion higher than the 
impact of a sectoral initiative in only ITA goods and $35.45 billion more than the impact of modality 
cuts alone in electronic/electrical goods (tables E8 to E10). For the United States a sectoral initiative in 
electronic/electrical goods would increase exports to the 21 other countries by $3.30 billion; most ($2.10 
billion) of this increase would be in exports to developing countries other than Brazil, China, and India. 94
Table E1     Goods covered by the Information Technology Agreement (ITA)
Code Description
381800 Chemical elements doped for use in electronics, in the form of discs, wafers, or similar forms; chemical compounds 
doped for use in electronics
701710 Of fused quartz or other fused silica
702000 Other articles of glass
841989 Other machinery, plant and equipment—other
841990 Parts for machinery, plant or laboratory equipment for the treatment of material involving temperature change (except 
domestic machinery), nesoi
842119 Centrifuges, including centrifugal dryers—other
842191 Parts of centrifuges, including centrifugal dryers
842430 Steam or sand blasting machines and similar jet projecting machines
842489 Other appliances—other
842490 Parts for mechanical appliances for projecting, dispersing, or spraying, fi  re extinguishers, spray guns, and steam or sand 
blasting machines
842820 Pneumatic elevators and conveyors
842833 Other continuous-action elevators and conveyors, for goods or materials—other, belt type
842839 Other continuous-action elevators and conveyors, for goods or materials—other
842890 Other machinery
843139 Of machinery of heading no. 84.28—other
845610 Operated by laser or other light or photon beam processes
845691 Other, for dry-etching patterns on semiconductor materials
845699 Machine tools for removal of material by electrochemical, electron-beam, ionic-beam or plasma arc processes, nesoi
846221 Bending, folding, straightening, or fl  attening machines (including presses)—numerically controlled
846229 Bending, folding, straightening, or fl  attening machines (including presses)—other
846410 Sawing machines
846420 Grinding or polishing machines
846490 Machine tools for working stone, ceramics, concrete, asbestos-cement or like mineral materials or for cold working glass, 
nesoi
846599 Machine tools (also those for nailing, stapling, glueing, etc.) for working wood, cork, bone, hard rubber, hard plastics or 
similar materials, nesoi
846610 Tool holders and self-opening dieheads
846620 Work holders
846630 Dividing heads and other special attachments for machine-tools
846691 Other—For machines of heading no. 84.64
846693 Other—For machines of headings nos. 84.56 to 84.61
846694 Other—For machines of heading no. 84.62 or 84.63
846911 Automatic typewriters and word-processing machines—word-processing machines
846912 Automatic typewriters and word-processing machines—automatic typewriters
847010 Electronic calculators capable of operation without an external source of electric power and pocket-sized data 
recording, reproducing, and displaying machines with calculating functions
847021 Other electronic calculating machines—incorporating a printing device
847029 Other electronic calculating machines—other
847030 Other calculating machines
847040 Accounting machines
847050 Cash registers
847090 Postage-franking machines, ticket-issuing machines and similar machines, incorporating a calculating device, nesoi
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Table E1     Goods covered by the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) (continued)
Code Description
847110 Analogue or hybrid automatic data-processing machines
847130 Portable digital automatic data-processing machines, weighing not more than 10 kg, consisting of at least a central 
processing unit, a keyboard, and a display
847141 Other digital automatic data-processing machines—comprising in the same housing at least a central processing unit 
and an input and output unit, whether or not combined
847149 Other digital automatic data-processing machines—other, presented in the form of systems
847150 Digital processing units other than those of sub-headings 8471.41 and 8471.49, whether or not containing in the same 
housing one or two of the following types of unit : storage units, input units, output units
847160 Input or output units, whether or not containing storage units in the same housing
847170 Storage units
847180 Other units of automatic data-processing machines
847190 Automatic data processing units thereof; magnetic/optical readers, machinery for transcribing data to data media in 
coded form and machinery for processing data, nesoi
847290 Offi   ce machines nesoi (including automatic banknote dispensers, coin-sorting machines, pencil-sharpening machines, 
perforating or stapling machines)
847310 Parts and accessories of the machines of heading no. 84.69
847321 Parts and accessories of the machines of heading no. 84.70—of the electronic calculating machines of subheading No. 
8470.10, 8470.21 or 8470.29
847329 Parts and accessories of the machines of heading no. 84.70—other
847330 Parts and accessories of the machines of heading no. 84.71
847340 Parts and accessories of the machines of heading no. 84.72
847350 Parts and accessories equally suitable for use with machines of two or more of the heading nos. 84.69 to 84.72
847710 Injection molding machines
847740 Vacuum molding machines and other thermoforming machines
847759 Other machinery for molding or otherwise forming—other
847790 Parts of machinery for working rubber or plastics or parts of machinery used in the manufacture of products from 
rubber or plastic materials, nesoi
847950 Industrial robots, not elsewhere specifi  ed or included
847989 Other machines and mechanical appliances—other
847990 Parts of machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions, nesoi
848071 Molds for rubber or plastics—injection or compression types
850440 Static converters
850450 Other inductors
850490 Parts for electrical transformers,static converters and inductors
851410 Resistance heated furnaces and ovens
851420 Induction or dielectric furnaces and ovens
851430 Other furnaces and ovens
851490 Parts for industrial or laboratory electric furnaces and ovens ; parts for industrial or laboratory induction or dielectric 
heating equipment, nesoi
851580 Other machines and apparatus
851590 Parts for electric laser, ultrasonic etc. welding etc. machines; parts for electric machines for hot spraying of metals or 
sintered metal carbides
851711 Telephone sets; videophones—line telephone sets with cordless handsets
851719 Telephone sets; videophones—other
851721 Facsimile machines and teleprinters—facsimile machines
851722 Facsimile machines and teleprinters—teleprinters
851730 Telephonic or telegraphic switching apparatus
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Table E1     Goods covered by the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) (continued)
Code Description
851750 Other apparatus, for carrier-current line systems or for digital line systems
851780 Other apparatus
851790 Parts of electrical apparatus for line telephony or telegraphy, including parts of such apparatus for carrier-current line 
systems
851810 Microphones and stands therefor
851829 Loudspeakers, whether or not mounted in their enclosures—Other
851830 Headphones, earphones, and combined microphone/speaker sets
851840 Audio-frequency electric amplifi  ers
851890 Parts of microphones, loudspeakers, headphones, earphones, audio-frequency electric amplifi  ers, and electric sound 
amplifi  er sets
852020 Telephone answering machines
852290 Parts and accessories, except pickup cartridges, for sound reproducing, sound recording, and video recording or 
reproducing apparatus
852311 Magnetic tapes—of a width not exceeding 4 mm
852312 Magnetic tapes—of a width exceeding 4 mm but not exceeding 6.5 mm
852313 Magnetic tapes—of a width exceeding 6.5 mm
852320 Magnetic discs
852390 Prepared magnetic media, unrecorded, nesoi
852431 Discs for laser reading systems—For reproducing phenomena other than sound or image
852439 Discs for laser reading systems—Other
852440 Magnetic tapes for reproducing phenomena other than sound or image
852491 Other—For reproducing phenomena other than sound or image
852499 Recorded media for reproducing sound or image, nesoi
852510 Transmission apparatus
852520 Transmission apparatus incorporating reception apparatus
852540 Still image video cameras and other video camera recorders
852790 Other apparatus
852812 Reception apparatus for television, whether or not incorporating radio-broadcast receivers or sound or video recording 
or reproducing apparatus—color
852910 Aerials and aerial refl  ectors of all kinds; parts suitable for use therewith
852990 Parts (except antennas and refl  ectors) for use with radio transmission, radar, radio navigational aid, reception and 
television apparatus, nesoi
853120 Indicator panels incorporating liquid crystal devices (LCD) or light-emitting diodes (LED)
853180 Other apparatus
853190 Parts of electric sound or visual signaling apparatus, nesoi
853210 Fixed capacitors designed for use in 50/60 Hz circuits and having a reactive power handling capacity of not less than 0.5 
kvar (power capacitors)
853221 Other fi  xed capacitors—tantalum
853222 Other fi  xed capacitors—aluminium electrolytic
853223 Other fi  xed capacitors—ceramic dielectric, single layer
853224 Other fi  xed capacitors—ceramic dielectric, multilayer
853225 Other fi  xed capacitors—dielectric of paper or plastics
853229 Other fi  xed capacitors—other
853230 Variable or adjustable (pre-set) capacitors
853290 Parts for electrical capacitors
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Table E1     Goods covered by the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) (continued)
Code Description
853310 Fixed carbon resistors, composition or fi  lm types
853321 Other fi  xed resistors—for a power handling capacity not exceeding 20 W
853329 Other fi  xed resistors—other
853331 Wirewound variable resistors, including rheostats and potentiometers—for a power handling capacity not exceeding 20 
W
853339 Wirewound variable resistors, including rheostats and potentiometers—other
853340 Other variable resistors, including rheostats and potentiometers
853390 Parts for electrical resistors, including parts for rheostats and potentiometers
853400 Printed circuits
853650 Other switches
853669 Lamp-holders, plugs and sockets—other
853690 Other apparatus
853890 Parts for electrical apparatus for electrical circuits, boards, panels etc. for electric control or distribution ofelectricity, 
nesoi
854110 Diodes, other than photosensitive or light-emitting diodes
854121 Transistors, other than photosensitive transistors—with a dissipation rate of less than 1 W
854129 Transistors, other than photosensitive transistors—other
854130 Thyristors, diacs and triacs, other than photosensitive devices
854140 Photosensitive semiconductor devices, including photovoltaic cells whether or not assembled in modules or made up 
into panels; light emitting diodes
854150 Other semiconductor devices
854160 Mounted piezoelectric crystals
854190 Parts for diodes, transistors and similar semiconductor devices; parts for photosensitive semiconductor devices and 
mounted piezoelectric crystals
854212 Cards incorporating an electronic integrated circuit (“smart cards”)
854213 Monolithic digital integrated circuits—metal oxide semiconductors (MOS technology)
854214 Monolithic digital integrated circuits—circuits obtained by bipolar technology
854219 Monolithic digital integrated circuits—other, including circuits obtained by a combination of bipolar and MOS 
technologies (BIMOS technology)
854230 Other monolithic integrated circuits
854240 Hybrid integrated circuits
854250 Electronic microassemblies
854290 Parts for electronic integrated circuits
854311 Particle accelerators—Ion implanters for doping semiconductor materials
854330 Machines and apparatus for electroplating, electrolysis or electrophoresis
854381 Other machines and apparatus—proximity cards and tags
854389 Other machines and apparatus—other
854390 Parts for electrical machines and apparatus having individual functions, nesoi
854441 Other electric conductors, for a voltage not exceeding 80 V—fi  tted with connectors
854449 Other electric conductors, for a voltage not exceeding 80 V—other
854451 Other electric conductors, for a voltage exceeding 80 V but not exceeding 1,000 V—fi  tted with connectors
854470 Optical fi  ber cables
900911 Electrostatic photocopying apparatus—operating by reproducing the original image directly onto the copy (direct 
process)
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Table E1     Goods covered by the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) (continued)
Code Description
900921 Other photocopying apparatus—incorporating an optical system
900990 Parts and accessories
901041 Apparatus for the projection or drawing of circuit patterns on sensitized semiconductor materials—direct write-on-
wafer apparatus
901042 Apparatus for the projection or drawing of circuit patterns on sensitized semiconductor materials—step and repeat 
aligners
901049 Apparatus for the projection or drawing of circuit patterns on sensitized semiconductor materials—other
901050 Other apparatus and equipment for photographic (including cinematographic) laboratories; negatoscopes
901090 Parts and accessories
901110 Stereoscopic microscopes
901120 Other microscopes, for photomicrography, cinephotomicrography or microprojection
901190 Parts and accessories
901210 Microscopes other than optical microscopes and diff  raction apparatus
901290 Parts and accessories
901380 Other devices, appliances and instruments
901390 Parts and accessories
901710 Drafting tables and machines, whether or not automatic
901720 Other drawing, marking-out, or mathematical calculating instruments
901790 Parts and accessories
902610 Instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking the fl  ow or level of liquids
902620 Instruments and apparatus For measuring or checking pressure
902680 Other instruments or apparatus
902690 Parts and accessories
902720 Chromatographs and electrophoresis instruments
902730 Spectrometers, spectrophotometers, and spectrographs using optical radiations (UV, visible, IR)
902750 Other instruments and apparatus using optical radiations (UV, visible, IR)
902780 Other instruments and apparatus
902790 Microtomes, parts and accessories
903040 Other instruments and apparatus, specially designed for telecommunications (for example, cross-talk meters, gain 
measuring instruments, distortion factor meters, psophometers)
903082 Other instruments and apparatus—for measuring or checking semiconductor wafers or devices
903090 Parts and accessories
903141 Other optical instruments and appliances—for inspecting semiconductor wafers or devices or for inspecting 
photomasks or reticles used in manufacturing semiconductor devices
903149 Other optical instruments and appliances—other
903180 Other instruments, appliances, and machines
903190 Parts and accessories
Sources: WTO (2009b); Finger (2007); US International Trade Commission Interactive Tariff   and Trade Dataweb, http://dataweb.usitc.gov, 2009..99










States Brazil China India
Current applied rates
All 22 countries 1.12 1.21 1.13 1.39 1.82 1.15 0.84 1.19 1.53
Developed (7) 0.40 0.52 0.40 0.67 1.13 0.50 0.04 0.52 0.65
Developing (15) 2.43 2.39 2.63 2.52 2.42 2.11 2.12 3.57 3.12
European Union 0.37 0.74 0.23 … 1.13 1.13 0.04 0.04 1.13
Japan 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 … 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.58 0.61 0.64 0.91 1.14 … 0.01 1.14 0.01
Brazil 9.91 12.19 8.60 12.27 11.77 11.77 … 12.27 12.28
China 1.73 1.84 1.71 1.84 1.84 1.84 2.16 … 1.87
India 3.43 3.37 4.70 3.35 3.45 3.37 8.62 3.35 …
Post-modality applied rates
All 22 countries 0.86 0.90 0.85 1.08 1.29 0.86 0.66 0.91 1.15
Developed (7) 0.27 0.34 0.25 0.48 0.69 0.31 0.04 0.31 0.41
Developing (15) 1.95 1.87 2.10 2.03 1.80 1.69 1.68 3.03 2.50
European Union 0.26 0.46 0.15 … 0.70 0.70 0.04 0.04 0.70
Japan 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 … 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.62 0.63 … 0.01 0.63 0.01
Brazil 8.76 10.56 7.49 10.60 10.34 10.34 … 10.59 10.72
China 1.21 1.21 1.20 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.43 … 1.23
India 2.81 2.94 3.24 2.93 3.01 2.95 4.36 2.93 …
ITA = Information Technology Agreement
Notes: Tariff  s are the simple average of 2008 (for most countries) applied tariff  s on all traded tariff   lines in each bilateral relationship. Applied tariff  s from 
2007 are used for Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Applied tariff  s from 2006 are used for Thailand. For Brazil 2008 applied tariff  s are used except for on 
imports from India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2007 applied tariff  s are used. For India 2008 applied tariff  s are 
used except for on imports from Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2007 applied tariff   are used. For Indonesia 
2007 applied tariff  s are used except for on imports from India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2006 applied tariff  s are used. 
For Mexico 2008 applied tariff  s are used except for on imports from Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2006 ap-
plied tariff  s are used. See table E1 for product coverage. Aggregate tariff  s are weighted by total 2007 imports for each country in the group.
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.100










States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 22 countries 5.99 3.31 2.51 0.96 1.57 0.67 0.00 0.52 0.03
Developed (7) 1.47 0.77 0.70 0.16 0.37 0.20 0.00 0.17 0.01
Developing (15) 4.52 2.54 1.81 0.80 1.20 0.47 0.00 0.35 0.02
European Union 0.87 0.42 0.45 … 0.21 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.01
Japan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 … 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.51 0.27 0.24 0.11 0.15 … 0.00 0.17 0.00
Brazil 0.27 0.20 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.02 … 0.05 0.00
China 1.90 0.67 1.19 0.15 0.43 0.07 0.00 … 0.00
India 0.22 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 …
Percent increase from current ITA trade
All 22 countries 0.53 0.59 0.51 0.58 0.87 0.43 0.17 0.24 0.73
Developed (7) 0.26 0.33 0.24 0.21 0.81 0.30 0.00 0.11 0.52
Developing (15) 0.79 0.77 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.52 0.50 0.63 1.18
European Union 0.41 0.54 0.39 … 1.03 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.88
Japan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 … 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.26 0.38 0.21 0.32 0.68 … 0.00 0.27 0.00
Brazil 1.62 1.90 1.57 1.94 1.58 1.58 … 2.24 2.15
China 0.98 0.70 1.34 0.53 0.82 0.59 1.30 … 0.68
India 1.06 0.72 0.00 0.83 0.54 0.54 13.21 0.99 …
ITA = Information Technology Agreement
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.101










States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 22 countries 29.20 15.66 12.21 5.23 6.35 3.30 0.04 2.82 0.14
Developed (7) 4.29 2.51 1.70 0.82 0.97 0.57 0.00 0.57 0.04
Developing (15) 24.91 13.15 10.51 4.42 5.38 2.72 0.04 2.25 0.10
European Union 2.06 1.09 0.94 … 0.46 0.57 0.00 0.06 0.04
Japan 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 … 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 1.50 0.86 0.62 0.44 0.37 … 0.00 0.43 0.00
Brazil 3.53 2.43 0.85 1.32 0.24 0.24 … 0.44 0.01
China 8.72 2.66 5.88 0.67 1.65 0.26 0.00 … 0.01
India 1.36 0.79 0.01 0.52 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.15 …
Percent increase from current ITA trade
All 22 countries 2.59 2.79 2.50 3.14 3.49 2.10 1.43 1.29 3.44
Developed (7) 0.77 1.08 0.58 1.08 2.11 0.87 0.06 0.35 1.61
Developing (15) 4.37 3.99 5.32 4.88 3.96 2.98 4.20 4.04 7.30
European Union 0.97 1.38 0.83 … 2.31 1.70 0.01 0.09 2.47
Japan 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 … 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.77 1.21 0.54 1.33 1.71 … 0.02 0.71 0.03
Brazil 21.00 23.16 19.19 24.97 23.96 23.96 … 21.04 21.97
China 4.51 2.76 6.63 2.38 3.16 2.08 4.17 … 4.52
India 6.42 6.96 0.00 7.31 7.48 5.43 20.74 5.07 …
ITA = Information Technology Agreement
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.102










States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 22 countries 23.21 12.35 9.70 4.28 4.77 2.63 0.03 2.30 0.11
Developed (7) 2.82 1.74 1.00 0.66 0.60 0.37 0.00 0.40 0.03
Developing (15) 20.39 10.61 8.70 3.61 4.17 2.25 0.03 1.90 0.08
European Union 1.18 0.67 0.49 … 0.26 0.37 0.00 0.06 0.03
Japan 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 … 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.99 0.59 0.38 0.34 0.22 … 0.00 0.27 0.00
Brazil 3.25 2.23 0.78 1.21 0.23 0.23 … 0.40 0.01
China 6.82 1.99 4.70 0.52 1.22 0.19 0.00 … 0.01
India 1.13 0.70 0.00 0.46 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.12 …
Percent increase from current ITA trade
All 22 countries 2.06 2.20 1.98 2.57 2.63 1.67 1.26 1.05 2.71
Developed (7) 0.51 0.75 0.34 0.87 1.30 0.57 0.06 0.24 1.09
Developing (15) 3.58 3.22 4.41 4.00 3.07 2.46 3.70 3.41 6.12
European Union 0.56 0.84 0.43 … 1.28 1.11 0.01 0.09 1.60
Japan 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 … 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.51 0.83 0.33 1.02 1.03 … 0.02 0.44 0.03
Brazil 19.37 21.26 17.61 23.03 22.38 22.38 … 18.80 19.82
China 3.53 2.06 5.29 1.85 2.34 1.50 2.86 … 3.84
India 5.35 6.24 0.00 6.48 6.94 4.88 7.54 4.08 …
ITA = Information Technology Agreement
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.103
Table E6     Goods to be included in an electronic/electrical goods sector initiative
Code Description
381800 Chemical elements doped for use in electronics, in the form of discs, wafers, or similar forms: chemical compounds 
doped for use in electronics, of other substances other than those of silicon
700991 Unframed glass mirrors, excluding rear-view mirrors for vehicles
702000 Articles of glass, other than those of headings 7001 to 7019
841430 Other machinery, plant and equipment—other
841451 Table, fl  oor, wall, window, ceiling, or roof fans, with a self-contained electric motor of an output not exceeding 125 W
841490 Centrifuges, including centrifugal dryers—other
841510 Parts of centrifuges, including centrifugal dryers
841581 Air conditioning machines, comprising a motor-driven fan and elements for changing the temperature and humidity, 
incorporating a refrigerating unit and a valve for reversal of the cooling/heat cycle (reversible heat pumps), other than 
those of subheadings 8415.10 and 8415.20
841590 Parts of air conditioning machines, comprising a motor-driven fan and elements for changing the temperature and 
humidity
841810 Combined refrigerator-freezers, fi  tted with separate external doors
841821 Household type refrigerators of compression-type
841822 Other continuous-action elevators and conveyors, for goods or materials—other, belt type
841829 Other continuous-action elevators and conveyors, for goods or materials—other
841830 Freezers of the chest type, not exceeding 800 l capacity
841840 Machinery of heading 84.28—other
841861 Refrigerating or freezing equipment of compression type, whose condensers are heat exchangers, other than those of 
subheadings 8418.10 to 8418.50, heat pumps
841899 Other, for dry-etching patterns on semiconductor materials
841989 Machinery, plant or laboratory equipment, for the treatment of materials by a process involving a change of 
temperature such as heating, cooking, roasting, distilling, rectifying, sterilizing, pasteurizing, steaming, drying, 
evaporating, vaporizing, condensing, or cooling, other than machinery or plant of a kind used for domestic purposes 
other than those of subheadings 8419.20 to 8419.81
841990 Bending, folding, straightening, or fl  attening machines (including presses)—numerically controlled
842112 Bending, folding, straightening, or fl  attening machines (including presses)—other
842119 Centrifuges, including centrifugal dryers, other than cream separators and clothes dryers
842191 Parts of centrifuges or centrifugal dryers
842211 Dish washing machines of the household type
842310 Personal weighing machines, including baby scales, household scales
842489 Mechanical appliances (whether or not hand hand-operated) for projecting, dispersing, or spraying liquids or powders, 
other than those for agricultural or horticultural use
842490 Parts of mechanical appliances (whether or not hand-operated) for projecting, dispersing, or spraying liquids or 
powders; parts of fi  re extinguishers, whether or not charged; parts of spray guns and similar appliances; parts of steam 
or sand blasting machines and similar jet projecting machines
842839 Continuous-action elevators and conveyors, for goods or materials, other than those specially designed for 
underground use, those of bucket or belt type, pneumatic elevators and pneumatic conveyors
842890 Other—for machines of heading 84.64
843139 Other—for machines of headings 84.56 to 84.61
845011 Other—for machines of heading 84.62 or 84.63
845012 Automatic typewriters and word-processing machines—word-processing machines
845019 Automatic typewriters and word-processing machines—automatic typewriters
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845090 Parts of household or laundry-type washing machines
845121 Other electronic calculating machines—incorporating a printing device
845190 Other electronic calculating machines—other
845210 Sewing machines of the household type 
845290 Parts of sewing machines, other than those of book-sewing machines of heading 84.40, sewing machine needles and 
furniture, base and covers for sewing machines and parts thereof
845610 Machine-tools for working any material by removal of material, by laser or other light or photon beam processes
845691 Machine-tools for working any material by removal of material, for dry-etching patterns on semiconductor materials, by 
electro-chemical, electron beam, ionic-beam or plasma arc processes 
845699 Machine-tools for working any material by removal of material by electro-chemical, electron beam, ionic-beam or 
plasma arc processes, other than for dry-etching patterns on semiconductor materials
846221 Numerically controlled bending, folding, straightening, or fl  attening machines (including presses) for working metal
846229 Other digital automatic data processing machines—comprising in the same housing at least a central processing unit 
and an input and output unit, whether or not combined
846410 Other digital automatic data processing machines—other, presented in the form of systems
846420 Grinding or polishing machines for working stone, ceramics, concrete, asbestos-cement, or like mineral materials or for 
cold working glass
846490 Machine-tools for working stone, ceramics, concrete, asbestos-cement, or like mineral materials or for cold working 
glass, other than sawing, grinding or polishing machines
846610 Self-opening die heads for use solely or principally with the machines of headings 84.56 to 84.65
846620 Work holders for use solely or principally with the machines of headings 84.56 to 84.65
846630 Dividing heads and other special attachments for machine-tools of heading 84.65
846691 Parts and accessories suitable for use solely or principally with the machines of heading 84.64 other than those of 
subheadings 8466.11 to 8466.30
846693 Parts and accessories suitable for use solely or principally with the machines of headings 84.56 to 84.61 other than those 
of subheadings 8466.11 to 8466.30
846694 Parts and accessories of the machines of heading 84.70—of the electronic calculating machines of subheading 8470.10, 
8470.21, or 8470.29
846911 Parts and accessories of the machines of heading 84.70—other
846920 Electric typewriters, other than automatic typewriters and printers of heading 84.71
8470 Calculating machines and pocket-size data recording, reproducing and displaying machines with calculating functions; 
accounting machines, postage-franking machines, ticket-issuing machines and similar machines, incorporating a 
calculating device; cash registers
8471 Automatic data-processing machines and units thereof; magnetic or optical readers, machines for transcribing data 
onto data media in coded form and machines for processing such data, not elsewhere specifi  ed or included
847290 Offi   ce machines, other than those of subheadings 8472.10 to 8472.30
8473 Parts and accessories (other than covers, carrying cases and the like) suitable for use solely or principally with machines 
of headings 84.69 to 84.72
847710 Other machinery for molding or otherwise forming—other
847740 Vacuum molding machines and other thermoforming machines, for rubber or plastics, not specifi  ed or included 
elsewhere in this chapter
847759 Machinery for molding or otherwise forming rubber or plastics, not specifi  ed or included elsewhere in this chapter
847790 Other machines and mechanical appliances—other
847950 Industrial robots, not elsewhere specifi  ed
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847989 Molds for rubber or plastics—injection or compression types
847990 Parts of machines and mechanical appliances, having individual functions, not specifi  ed or included elsewhere in this 
chapter
848071 Molds for rubber or plastics, of injection or compression types
8501 Electric motors and generators (excluding generating sets)
8502 Electric generating sets and rotary converters
8503 Parts suitable for use solely or principally with the machines of heading 85.01 or 85.02
850421 Liquid dielectric transformers, having a power-handling capacity not exceeding 650 kVA, other than ballasts for 
discharge lamps or tubes
850422 Liquid dielectric transformers having a power-handling capacity exceeding 650 kVA but not exceeding 10,000 kVA
850423 Liquid dielectric transformers having a power-handling capacity exceeding 10,000 kVA
850431 Electrical transformers, having a power handling capacity not exceeding 1 kVA, other than those of liquid dielectric 
transformers and ballasts for discharge lamps or tubes
850432 Telephone sets, videophones—line telephone sets with cordless handsets
850434 Telephone sets, videophones—other
850440 Facsimile machines and teleprinters—facsimile machines
850450 Facsimile machines and teleprinters—teleprinters
850490 Parts of electrical transformers, static converters or inductors
8505 Electro-magnets; permanent magnets and articles intended to become permanent magnets after magnetisation; 
electromagnetic or permanent magnet chucks, clamps and similar holding devices; electro-magnetic couplings, 
clutches and brakes; electro-magnetic lifting heads
8506 Primary cells and primary batteries
8507 Electric accumulators, including separators therefore, whether or not rectangular (including square)
850910 Vacuum cleaners for domestic appliances, including dry and wet vacuum cleaners, with self-contained electric motors
850920 Loudspeakers, whether or not mounted in their enclosures—other
850940 Food grinders, mixers, and fruit or vegetable juice extractors, for domestic appliance, with self-contained electric motors
850980 Electromechanical domestic appliances, with self-contained electric motors, other than those of subheadings 8509.10 
to 8509.40
8510 Shavers, hair clippers, and hair-removing appliances, with self-contained electric motors
851310 Portable electric lamps designed to function by their own sources of energy (for example, dry batteries, accumulators  
magnetos), other than lighting equipment of heading 8512
851410 Resistance heated furnaces and ovens
851420 Magnetic tapes—of a width not exceeding 4 mm
851430 Magnetic tapes—of a width exceeding 4 mm but not exceeding 6.5 mm
851440 Magnetic tapes—of a width exceeding 6.5 mm
851490 Parts of industrial or laboratory electric furnaces and ovens (including those functioning by induction or dielectric loss) 
and other industrial or laboratory equipment for the heat treatment of materials by induction or dielectric loss
851519 Electric brazing or soldering machines or apparatus, other than soldering irons and guns
851521 Discs for laser reading systems—for reproducing phenomena other than sound or image
851529 Discs for laser reading systems—other
851531 Machines and apparatus for arc welding of metals, fully or partly automatic
851580 Other—for reproducing phenomena other than sound or image
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851590 Parts of electric (including electrically heated gas), laser or other light or photon beam, ultrasonic, electron beam, 
magnetic pulse or plasma arc soldering, brazing or welding machines and apparatus, whether or not capable of cutting, 
or parts of electric machines and apparatus for hot spraying of metals or cermets
8516 Electric instantaneous or storage water heaters and immersion heaters; electric space heating apparatus and 
soil heating apparatus; electrothermic hair-dressing apparatus and hand dryers; electric smoothing irons; other 
electrothermic appliances of a kind used for domestic purposes; electric heating resistors, other than those of heading 
85.45
8517 Electrical apparatus for line telephony or line telegraphy, including line telephone sets with cordless handsets and 
telecommunication apparatus for carrier-current line systems or for digital line systems, videophones
8518 Microphones and stands thereof; loudspeakers, whether or not mounted in their enclosures; headphones and 
earphones, whether or not combined with a microphone, and sets consisting of a microphone and one or more 
loudspeakers; audio-frequency electric amplifi  ers; electric sound-amplifi  er sets
851910 Coin- or token-operated record players
851921 Reception apparatus for television, whether or not incorporating radio-broadcast receivers or sound or video recording 
or reproducing apparatus—color
851931 Turntables, with automatic record changing mechanism
851992 Pocket-sized cassette players, not incorporating a sound recording device
851993 sound reproducing apparatus of cassette-type, not incorporating a sound recording device, other than those of pocket-
size cassette-players
851999 Sound reproducing apparatus, not incorporating a sound recording device, other than those of subheadings 8519.10 to 
8519.93
8520 Magnetic tape recorders and other sound recording apparatus
8521 Video recording or reproducing apparatus of magnetic tape-type
8522 Other fi  xed capacitors—tantalum
8523 Other fi  xed capacitors—aluminium electrolytic
8524 Other fi  xed capacitors—ceramic dielectric, single layer
8525 Other fi  xed capacitors—ceramic dielectric, multilayer
852691 Other fi  xed capacitors—dielectric of paper or plastics
852692 Other fi  xed capacitors—other
8527 Reception apparatus for radio-telephony, radio-telegraphy or radio-broadcasting, whether or not combined, in the 
same housing, with sound recording or reproducing apparatus or a clock
852812 Reception apparatus for television of color, whether or not incorporating radio-broadcast receivers or sound or video 
recording or reproducing apparatus
852813 Black and white or other monochrome reception apparatus for television, whether or not incorporating radio-broadcast 
receivers or sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus. Reception apparatus for television of black and 
white or other monochrome whether or not incorporating radio-broadcast receivers or sound or video recording or 
reproducing apparatus
852821 Other fi  xed resistors—for a power handling capacity not exceeding 20 W
852830 Other fi  xed resistors—other
8529 Wirewound variable resistors, including rheostats and potentiometers—for a power handling capacity not exceeding 20 
W
8530 Wirewound variable resistors, including rheostats and potentiometers—other
8531 Electric sound or visual signaling apparatus, other than those of heading 85.12 or 85.30
8532 Electrical capacitors, fi  xed, variable or adjustable (pre-set)
8533 Electrical resistors, other than heating resistors
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8534 Printed circuits
8535 Lamp-holders, plugs and sockets—other
853610 Fuses, for a voltage not exceeding 1,000 volts
853620 Automatic circuit breakers for a voltage not exceeding 1,000 volts
853630 Apparatus for protecting electrical circuits for a voltage not exceeding 1,000 volts, other than fuses and automatic 
circuit breakers
853641 Transistors, other than photosensitive transistors—with a dissipation rate of less than 1 W
853649 Transistors, other than photosensitive transistors—other
853650 Switches for a voltage not exceeding 1,000 volts, other than relays
853669 Plugs and sockets for a voltage not exceeding 1,000 volts
853690 Electrical apparatus forsaking connections in electrical circuits, for a voltage not exceeding 1,000 volts, other than those 
of subheadings 8536.10 to 8536.69
8537 Boards, panels, consoles, desks, cabinets, and other bases, equipped with two or more apparatus of heading 85.35 or 
85.36, for electric control or the distribution of electricity, including those incorporating instruments or apparatus of 
chapter 90, and numerical control apparatus, other than switching apparatus of heading 85.17
8538 Parts suitable for use solely or principally with the apparatus of heading 85.35, 85.36 or 85.37
853921 Electric fi  lament lamps of tungsten halogen
853922 Monolithic digital integrated circuits—metal oxide semiconductors (MOS technology)
853929 Monolithic digital integrated circuits—circuits obtained by bipolar technology
853931 Monolithic digital integrated circuits—other, including circuits obtained by a combination of bipolar and MOS 
technologies (BIMOS technology)
853932 Mercury or sodium vapor lamps; metal halide lamps
853939 Electric discharge lamps, other than ultraviolet lamps, and those of subheadings 8539.31 and 8539.32
853941 Arc lamps
853949 Ultraviolet lamps and infrared lamps
853990 Particle accelerators—ion implanters for doping semiconductor materials
8540 Thermionic, cold cathode or photocathode valves and tubes
8541 Other machines and apparatus—proximity cards and tags
8542 Other machines and apparatus—other
8543 Electrical machines and apparatus, having individual functions, not specifi  ed or included elsewhere in this chapter.
854411 Other electric conductors, for a voltage not exceeding 80 V—fi  tted with connectors
854419 Other electric conductors, for a voltage not exceeding 80 V—other
854420 Other electric conductors, for a voltage exceeding 80 V but not exceeding 1,000 V—fi  tted with connectors
854441 Electric conductors fi  tted with connectors, for a voltage not exceeding 80 V, other than those of subheadings 8544.20 
and 8544.30
854449 Electrostatic photocopying apparatus—operating by reproducing the original image directly onto the copy (direct 
process)
854451 Other photocopying apparatus—incorporating an optical system
854459 Insulated electric conductors, for a voltage exceeding 80 V but not exceeding 1,000 V, not fi  tted with connectors
854460 Apparatus for the projection or drawing of circuit patterns on sensitized semiconductor materials—direct write-on-
wafer apparatus
854470 Apparatus for the projection or drawing of circuit patterns on sensitized semiconductor materials—step and repeat 
aligners
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8545 Apparatus for the projection or drawing of circuit patterns on sensitized semiconductor materials—other
8546 Electrical insulators of any material
8547 Insulating fi  ttings for electrical machines, appliances, or equipment, being fi  ttings wholly of insulating material apart 
from any minor components of metal incorporated during molding solely for purposes of assembly, other than 
insulators of heading 85.46; electrical conduit tubing and joints thereof, of base metal lined with insulating material
8548 Waste and scrap of primary cells, primary batteries and electric accumulators; spent primary cells, spent primary 
batteries and spent electric accumulators; electrical parts of machinery or apparatus, not specifi  ed or included else 
where in this chapter
900110 Optical fi  bers, optical fi  ber bundles and cables, other than optical fi  ber cables made up of individually sheathed fi  bers
900120 Sheets and plates of polarizing material
900190 Lenses (including contact lenses), prisms, mirrors and, other optical elements of any material, unmounted, other than 
those of glass not optically worked  and of subheadings 9001.30 to 9001.50
9002 Lenses, prisms, mirrors and other optical elements, of any material, mounted, being parts of or fi  ttings for instruments or 
apparatus, other than such elements of glass not optically worked
9006 Photographic (other than cinematographic) cameras; photographic fl  ashlight apparatus and fl  ashbulbs other than 
discharge lamps of heading 85.39
9007 Cinematographic cameras and projectors
9008 Image projectors, other than cinematographic; photographic (other than cinematographic) enlargers and reducers
900911 Electrostatic photocopying apparatus, operated by reproducing the original image directly onto the copy (direct 
process)
900912 Electrostatic photocopying apparatus, operated by reproducing the original image via an intermediate onto the copy 
(indirect process)
900921 Photocopying apparatus incorporating an optical system, other than those of subheadings 9009.11 and 9009.12
900991 Automatic document feeders for photocopying apparatus incorporating an optical system or of the contact type and for 
thermocopying apparatus
900992 Paper feeders, photocopying apparatus and thermocopying apparatus
900993 Sorters for photocopying apparatus incorporating an optical system or of the contact type and for thermocopying 
apparatus
900999 Parts and accessories of photocopying apparatus (incorporating an optical system or the apparatus of the contact type) 
and thermocopying apparatus, other than automatic document feeders, paper feeders and sorters
901010 Apparatus and equipment for automatically developing photographic ( including cinematographic) fi  lm or paper in rolls 
or for automatically exposing developed fi  lm to rolls of photographic paper
901041 Apparatus for the projection or drawing of circuit patterns on sensitized semiconductor materials, direct write-on-water 
apparatus, not specifi  ed or included elsewhere in this chapter
901042 Apparatus for the projection or drawing of circuit patterns on sensitized semiconductor materials, step and repeat 
aligners, not specifi  ed or included elsewhere in this chapter
901049 Apparatus for the projection or drawing of circuit patterns on sensitized semiconductor materials, not specifi  ed or 
included elsewhere in this chapter
901050 Other apparatus and equipment for photographic (including cinematographic) laboratories, negatoscopes
901090 Other instruments and apparatus—for measuring or checking semiconductor wafers or devices
901110 Stereoscopic microscopes
901120 Other optical instruments and appliances—for inspecting semiconductor wafers or devices or for inspecting 
photomasks or reticles used in manufacturing semiconductor devices
901180 Other optical instruments and appliances—other
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901190 Parts and accessories for compound optical microscopes, including those for microphotography, micro cinematography 
or micro projection
901210 Microscopes other than optical microscopes and diff  raction apparatus
901290 Parts and accessories for microscopes other than optical microscopes; and diff  raction apparatus
901390 Liquid crystal devices not constituting articles provided for more specifi  cally in other headings; lasers, other than laser 
diodes; other optical appliances and instruments, not specifi  ed or included elsewhere in this chapter
901410 Direction-fi  nding compasses
901480 Other instruments and appliances
901490 Parts and accessories for direction-fi  nding compasses and other navigational instruments and appliances excluding 
those of electrical instruments and apparatus
9015 Surveying, hydrographic, oceanographic, hydrological, meteorological, or geophysical instruments and appliances, 
excluding compasses; rangefi  nders
9016 Balances of a sensitivity of 5 cg or better, with or without weights
901710 Drafting tables and machines
901720 Drawing, marking-out, or mathematical calculating instruments, other than drafting tables and machines
901780 Drawing, marking-out, or mathematical calculating instruments other than drafting tables and machines, micrometers, 
calipers, and gauges
901790 Parts and accessories for drawing, marking-out or mathematical calculating instruments; parts and accessories for 
instruments for measuring length, for use in the hand 
901812 Ultrasonic scanning apparatus
901819 Electrodiagnostic apparatus (including apparatus for functional exploratory examination or for checking physiological 
parameters), other than those subheadings 9018.11 to 9018.14 and parts thereof
9023 Instruments, apparatus and models, designed for demonstrational purposes, unsuitable for other uses
9024 Machines and appliances for testing the hardness, strength, compressibility, elasticity or other mechanical properties of 
materials
9025 Hydrometers and similar fl  oating instruments, thermometers, pyrometers, barometers, hygrometers and psychrometers, 
recording or not, and any combination of these instruments
9026 Instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking the fl  ow, level, pressure or other variables of liquids or gases, 
excluding instruments and apparatus of heading 90.14, 90.15, 90.28 or 90.32
9027 Instruments and apparatus for physical or chemical analysis; instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking 
viscosity, porosity, expansion, surface tension, or the like; instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking 
quantities of heat, sound, or light; microtomes
9028 Gas, liquid, or electricity supply or production meters, including calibrating meters thereof
9029 Revolution counters, production counters, taximeters, mileometers, pedometers, and the like; speed indicators and 
tachometers, other than those of heading 90.14 or 90.15; stroboscopes 
903010 Instruments and apparatus for measuring or detecting ionizing radiations
903020 Cathode-ray oscilloscopes and cathode-ray oscillographs
903031 Multimeters; instruments and apparatus, for measuring or checking voltage, current, resistance or power, without a 
recording device
903039 Instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking voltage, current, resistance or power, without a recording device 
(excluding multimeters), other than those of subheadings 9030.10 and 9030.20
903040 Instruments and apparatus, specially designed for telecommunications, other than those of subheadings 9030.10 to 
9030.39
903082 Instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking semiconductor wafers or devices, other than those of 
subheadings 9030.10 to 9030.40
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903083 Other instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking electrical quantities, with a recording device 
903090 Parts and accessories of instruments and apparatus for measuring or checking electrical quantities, excluding meters of 
heading 90.28; parts and accessories of instruments and apparatus for measuring or detecting ionizing radiations
9031 Measuring or checking instruments, appliances and machines, not specifi  ed or included elsewhere in this chapter; 
profi  le projectors
9032 Automatic regulating or controlling instruments and apparatus
9033 Parts and accessories (not specifi  ed or included elsewhere in this chapter) for machines, appliances, instruments or 
apparatus of chapter 90
910111 Wrist watches with mechanical display only, with case of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal
910112 Wrist watches, electrically operated with optoelectronic display only, with cases of precious metal or of metal clad with 
precious metal
910119 Wrist watches, electrically operated, with case of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal, other than those 
of subheadings 9101.11 and 9101.12
910191 Electrically operated pocket watches and other watches, including stopwatches, with case of precious metal or of metal 
clad with precious metal
910211 Electrically operated wrist watches with mechanical display only, whether or not incorporating a stopwatch facility, 
other than those of heading 91.01
910212 Electrically operated wrist watches with optoelectronic only, whether or not incorporating a stopwatch facility, other 
than those of heading 91.01
910219 Electrically operated wrist watches, whether or not incorporating a stopwatch facility, other than those of heading 91.01 
and of subheadings 9102.11 and 9102.12
910291 Electrically operated pocketwatches and other watches, including stopwatches, other than those of heading 91.01
910310 Electrically operated clocks with watch movements, excluding clocks of heading 91.04
910511 Alarm clocks, electrically operated
910521 Wall clocks, electrically operated
910591 Clocks, electrically operated, not specifi  ed or included elsewhere in this chapter
910811 Electrically operated watch movements, complete and assembled, with mechanical display only or with a device to 
which a mechanical display can be incorporated
910812 Electrically operated watch movements, complete and assembled, with optoelectronic display only
910819 Electrically operated watch movements, complete and assembled other than those of subheadings 9108.11 and 
9108.12
910911 Electrically operated clock movements, complete and assembled, of alarm clocks
910919 Electrically operated clock movements, complete and assembled, other than those of alarm clocks
940510 Chandeliers and other electric ceiling or wall lighting fi  ttings, excluding those of a kind used for lighting public open 
spaces or thoroughfares, excluding those of base metal
940520 Electric table, desk, bedside or fl  oor-standing lamps
940530 Lighting sets of a kind used for Christmas trees
940540 Electric lamps and lighting fi  ttings, nes
940560 Illuminated signs, illuminated name-plates and the like
940592 Parts of lamps and lighting fi  ttings, of plastics; parts of illuminated signs, illuminated name-plates and the like, of 
plastics
940599 Parts of lamps and lighting fi  ttings, nes.; parts of illuminated signs, illuminated name-plate and the like, nes
950410 Video games of a kind used with a television receiver
(continued on next page)111
Table E6     Goods to be included in an electronic/electrical goods sector initiative (continued)
Code Description
950490 Articles for funfair, table, or parlor games, including pinball tables, billiards, special tables for casino games and 
automatic bowling alley equipment, other than those of subheadings 9504.10 to 9504.40
961210 Typewriter or similar ribbons, inked or otherwise prepared for giving impressions, whether or not on spools or in 
cartridges
Source: WTO (2008c).










States Brazil China India
Current applied rates
All 22 countries 2.34 3.08 2.91 2.72 4.23 2.29 1.64 2.01 2.97
Developed (7) 1.24 1.11 0.86 1.37 2.27 1.17 0.27 1.05 1.45
Developing (15) 7.02 6.47 7.19 6.26 7.87 5.13 5.10 7.22 8.55
European Union 0.85 1.64 0.68 … 2.31 2.31 0.25 0.27 2.22
Japan 0.04 0.40 0.08 0.09 … 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.95 1.06 1.09 1.53 1.82 … 0.11 1.82 0.08
Brazil 11.23 12.83 9.36 13.90 13.06 13.06 … 13.98 13.44
China 6.62 9.29 8.46 7.47 7.49 7.39 5.99 … 6.46
India 6.38 8.19 9.31 6.74 6.32 6.66 9.51 6.62 …
Post-modality applied rates
All 22 countries 1.79 2.33 2.27 2.04 3.02 1.68 1.27 1.57 2.17
Developed (7) 0.87 0.80 0.61 1.04 1.56 0.83 0.25 0.73 1.05
Developing (15) 5.47 4.97 5.73 4.84 5.92 3.98 4.03 6.38 6.34
European Union 0.62 1.17 0.54 … 1.53 1.53 0.18 0.20 1.47
Japan 0.03 0.26 0.05 0.06 … 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.64 0.74 0.66 1.09 1.11 … 0.07 1.11 0.06
Brazil 9.13 10.72 7.85 10.96 10.61 10.61 … 10.96 10.85
China 4.57 6.06 5.99 4.84 4.84 4.81 4.05 … 4.25
India 5.73 8.03 8.87 6.12 5.72 6.05 7.79 6.02 …
Notes: Tariff  s are the simple average of 2008 (for most countries) applied tariff  s on all traded tariff   lines in each bilateral relationship. Applied tariff  s from 
2007 are used for Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Applied tariff  s from 2006 are used for Thailand. For Brazil 2008 applied tariff  s are used except for on 
imports from India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2007 applied tariff  s are used. For India 2008 applied tariff  s are 
used except for on imports from Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2007 applied tariff   are used. For Indonesia 
2007 applied tariff  s are used except for on imports from India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2006 applied tariff  s are used. 
For Mexico 2008 applied tariff  s are used except for on imports from Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2006 ap-
plied tariff  s are used. See table E6 for product coverage. Aggregate tariff  s are weighted by total 2007 imports for each country in the group.
Sources:  UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.112










States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 22 countries 9.94 0.69 0.30 1.31 2.31 0.92 0.01 1.88 0.04
Developed (7) 0.48 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.00
Developing (15) 0.97 0.49 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.01
European Union 1.71 0.07 0.01 … 0.45 0.28 0.00 0.28 0.02
Japan 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 … 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 1.39 0.11 0.07 0.19 0.22 … 0.00 0.81 0.00
Brazil 0.53 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.02 … 0.16 0.00
China 3.58 0.30 0.12 0.49 1.03 0.21 0.00 … 0.01
India 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.05 …
Percent increase from current electronics trade
All 22 countries 0.59 1.03 0.78 0.75 1.17 0.47 0.15 0.48 0.81
Developed (7) 0.59 0.53 0.35 0.62 0.85 0.42 0.05 0.48 0.26
Developing (15) 1.82 1.68 1.84 1.62 2.19 1.21 0.77 1.54 5.09
European Union 0.50 0.56 0.08 … 1.40 0.57 0.01 0.23 0.92
Japan 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.01 … 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.40 0.81 0.61 0.46 0.69 … 0.00 0.67 0.00
Brazil 2.33 2.09 5.01 3.15 2.54 2.54 … 3.67 2.78
China 1.16 3.01 2.91 1.73 1.76 1.09 3.53 … 1.72
India 1.41 0.03 0.00 1.30 1.19 2.11 2.96 0.60 …
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.113










States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 22 countries 45.38 3.79 1.69 6.99 8.78 4.36 0.12 8.62 0.21
Developed (7) 1.68 0.76 0.38 0.34 0.17 0.20 0.00 0.27 0.02
Developing (15) 6.10 3.03 1.31 1.36 1.02 0.54 0.02 0.59 0.05
European Union 4.66 0.30 0.05 … 1.17 0.89 0.00 0.90 0.07
Japan 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 … 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 4.03 0.33 0.24 0.80 0.66 … 0.00 2.03 0.00
Brazil 4.42 0.27 0.12 1.02 0.17 0.17 … 1.04 0.02
China 14.86 1.18 0.43 1.93 3.76 0.77 0.01 … 0.03
India 2.09 0.30 0.00 0.65 0.13 0.18 0.01 0.50 …
Percent increase from current electronics trade
All 22 countries 2.69 5.68 4.38 3.98 4.44 2.20 2.10 2.19 3.86
Developed (7) 2.03 2.02 1.38 2.35 2.75 1.95 0.66 1.93 1.75
Developing (15) 11.46 10.39 11.73 11.54 10.71 8.39 7.77 14.07 18.66
European Union 1.36 2.59 0.44 … 3.63 1.81 0.08 0.74 3.21
Japan 0.02 0.34 0.14 0.03 … 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 1.15 2.48 1.99 1.99 2.03 … 0.04 1.69 0.03
Brazil 19.40 22.32 26.94 23.71 22.02 22.02 … 23.10 23.91
China 4.84 11.80 10.53 6.77 6.40 3.92 12.03 … 8.38
India 7.22 14.84 0.00 9.53 9.08 7.19 20.96 5.86 …
Sources:  UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.114
Table E10     Additional increase in electronic/electrical goods trade from sectoral tariff   cuts above










States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 22 countries 35.45 3.10 1.39 5.68 6.47 3.43 0.11 6.74 0.16
Developed (7) 1.19 0.56 0.28 0.25 0.12 0.16 0.00 0.20 0.01
Developing (15) 5.13 2.54 1.10 1.17 0.81 0.46 0.02 0.52 0.04
European Union 2.96 0.24 0.04 … 0.72 0.61 0.00 0.62 0.05
Japan 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 … 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 2.63 0.22 0.16 0.62 0.44 … 0.00 1.22 0.00
Brazil 3.89 0.24 0.10 0.89 0.15 0.15 … 0.87 0.02
China 11.28 0.88 0.31 1.44 2.73 0.55 0.01 … 0.02
India 1.68 0.30 0.00 0.56 0.11 0.13 0.01 0.45 …
Percent increase from current electronics trade
All 22 countries 2.10 4.65 3.60 3.23 3.27 1.73 1.96 1.71 3.05
Developed (7) 1.45 1.50 1.04 1.73 1.90 1.52 0.62 1.44 1.48
Developing (15) 9.64 8.71 9.89 9.93 8.52 7.18 7.00 12.53 13.57
European Union 0.86 2.03 0.35 … 2.24 1.25 0.08 0.51 2.28
Japan 0.01 0.22 0.09 0.02 … 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.75 1.67 1.38 1.52 1.34 … 0.03 1.02 0.03
Brazil 17.06 20.23 21.93 20.56 19.48 19.48 … 19.43 21.13
China 3.68 8.79 7.62 5.04 4.64 2.83 8.50 … 6.67
India 5.81 14.81 0.00 8.24 7.89 5.08 18.00 5.27 …
Sources:  UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.115
APPENDIX F ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS 
Th   ere is no set deﬁ  nition of what constitutes an “environmental good.” For our calculations we use a list 
developed by the World Bank (2007) (table F1). Products related to solar power, wind power, heating/
cooling, and natural gas dominate the list.
Th   ere is a large disparity between applied tariﬀ  s on environmental goods in developed and 
developing countries. Th   e average applied tariﬀ   in the seven developed countries in this study is 1.24 
percent, while the average applied tariﬀ   in the 15 developing countries is 7.02 percent (table F2).  Th  e 
average developing-country tariﬀ   is brought up by the high average tariﬀ  s in the three main developing 
countries—Brazil (11.74 percent), China (9 percent), and India (8.47 percent). After the modality cuts, 
China experiences the largest cuts in applied tariﬀ  s, in large part because of the small amount of “water” 
between its bound and applied tariﬀ  s (table A3). Under a sectoral initiative we assume all tariﬀ  s on 
environmental goods go to zero.
Tables F3 to F5 show the increase in trade following the modality and sectoral tariﬀ   cuts. Th  e 
impact of the modality cuts is small. Th   e total increase in world exports is only $1.45 billion, and 
more than half of this goes into US and Chinese imports (increases of $0.33 billion and $0.58 billion, 
respectively). Th   e impact of the sectoral initiative is much larger: World exports of environmental 
goods would increase by $7.78 billion. Th   is increase is widely dispersed as no one bilateral relationship 
experiences a trade increase above $1 billion. In percentage terms, the environmental goods imports of all 
three main developing countries increase more than 10 percent over their current levels in most of their 
bilateral relationships.1 
1. While all of the percentage impacts on Brazilian, Chinese and Indian imports shown in table F4 are above 10 percent, 
some of the underlying bilateral relationships that make up “developed (7)” and “developing (15)” do not experience 
increases above 10 percent.116
Table F1     List of environmental goods
Code Description
392010 PVC or polyethylene plastic membrane systems to provide an impermeable base for landfi  ll sites and protect soil under 
gas stations, oil refi  neries, etc. from infi  ltration by pollutants and for reinforcement of soil
560314 Nonwovens, whether or not impregnated, coated, covered, or laminated: of manmade fi  laments, weighing more than 
150 g/m2 for fi  ltering wastewater
701931 Thin sheets (voiles), webs, mats, mattresses, boards, and similar nonwoven products
730820 Towers and lattice masts for wind turbines
730900 Containers of any material, of any form, for liquid or solid waste, including for municipal or dangerous waste
732111 Solar driven stoves, ranges, grates, cookers (including those with subsidiary boilers for central heating), barbecues, 
braziers, gas rings, plate warmers, and similar nonelectric domestic appliances, and parts thereof, of iron or steel
732190 Stoves, ranges, grates, cookers (including those with subsidiary boilers for central heating), barbecues, braziers, gas-
rings, plate warmers, and similar nonelectric domestic appliances, and parts thereof, of iron or steel
732490 Water saving shower
761100 Aluminum reservoirs, tanks, vats and similar containers for any material (specifi  cally tanks or vats for anaerobic 
digesters for biomass gasifi  cation)
761290 Containers of any material, of any form, for liquid or solid waste, including for municipal or dangerous waste
840219 Vapor generating boilers, not elsewhere specifi  ed or included (nesoi), hybrid
840290 Superheated water boilers and parts of steam generating boilers
840410 Auxiliary plant for steam, water, and central boiler
840490 Parts for auxiliary plant for boilers, condensers for steam, vapor power unit
840510 Producer gas or water gas generators, with or without purifi  ers
840681 Turbines, steam and other vapor, over 40 MW, not elsewhere specifi  ed or included
841011 Hydraulic turbines and water wheels of a power not exceeding 1,000 kW
841090 Hydraulic turbines and water wheels, parts, including regulators
841181 Gas turbines of a power not exceeding 5,000 kW
841182 Gas turbines of a power exceeding 5,000 kW
841199 Gas turbine parts nesoi
841581 Air conditioning machines nesoi, incorporating a refrigerating unit and valve for reversal of the cooling/heat cycle
841861 Heat pumps, other than air conditioning machines of 8415
841869 Refrigerating or freezing equipment, nesoi
841919 Solar boiler (water heater)
841940 Distilling or rectifying plant
841950 Solar collector and solar system controller, heat exchanger
841989 Machinery, plant, or laboratory equipment whether or not electrically heated (excluding furnaces, ovens, etc.) for 
treatment of materials by a process involving a change of temperature
841990 Medical, surgical, or laboratory stabilizers
848340 Gears and gearing and other speed changers (specifi  cally for wind turbines)
848360 Clutches and universal joints (specifi  cally for wind turbines)
850161 AC generators not exceeding 75 kVA (specifi  cally for all electricity-generating renewable energy plants)
850162 AC generators exceeding 75 kVA but not 375 kVA (specifi  cally for all electricity-generating renewable energy plants)
(continued on next page)117
Table F1     List of environmental goods (continued)
Code Description
850163 AC generators exceeding 375 kVA but not 750 kVA (specifi  cally for all electricity-generating renewable energy plants)
850164 AC generators exceeding 750 kVA (specifi  cally for all electricity-generating renewable energy plants)
850231 Electric generating sets and rotary converters, wind-powered
850680 Fuel cells that use hydrogen or hydrogen-containing fuels such as methane to produce an electric current, through an 
electrochemical process rather than combustion
850720 Other lead acid accumulators
853710 Photovoltaic system controller
853931 Discharge lamps, (ex ultraviolet), fl  uorescent
854140 Photosensitive semiconductor devices, including photovoltaic cells whether or not assembled in modules or made up 
into panels, light-emitting diodes
900190 Mirrors of other than glass (specifi  cally for solar concentrator systems)
900290 Mirrors of glass (specifi  cally for solar concentrator systems)
903210 Thermostats
903220 Manostats
Source: World Bank (2007); US International Trade Commission Interactive Tariff   and Trade Dataweb, http://dataweb.usitc.gov, 2009..118










States Brazil China India
Current applied rates
All 22 countries 3.27 3.08 2.91 3.27 5.28 2.75 2.11 2.41 3.98
Developed (7) 1.24 1.11 0.86 1.37 2.27 1.17 0.27 1.05 1.45
Developing (15) 7.02 6.47 7.19 6.26 7.87 5.13 5.10 7.22 8.55
European Union 1.59 1.64 0.68 … 2.51 2.51 0.33 0.37 2.46
Japan 0.26 0.40 0.08 0.40 … 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 1.23 1.06 1.09 1.62 1.92 … 0.04 1.90 0.04
Brazil 11.74 12.83 9.36 12.78 12.72 12.72 … 13.67 13.34
China 9.00 9.29 8.46 9.29 9.18 9.31 7.09 … 9.48
India 8.47 8.19 9.31 8.22 8.16 8.23 11.76 8.23 …
Post-modality applied rates
All 22 countries 2.49 2.33 2.27 2.52 3.90 2.09 1.69 1.98 2.94
Developed (7) 0.87 0.80 0.61 1.04 1.56 0.83 0.25 0.73 1.05
Developing (15) 5.47 4.97 5.73 4.84 5.92 3.98 4.03 6.38 6.34
European Union 1.15 1.17 0.54 … 1.79 1.79 0.32 0.35 1.76
Japan 0.17 0.26 0.05 0.26 … 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.79 0.74 0.66 1.20 1.18 … 0.03 1.15 0.03
Brazil 9.82 10.72 7.85 10.65 10.68 10.68 … 11.26 11.33
China 6.04 6.06 5.99 6.07 6.01 6.07 5.08 … 6.13
India 8.24 8.03 8.87 8.06 8.01 8.05 10.33 8.08 …
Notes: Tariff  s are the simple average of 2008 (for most countries) applied tariff  s on all traded tariff   lines in each bilateral relationship. Applied tariff  s from 
2007 are used for Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Applied tariff  s from 2006 are used for Thailand. For Brazil 2008 applied tariff  s are used except for on 
imports from India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2007 applied tariff  s are used. For India 2008 applied tariff  s are 
used except for on imports from Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2007 applied tariff   are used. For Indonesia 
2007 applied tariff  s are used except for on imports from India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2006 applied tariff  s are used. 
For Mexico 2008 applied tariff  s are used except for on imports from Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, where 2006 ap-
plied tariff  s are used. See table F1 for product coverage. Aggregate tariff  s are weighted by total 2007 imports for each country in the group.
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.119










States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 22 countries 1.45 0.69 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.02
Developed (7) 0.48 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.00
Developing (15) 0.97 0.49 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.01
European Union 0.10 0.07 0.01 … 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Japan 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 … 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.33 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.03 … 0.00 0.06 0.00
Brazil 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 … 0.02 0.00
China 0.58 0.30 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.00 … 0.01
India 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 …
Percent increase from current environmental goods trade
All 22 countries 1.07 1.03 0.78 1.07 1.67 0.72 0.44 0.73 1.30
Developed (7) 0.59 0.53 0.35 0.62 0.85 0.42 0.05 0.48 0.26
Developing (15) 1.82 1.68 1.84 1.62 2.19 1.21 0.77 1.54 5.09
European Union 0.40 0.56 0.08 … 0.50 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.54
Japan 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.12 … 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.96 0.81 0.61 0.91 1.34 … 0.04 1.15 0.00
Brazil 2.71 2.09 5.01 2.26 2.69 2.69 … 6.90 2.34
China 3.07 3.01 2.91 2.92 2.93 3.92 3.17 … 9.33
India 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 1.82 0.02 …
NAMA = nonagricultural market access
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.120










States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 22 countries 7.78 3.79 1.69 1.71 1.19 0.75 0.02 0.85 0.07
Developed (7) 1.68 0.76 0.38 0.34 0.17 0.20 0.00 0.27 0.02
Developing (15) 6.10 3.03 1.31 1.36 1.02 0.54 0.02 0.59 0.05
European Union 0.42 0.30 0.05 … 0.08 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.01
Japan 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 … 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.90 0.33 0.24 0.24 0.08 … 0.00 0.20 0.00
Brazil 0.54 0.27 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.03 … 0.09 0.01
China 2.28 1.18 0.43 0.50 0.48 0.17 0.00 … 0.02
India 0.79 0.30 0.00 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.15 …
Percent increase from current environmental goods trade
All 22 countries 5.74 5.68 4.38 6.45 7.58 4.40 4.54 4.74 5.37
Developed (7) 2.03 2.02 1.38 2.35 2.75 1.95 0.66 1.93 1.75
Developing (15) 11.46 10.39 11.73 11.54 10.71 8.39 7.77 14.07 18.66
European Union 1.78 2.59 0.44 … 2.17 3.81 0.26 0.11 2.69
Japan 0.25 0.34 0.14 0.32 … 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 2.67 2.48 1.99 3.07 3.26 … 0.26 3.90 0.02
Brazil 23.73 22.32 26.94 24.30 26.39 26.39 … 32.78 28.70
China 12.02 11.80 10.53 12.48 10.64 14.59 13.13 … 24.19
India 15.78 14.84 0.00 15.40 13.95 13.60 26.25 17.78 …
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.121
Table F5     Additional increase in environmental goods trade from sectoral tariff   cuts above modality










States Brazil China India
Increase in billions of dollars
All 22 countries 6.32 3.10 1.39 1.42 0.93 0.62 0.02 0.72 0.05
Developed (7) 1.19 0.56 0.28 0.25 0.12 0.16 0.00 0.20 0.01
Developing (15) 5.13 2.54 1.10 1.17 0.81 0.46 0.02 0.52 0.04
European Union 0.33 0.24 0.04 … 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.01
Japan 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 … 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.58 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.05 … 0.00 0.14 0.00
Brazil 0.48 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.02 0.02 … 0.07 0.01
China 1.70 0.88 0.31 0.38 0.35 0.12 0.00 … 0.01
India 0.78 0.30 0.00 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.15 …
Percent increase from current environmental goods trade
All 22 countries 4.66 4.65 3.60 5.39 5.91 3.67 4.10 4.01 4.07
Developed (7) 1.45 1.50 1.04 1.73 1.90 1.52 0.62 1.44 1.48
Developing (15) 9.64 8.71 9.89 9.93 8.52 7.18 7.00 12.53 13.57
European Union 1.38 2.03 0.35 … 1.67 2.99 0.26 0.11 2.14
Japan 0.16 0.22 0.09 0.20 … 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 1.71 1.67 1.38 2.16 1.92 … 0.23 2.75 0.02
Brazil 21.02 20.23 21.93 22.05 23.70 23.70 … 25.88 26.36
China 8.95 8.79 7.62 9.56 7.71 10.67 9.96 … 14.86
India 15.73 14.81 0.00 15.37 13.94 13.59 24.43 17.76 …
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS Database via WITS (2009); authors’ calculations.